# Ethical Ontology, Volume II

## The Sacred Economy

Alessio Montaruli
INSTITUTE FOR ETHICAL ONTOLOGY

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# ETHICAL ONTOLOGY, VOLUME II

## The Sacred Economy

ALESSIO MONTARULI

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# Imprint and Deposits



This volume is the second of the **Ethical Ontology** series and the doctrine's first preregistered out-of-sample historical trial. Its procedural and evidential apparatus is published separately, in full, as the open-access **Trial Record** (see **On the Trial Record**, below).

**Governing prior deposits.** **Ethical Ontology, Volume I: The Modal Coincidence**, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21721619 · **Positive No-Ground: The Common and the Locus of Answerability**, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21628405 · **Out-of-Sample Trial Preregistration** V1.1, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21744060 · **Episode Registries Parts II–VI** V1.1, concept DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21744435 (version DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21802467) · **Title-Location Collateral Audit Protocol** V1, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21802344 · **Volume II Book Plan** V8.2, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21802523 · **Hypothesis-Emergence and Later-Test Protocol**, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21843024 · **Arrival Declaration — The Imperium–Actus Hypothesis** V1.10 with **Integration Ruling**, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21860046 (concept DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21860045) · binding Errata, DOIs 10.5281/zenodo.21860688 and 10.5281/zenodo.21860687. All deposits carry persistent identifiers and timestamps; the registration of the trial protocol, the episode sample, and the collateral audit protocols precedes the episode verdicts.

# On the Trial Record

This Reading Edition is accompanied, at publication, by a separate open-access **Trial Record**. The book carries the historical argument, the source discussions, the findings, and the refusals in prose. The Record carries the machinery by which those findings can be checked: the registered sample; the protocols and deposit records; source grades; controls and defeaters; verdict tables; collateral audits; emergence records; integration and version history; stable claim cross-keys; and the freeze hashes of the book, the Record, and the archived full-apparatus masters. The masters remain public provenance, not a concealed third authority. After publication, the controlling pair is this Reading Edition and the deposited Record.

The trial's public sequence is fixed by four deposited instruments:

- **Out-of-Sample Historical Trial Preregistration V1.1**, version DOI `10.5281/zenodo.21744060`;
- **Episode Registries, Parts II–VI, V1.1**, version DOI `10.5281/zenodo.21802467`;
- **Title-Location Collateral Audit Protocol V1**, version DOI `10.5281/zenodo.21802344`; and
- **Hypothesis-Emergence and Later-Test Protocol V1**, version DOI `10.5281/zenodo.21843024`.

The completed Trial Record will be cited at 10.5281/zenodo.21877854. Its chapter keys allow a reader to move from a sentence or note in the book to the evidence status, maximum claim width, contrary, verdict, and governance path that support it. Nothing in the book asks methodological trust in place of that check.

One later arrival must be disclosed here because it affected governance without entering the trial. The Imperium–Actus hypothesis complex arrived during drafting, outside the registered sample. It was not opened under the deposited Emergence Protocol and was routed to Volume III by the Integration Ruling of 9 August 2026. Chapters 11–17 were drafted under declared knowledge of that arrival. No claim from the routed complex altered a Volume II reconstruction, contrary, emphasis, or registered verdict, and no Volume III finding may retro-modify one. The Arrival Declaration and Integration Ruling are deposited together at version DOI `10.5281/zenodo.21860046`.

# How to Read This Volume

This book is a history conducted as a trial, and its claim to honesty is procedural rather than tonal. Before any historical verdict was reached, three things were fixed and publicly deposited with timestamps: the instruments to be tested, the sample of episodes on which they would be tested, and the conditions under which they could lose. The chapters then report what happened — including where the book's own instruments were cut down by the evidence, where its governing conjectures were rejected, and where the sources simply did not bear the weight a question required.

The reader will therefore meet five kinds of outcome, and should expect all of them. A claim may be **confirmed** — always together with a statement of what a contrary finding would have looked like. A claim may be **restricted** — shown to be true at a narrower width than asserted, with the restriction printed and returned to the doctrine. A question may remain **undecided** after honest trial. The instruments themselves may **fail**. And a question may go **untried**, because the evidence does not reach it — an evidential limit, reported as such, and never converted afterwards into support for anything. The findings of this volume are mixed, and their mixture is the result: across the episodes, the same questions recur, but the findings do not.

Two editions exist. This Reading Edition carries the history and the argument in ordinary prose. The **Trial Record**, deposited separately and open to all, carries the apparatus in full: the protocols, the registered sample, the verdict tables and their exact widths, the audits, the negative results, the complete version history of every chapter, and the record of every loss. Nothing in this book asks to be trusted without it. The reader who wants the history can stay with the book; the reader who wants to check the trial can hold the book to the Record — which is what it is for.

One last expectation should be set exactly, because the whole volume converges on it. The test at the centre of this book — whether anything jointly authorises the whole field, terminates the question of right, and stands immune from the interrogation it applies — is conjunctive, and its conjunctivity has a consequence: a record in which no candidate establishes all three marks awards the seat to no occupant, and proves no vacancy. This book ends on that distinction, deliberately, and earns it one dated case at a time.

# Note on Texts, Translations, and Dates

Translations are the author's unless otherwise attributed; the editions, manuscripts, inscriptions, and papyri cited stand at the identities and locators given in the notes and, in full, in the Trial Record, together with the translation controls consulted. Contested sources are used at the width their status warrants and are marked as contested where they appear. Contemporary web pages and proceedings are cited as captured on stated dates — principally 8 August 2026 — and every such claim is a claim about the captured state; the captures, hashes, and reverification records are preserved in the Trial Record. The volume's evidence closes at its stated capture and search dates; nothing after them is silently incorporated.

# PART I — ACCESS

Three chapters open the volume: a question, a kit, and a road. Nothing in them classifies a historical case.

# Chapter 1 — Living Inside the Folds

## 1.1 A Tuesday

A courier's morning, in a city of the European Union, in the present tense of this book's writing. This is a composed scene, not reportage: it gathers documented features of platform work to open the question, depicts no individual and no company, belongs to no case in this book's historical sample, and returns no verdict.

She logs in at 6:41 because the morning block carries a reliability bonus. The app opens to a sentence: **Your account is under review. You will be notified.** There is no second sentence. The work she planned to do has not been prohibited; it has been made unavailable, which forbids nothing and prevents everything. She taps **Support**. The reply is instant, warm in tone, and generated: her case has been received; her case matters; a decision will follow. It does not say what the case is. Days later — the rent unmoved, the instalment on the bike unmoved, the bonus threshold now unreachable for the month — a second sentence arrives: **Following review, your account has been reactivated. We apologise for any inconvenience.** No reason is given for the restriction or the restoration. Nothing in the grammar accounts for what happened between the two messages. Everything between them has been paid for by her.

Now watch the scene under two questions.

**Where did the cost fall?** The answer is comparatively exact: lost working time, foregone earnings, a missed instalment, uncertainty carried through several days. Each cost lands in one finite life. It may have consequences for others, but it does not become less hers by being shared.

**Where did the answer terminate?** The messages do not let us say. They acknowledge a case and announce an outcome, but they do not identify the reason for the decision, the party to whom it is attributable, or the place at which a challenge would receive a determinate answer. We must be precise about that limit. The silence does **not** prove that no such place exists. The platform may itself sustain one through authorised organs, records, and procedures; nothing in our approach denies that possibility. Nor does the lack of a named individual show that an institution has failed to answer. What the scene discloses is an asymmetry of access: the cost is available at the grain of a finite life, while the answer-side is returned as an outcome without an attributable route.

That asymmetry is not invented from nothing. A directive of the European Union on platform work requires Member States to ensure that decisions restricting, suspending, or terminating a platform-work account, or imposing equivalent detriment, are taken by a human being; and, within its scope, it likewise requires them to ensure an intelligible explanation, access to a competent and authorised contact person, written reasons for specified consequential decisions, and review followed by a sufficiently precise and adequately substantiated reply.[1] The directive is evidence neither that every platform arrangement has the structure of our scene nor that a human contact is the only possible terminus for an answer. Its narrower significance is enough: the Union legislator judged the distance among decision, explanation, review, and affected working life serious enough to require express institutional routes across it.

The same provisions supply the illustration's contrary shape — what the morning would have looked like in a world this book has no quarrel with. The message would identify reasons; a designated contact could discuss the facts; the decision would be attributable under a humanly overseen procedure; review would return a substantiated reply; and, where rights had been infringed, rectification or compensation would follow. The contrary does not imagine a world without error. It imagines an error whose route remains findable and whose answer can be contested. The distance between the two versions of the morning gives this volume access to its question. It does not answer it in advance.

## 1.2 One Question Asked Twice

The two questions just asked belong together, and the discovery that their answers can be pulled apart is where this volume begins.

**Who pays?** has an accounting sense: on whom does the cost fall — the fee, the loss, the wait, the risk, the exhaustion, the morning? It also has an answerability sense: where does the relevant answer terminate — who or what institution can be asked, under what standing, for which decision or duty, and at which point does further forwarding cease to preserve whose answer is required?

These senses need not name the same person, and their mere difference is often harmless or even admirable. A victim may bear a cost while another party answers for causing it; an institution may answer through an organ while compensation reaches someone elsewhere. Such difference is frequently the very achievement of answerability. The divergence that concerns this book is something else. It appears when finite cost remains locatable while the relevant answer is absorbed, indefinitely forwarded, or rendered immune within a promoted form. And even then, divergence is a diagnostic entrance, not a sufficient verdict: the sourced case and the governing test received in the next chapter must still support the classification.

At the width earned by the opening scene, the volume's governing sentence can now be stated:

> **In the sacred economy, "who pays?" is one question asked twice: where does the cost fall, and where does the answer terminate. The fold appears where finite cost remains locatable while the corresponding answer is absorbed, indefinitely forwarded, or rendered immune within a promoted form.**

The canonical carries its own width: it does not classify every separation of cost-bearer and answerer — only the arrangement in which a locatable cost faces an answer that no longer terminates anywhere.

Volume II uses **fold** without qualification for that arrangement. The neutral and necessary carriage inherited from our predecessor work will be called the **sedimented fold** — the repetition, record, office, and transmission on which finite life depends. Without that lexical guard, the book would condemn the very things that make a life continuable.

Divergence is the **first appearance** of capture, not capture already proved. The composed scene displays the question's face. Whether a treasury, a mint, a council, a monetary arrangement, or a modern exhibit satisfies the received test is left to sourced reconstruction, controls, contrary results, and verdicts capable of going against our own instruments. Chapter 1 opens the question; it classifies no case.

The distinction fixes the tone as well. Diagnosis is not denunciation. No structural result requires malice, a conspiracy, or a single culprit. Polite automated replies can be designed to reduce distress; thresholds can answer to real fraud; institutions can aggregate because scale requires aggregation; workers can depend on and value the service whose procedures they contest. None of this defeats inquiry. It prevents inquiry from replacing a trace with a villain. Fault, benefit, negligence, and deliberate design remain possible findings where evidence and attribution support them. They are not assumed by the word **fold**.

## 1.3 The Folds, and Why No One Is Behind Them

The present is dense with candidate forms: index, brand, institution, nation, model, protocol, promise, market. They are routes through which work is allocated, value recorded, conduct coordinated, commitments maintained, and decisions carried. Each has forms of continuation; none is therefore an archic fold. Continuity is necessary to any record, promise, office, or institution worthy of the name. The question is what happens when continuation comes to authorise the field, terminate the question of right, and remain exempt from the interrogation directed at everything else — while finite costs are made to travel elsewhere.

This volume names the inventory once and refuses the tour. Each candidate could sustain its own study, and the temptation of the present is the panoramic diagnosis that visits every institution and returns with a theory of universal fallenness. Our sample is narrower. The modern material returns in dated and bounded exhibits near the far end of the book. The civic candidates — Nation and Class — are not tried here at all: their dossier has been set aside whole, under explicit governance, so that atrocity-adjacent evidence and competing historiographies receive specialist treatment rather than an opening chapter's gesture.[2] Non-examination is not exoneration, condemnation, or a verdict of any kind. It is a claim-edge.

One conviction remains load-bearing for everything ahead:

> **The fold has no foldmaster.**

This does not mean that no one designs systems, benefits from them, makes decisions, conceals information, or incurs responsibility. It does not turn institutions into weather. It denies a different figure: the single hidden subject whose intention would explain the whole arrangement and whose exposure would complete the analysis. A founder is not thereby a foldmaster; a beneficiary is not thereby an author; an occupant is not thereby the source of the seat; and a person who acts through a system does not cease to be attributable merely because the system exceeds that person's design.

Folds are traced through routes, defaults, records, incentives, permissions, offices, and continuities. The trace may reach finite agents, authorised organs, beneficiaries, and institutional termini. It may also find distributed maintenance, inherited procedure, or consequences no participant intended in full. What it may not do is invent a master to save itself the work of differentiation. The refusal of the foldmaster is therefore no courtesy to power. It is the condition of exact accountability: identify what was done, by whom or by which institution, under what authority, for whose benefit, at whose cost, and where the relevant answer became non-forwardable.

## 1.4 The Register of Cost

The normative register is stated once here so that later chapters need not smuggle it into their historical descriptions.

The costs this book will document are not only quantities. Where the record shows payment, deprivation, sanction, exhaustion, exile, or loss borne by finite whos, their worth is not generated by the act of counting. Worth is disclosed rather than derived; the failure to derive it licenses no denial of it; and disclosed worth commands nothing by itself. Obligations arise, where they arise, under determinate relations of address, standing, attribution, benefit, undertaking, and duty.

The series carries one normative instrument, avowed and non-derived:

> **No finite who is normatively reducible to an expendable carrier of an ownerless manner, common condition, public form, institution, route, or promise.**

The postulate makes no historical finding. It does not turn every cost into a wrong: costs can be chosen, reciprocated, shared, justified, contested, or repaired. Nor does it permit the historian to infer reduction from suffering alone. Its office is narrower and firmer. Where sources establish that a finite who is organised as expendable carriage for a promoted form, the postulate identifies the normative commitment under which this book refuses that reduction. Whether the sources establish it, which relation makes an answer due, and where the answer terminates remain separate questions.

The order is therefore strict: source before structure; structural classification only through the received test; normative avowal neither hidden nor allowed to manufacture the result. A continuous indictment would be a sermon with footnotes, and sermons are among the forms whose costs this book examines. The restraint lets documented costs retain their own weight.

## 1.5 What We Bring

Two completed works stand behind this volume, and the reader is owed a plain account of what each supplies.

**Positive No-Ground** supplies the grammar of answerability: address, claimant-standing, attribution, and the localisation of an answer. Answers may travel through deputies, records, offices, procedures, and technical systems. Under determinate conditions they reach a point beyond which another forwarding would no longer carry the same answer but change whose answer it is. That indexed terminus is the **locus**. An institution may sustain one through organised continuity and authorised organs without becoming a second lived subject. The predecessor also supplies the sedimented fold — the necessary carriage through which judgments, practices, roles, records, and prior answers remain usable beyond their first enactment. Its critique begins only where carriage usurps the answering or claiming place.[3]

Volume I supplies the **who**: not a bearer beneath a life, a soul-substrate, or a bundle of capacities, but the whole modal coincidence obtaining as someone. Ownness is what distinguishes the category; non-vicariousness is what distinguishes ownness. The finite cost in the opening scene is not exact because the courier owns a private manner. It is exact because another may perform the same shared practice without living this participation vicariously as hers. Yet the who is not the locus. Who-hood does not decide where an indexed answer terminates, and institutional locushood does not manufacture a who.[4]

Volume I also closes on a refusal this volume inherits:

> **The hinge does not command.**

The ontological articulation of the who issues no norm by itself and occupies no archic office. Volume II therefore asks a historical question rather than drawing a deduction: what happens when a condition, public form, institution, model, promise, or claimed divine form is promoted into the office that authorises, terminates, and exempts — and when finite whos carry the cost of that promotion? The episodes ahead may confirm our instruments, restrict them, leave a question open, defeat them, or supply no trial at all. Nothing in the inheritance decides their answers beforehand.

## 1.6 Classification, Not Unmasking

An opening chapter is a contract. This one has two terms.

First, the book will not unmask. Unmasking treats the surface as a lie and the analyst's revelation as the hidden truth: the treasury is **really** an elite purse; the council is **really** power; the market is **really** the temple continued. Such claims may occasionally be supported by evidence, but **really** is not a method. It tempts the analyst to install a constant beneath differences and to exempt the revelation from the interrogation it directs elsewhere. This volume will instead keep what the sources establish separate from what our instruments read in them; it will mark repetition without claiming descent; it will date contemporary claims; it will print material contests rather than average them; and it will say **not tried here** wherever the sources do not bear the required weight.

Second, the book will classify and date. Six event-forms — capture, severance, tether, release, refusal, repair — are a closed vocabulary, not a plot, a sequence, or a guarantee that one of them must apply. Each classification must be earned from a case's own grain and may fail. Dating is equally conditional on the record. Institutions, contests, sanctions, releases, and repairs will be dated as closely as the sources permit; where they cannot be dated or distinguished at the required grain, the book will print the limit rather than manufacture a calendar. Every claim of timelessness or inevitability will be asked for its paperwork.

The reader now holds the question, the tone, the inheritance, and the promise. What the reader does not yet hold is the kit: the exact instruments by which twenty-five centuries of material may be read without piety or hostility deciding the verdict, the controls that can defeat a classification, and the safeguards that prevent a later discovery from rewriting the trial that produced it. That is the next chapter's work. Nothing in the historical sample proceeds without it.

[1] Directive (EU) 2024/2831 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on improving working conditions in platform work, OJ L, 11 November 2024; in force from 1 December 2024; national transposition due by 2 December 2026. The Directive supplies the contrary's institutional form; it is not asserted as the law governing the composed scene. (ELI: data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/2831/oj), especially arts 10(5), 11(1)–(3), 29(1), 31; art. 11(5) limits the human-review provision for persons who are also business users under Regulation (EU) 2019/1150. Verified 8 August 2026; cited to establish the legal response and the answer-routes it requires, not to classify any platform practice or to offer legal advice.

[2] The civic-modal question — whether a nation or class can be a *who* of a regional kind — remains open in this series and is deliberately not prejudged by a compressed treatment here; the reasons, and the research programme that receives the dossier, are set out in the Trial Record.

[3] *Positive No-Ground: The Common and the Locus of Answerability* (DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21628405), especially chs. 9–13 and the Conclusion.

[4] *Ethical Ontology, Volume I: The Modal Coincidence* (DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21721619), especially the ownness settlement, the who/locus distinction, and the Conclusion.

# Chapter 2 — The Instruments

## 2.1 The Borrowed Kit

Before a coin is weighed, a formula parsed, or a council dated, we owe the reader the kit and its provenance. None of its first-order instruments is made in this chapter. **Positive No-Ground** supplied the grammar of answerability before the series had completed its account of the who. Volume I supplied that account and ended by refusing the who an archic office. Volume II adds history, classification, dated verdicts, and a controlled trial. It adds no doctrine in place.

That dependency runs in one direction. No result of Volume I waits on what we find here. If the historical record restricts or defeats an imported instrument, the restriction is a result: it is printed, and returned to the doctrine's own seat, never repaired silently inside historical prose. A history conducted with received instruments owes two things: to use them at the scope in which they were received, and to report every point at which the record prevents their intended use.

The mismatch between instrument and field is deliberate. The apparatus was completed and tested before this historical sample was assembled — through trials among finite living whos and hard cases chosen to strain it, from machines to the dead. This volume takes that apparatus into sacred property, sanctuary finance, coinage and mint, temple severance, **religio**, Constantinian scaling, monetary untethering, and dated modern exhibits. The episodes did not generate the instruments that read them; the method, the episode set, its boundaries, and its principal source classes were fixed publicly before any verdict.[5] Item-level selection within those registered bounds remained historical work and is reported in the Record. That is the exact independence claimed here: not an untouched sacred region, but the first preregistered out-of-sample historical trial of a completed doctrine. One rule of use governs everything:

> **The order of the book is the order of the argument.**

We install no thesis about religion, capitalism, modernity, secularisation, technology, or political theology and then seek illustrations. We state the instruments and the conditions under which they can lose; we enter the cases; we let each case return only the verdict its evidence permits.

## 2.2 Two Grammars, One Refusal

Two grammars arrive from the predecessor works, and their independence from one another is the first discipline.

From **Positive No-Ground** comes the **grammar of answerability**. An answer can be carried through deputies, records, offices, and procedures; under determinate conditions it reaches a point past which another forwarding would no longer deliver the same answer but change whose answer it is. That terminus is the **locus**. Non-forwardability is a fact about an answer, not evidence of a soul; and an institution can be a locus — through organised continuity, records, procedures, and authorised organs — without a second lived subject standing behind it. This distinction governs the fiscal materials ahead. A temple formula may name a god as owner while treasurers receive, auditors examine, magistrates repay, and a civic body enforces. The formula, the property relation, the office, the public name, the claimed addressee, and the terminus of an answer are not one thing; and asking where an answer terminated decides nothing, by itself, about who — if anyone — was reached under the divine name.

From the same predecessor comes the distinction between necessary carriage and its capture. The **sedimented fold** is the temporal carriage through which inherited judgments, practices, roles, records, and prior answers remain usable beyond their first enactment; carriage is not a pathology. This volume reserves **fold**, without qualification, for the **archic fold**: an arrangement organised toward its own continuation at finite cost. Between carriage and capture stand usurpation — a carrier occupying the claimant's place — and impersonation — a carrier passing itself off as what it carries.

From Volume I comes the **who**: a common manner obtaining as this finite occurrence, wholly, with no bearer beneath the obtaining. Ownness distinguishes the category; non-vicariousness distinguishes ownness. And the separation this whole volume depends on follows: **the who is not the locus.** Who-hood does not determine where an answer terminates; locushood does not manufacture a someone. An institutional locus is not deficient because it discloses no one, and no accumulation of procedures yields a person.

The governing denial is the closing sentence of Volume I: **the hinge does not command.** The who is a hinge, not an authorising summit; nothing in ownness founds an order or claims the archic office. Volume I refused that office on the who's behalf. Volume II asks how other candidates were historically installed there.

## 2.3 One Name, Many Things

The word **sacred** gathers structures whose nominal unity proves no identity, and the historical chapters cannot proceed without holding them apart. An **ownerless sacred condition** — a manner held sacred that no one owns and no one is — is not a **perimetralised finite who** — someone who lived and died and stands under indelible having-been, addressable without present reception. Neither is a **public who-form** — the name, image, epithet, or title through which recognition is routed, which may carry recognition where no living occurrence goes, and which is not the one it presents. None of these is an **institutional locus** — the priesthood, treasury, board, or council at which an answer can terminate. Distinct from all four is the **properly divine claim** — that a god hears, owns, acts, receives, or answers — which historical evidence can establish as **inhabited** (enacted, funded, authorised, repeated, institutionally answered for) while establishing neither its truth nor its falsity. Whether some configuration — a city's cult, a people, an office — constitutes a **who of a regional kind** is a further question, a candidacy and not a verdict, and it gains nothing from scale, continuity, or mourning alone. And claims of passage — resurrection, apotheosis, return — are not another kind of being but a further claim-layer, carrying a burden no historical trial discharges.

The restraint is symmetrical and constant: names and forms manufacture no collective who, and the institutional analysis of a cult refutes no claimed addressee. Where later chapters find grief at the end of a cult or an office, that grief discloses loss and historical singularity; whether **someone** was there is a distinct question that mourning alone cannot answer.

## 2.4 The Test

The governing test of the whole volume is received, not invented here:

> **A candidate performs the archic function when it authorises the whole normative field, terminates the question of right, and stands immune to the interrogation it licenses against everything else.**

Authorisation, termination, and immunity are jointly required. No verdict follows from any one alone; and neither size, duration, solemnity, sanctity, coordination, technical complexity, nor social force establishes the function. A subordinate description helps us recognise a promotion when we see one — something made to command in its own name, authorise every application, organise finite lives toward its continuation, and receive whatever is forwarded until no finite, attributable answer-locus remains available — but the description decides nothing; the three marks govern. And one consequence of that joint requirement should be fixed now, before a single case is heard, so that the end of the book cannot outrun its beginning: because all three marks are required together, a trial that establishes fewer than three — or leaves one untested — establishes **no occupant**; and the absence of an established occupant is not a discovery of vacancy. If this book ends by awarding the seat to no one, that will be a statement about what its trials established, not a proof that the seat was empty.

Two compact formulas, defined here, will recur. **Idolatry = categorial collapse + archic promotion**: distinct strata collapsed under one name, and the collapsed result promoted into the office that must remain answerable and unoccupied — both parts required, since collapse without promotion is mere confusion, and promotion without collapse is capture of another kind. **Capture = divergence of cost-locus and answer-locus**: the two senses of **who pays?** coming apart — evidence of capture only where the test and the sources support it, never a shortcut around either. And the critique's target is fixed with its remedy: what this book opposes is archic promotion, never necessary carriage; **repair** is the restoration or transformation of routes and institutions for the sake of finite whos, without erasing attribution and without pretending the damage never occurred.

## 2.5 What the Historian May Not Do

The episodes ahead include expropriation, persecution, sacrifice, exhaustion, and abandonment, and **who pays?** is asked in a register exceeding accounting. So the normative position is stated once, without derivation from ontology: **worth is disclosed, not derived; the failure to derive it licenses no denial of it; and disclosed worth commands nothing by itself** — obligations arise relationally, under address and standing. With that doctrine travels the one avowed normative instrument of the series, already given in Chapter 1: no finite who is normatively reducible to an expendable carrier.

The working rule that follows is strict: **source before structure**. A payment, deprivation, sanction, loss, or burden must stand in the inscription, account, statute, narrative, or record at the strength that evidence warrants, before any structural reading touches it. The historian does not manufacture the wrongness; a structural sentence may not borrow the authority of a source citation; and where the material presents a practice as timeless or inevitable, we date the institution, the contest, the enforcement, or the sanction, and test the costume of eternity against the paperwork. Dating a promotion does not refute the practice it promoted; it returns the practice from claimed destiny to answerable history.

## 2.6 The Trial, and How It Can Lose

The reader should know exactly what kind of book stands under these instruments, because its claim to honesty is procedural, not tonal.

The historical sample — the episodes, their boundaries, their inclusion and exclusion criteria, and their principal source classes — was fixed and publicly registered before any verdict was reached, so that no case could be quietly added because it flattered the thesis or dropped because it resisted. The registry did not pretend to choose every inscription, coin, or document in advance; item selection remained answerable at chapter level. Every episode is asked the same six questions, in the same order: **What is promoted? What is collapsed? Which of the three marks are seized? Who pays — where does the cost fall, and where does the answer terminate? What restrained, severed, released, refused, or repaired the arrangement? And what would the contrary result have looked like?**

Five kinds of outcome are possible, and the reader will meet all of them. An episode may **confirm** an instrument — and every confirmation must state, in the body of the chapter, what a contrary finding would have looked like and what evidence prevented it; a confirmation that cannot name its own defeat did not test anything. An episode may **restrict** an instrument — show that it claims too much — and the restriction is printed and returned to the doctrine, never absorbed. A question may remain **undecided**. The instruments themselves may **fail** — by finding nothing where evidence was rich, by finding whos everywhere, or by bending to piety or hostility. And where the sources do not bear the required weight, the episode is **not tried**: an evidential limit, not a finding, and never converted afterwards into support for anything. Several chapters of this book return **not tried** for questions their readers may care about most. We count that among the book's results, not among its apologies.

Three further disciplines govern how outcomes are handled, and the reader may hold the book to them. An **undecided** question is a tried question: it is never quietly re-filed as untried, and the close never promotes it to a success or writes it off as a defeat. Wherever outcomes are counted, the unit of counting is named — an episode, a family of questions, and a single line of evidence are not interchangeable things to count, so the book reports how its results distribute rather than manufacturing percentages across unlike units. And the trial predicts no convergence: the findings may — and, the reader will discover, do — come out mixed, and a mixed return is the trial succeeding, not the book failing to make up its mind.

Two side inquiries run beside the main trial, each sealed off from it so that no discovery in one can quietly move the other. One asks, case by case, where the warrant by which something counts is located — a question that will be explained in context when the book first meets it, and one on which most cases will honestly return nothing. The other governs what happens if, in the middle of the work, the history itself suggests a new idea: a trial whose instruments were fixed in advance cannot let a mid-trial discovery rewrite the cases that produced it, so any such idea is recorded, dated, quarantined from the chapters that suggested it, and permitted to earn standing only against untouched material registered before it existed — or not at all. That rule binds the author above all: an idea arriving from the author's own desk, outside the registered sample, opens nothing in this volume, whatever its merits, and the procedural register closes with a public row recording the refusal. A method that cannot say no to its own author is not a method. Neither inquiry may alter a primary verdict.

## 2.7 The Trial Record

At publication, this book will be accompanied by the separate, open-access **Trial Record** identified in the front matter. It contains in full the procedural and evidential apparatus summarised in this chapter: the protocols and their deposit records, the registered sample, the verdict tables, the audits, the controls and defeaters, the integration and version history of every chapter, and the record of every restriction this book's own instruments suffered at the hands of its evidence. The Record is citable on its own and keyed to this book chapter by chapter 10.5281/zenodo.21877854. Nothing in what follows asks to be trusted without it. The reader who wants the history can stay with the book. The reader who wants to check the trial can hold it to the Record — which is what it is for.

What remains before the first coin is the road: what a case is, what our six event-words mean, how repetitions can be compared without becoming a genealogy, and why this book's line through history is particular and says so. That is the next chapter, and then the sample opens — where the instruments meet evidence that owes them nothing, and acquire, for the first time, the chance to lose.

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[5] The registration is public and prior: the trial protocol, the episode sample, and the further audit protocols were deposited open-access, with persistent identifiers and timestamps, before the verdicts they govern. The front matter identifies the deposited instruments; the Trial Record itemises their dates, versions, scopes, and relation to each verdict lane.

# Chapter 3 — Episodes, Not Genealogy

## 3.1 A History Without a Plot

The instruments have been declared; the question is now the road. This volume moves from Athenian silver to conciliar canons, from **religio** to fiat money, from a temple courtyard to a deployment pipeline. A book crossing some twenty-five centuries under one title owes the reader an account of what holds the crossings together.

Several familiar answers supply more than an order: they supply a plot. A descent narrative makes the later form the transformed heir of the earlier, so that the present becomes the past under another name. A decline or progress narrative gives the sequence a direction and lets the direction carry the verdict. A history of a hidden constant lets power, capital, religion, or the sacred itself persist beneath changing appearances. These forms differ, and none is dismissed merely for having reach. What this volume refuses is to receive any of them in advance as the rule by which its cases must become one history.

The refusal follows from the trial's design. Capture is tested as the divergence of cost-locus and answer-locus, case by case, within a sample whose units and sources were fixed before any verdict. Nothing in that diagnostic establishes that one capture descends from another. Nor does the no-foldmaster thesis license a master subject in the past tense. A fold is traced through routes, offices, records, incentives, permissions, defaults, and continuities. To install a single hidden historical subject behind those organisations would forward the explanation away from the very places it is meant to find.

This is not a refusal of chronology, local causation, transmission, or historical explanation. An episode may show why a particular arrangement arose, persisted, broke, or was repaired. A source may establish that a later institution received a formula, office, practice, or technique from an earlier one. What is refused is the conversion of resemblance into ancestry, sequence into destiny, or a series of local explanations into one subject's career.

What holds the volume together is therefore neither a lineage nor a constant but a question asked repeatedly under fixed conditions: **what was promoted, what was collapsed, which archic marks were seized, who paid, and what — if anything — restrained, severed, released, refused, or repaired the arrangement?** The order of the book remains the order of the argument. The instruments accumulate; verdicts do not. The cases can be compared; their causes are not concatenated unless the sources themselves warrant the connection.

## 3.2 What Counts as an Episode

An **episode** is the unit at which historical material is reconstructed and a verdict returned, and its grain is not chosen afresh by each chapter: it was fixed when the sample was registered — sometimes a bounded case, sometimes a family of dated events requiring separate sub-verdicts, sometimes a structural entry, and near the end of the book a dated contemporary exhibit. The common word does not make those units homogeneous. It binds the writer to the grain at which each was registered.

Four things make such a unit workable. An episode is **historically bounded**: it has a period, place, object, source class, and testability condition proper to it — and the discipline against timelessness applies first to our own prose, since an event described as timeless, necessary, or already complete in what came later has been converted into a plot before any instrument touches it. An episode is **evidentially answerable**: where the surviving record cannot carry the trial, the case returns **not tried** — never failure, and never an invitation to complete the record by analogy. An episode is **independent at the level of its verdict**: no earlier confirmation can make a later case confirm, and no later pattern can repair an earlier gap; instruments and questions travel, results do not. And an episode's description, its event-classification, and its verdict are three different acts, kept apart so that none can borrow the others' authority.

One requirement governs everything and deserves its own line:

> **An episode counts as a trial only if it can restrict the instrument.**

The requirement is counterfactual and evidential, not rhetorical. A confirming episode must be able to say what the contrary finding would have been, what it would have changed, and what evidence prevented it. If no such statement can be written, the material is illustrative and earns no confirmation. Registration does not guarantee that a record will permit a trial — which is exactly why **not tried** remains a distinct and honest outcome.

## 3.3 The Six Event-Types

The volume receives six event-words, and no chapter may add a seventh by local convenience: **capture, severance, tether, release, refusal, repair**. The list is closed as vocabulary, not as a sequence and not as a set of mutually exclusive boxes. An episode may contain several dated events; one event may sustain more than one classification only where the sources independently earn each. Co-occurrence is not succession, and succession is not descent.

**Capture** names the event-form diagnosed where cost and answer diverge: finite whos bear the cost while the answer is forwarded into the promoted form until no finite, attributable answer-locus remains available. The classification requires more than harm, hierarchy, institutional complexity, or imperfect accountability. It fails where the sourced answer still terminates at an identifiable finite place, or where no promoted form can be shown to occupy the archic office.

**Severance** names a dated parting of what a prior arrangement had joined. The sources must disclose the joint, the act or process of cutting, and the changed routing that follows. Severance says neither that the prior joint was good nor that what followed was emancipatory. It is not repair, release, or capture by implication.

**Tether** names a maintained institutional binding of distinguishable orders — economic and cultic, fiscal and sacral, monetary and civic — under identifiable practices, offices, or prohibitions. A tether can restrain capture and still exact finite cost; it can coexist with an archic fold; and it is not a sacred golden age. The classification fails where the joint is supplied by retrospective analogy rather than by the material, or where the alleged bond has no maintained institutional form.

**Release** names the dated loosening or discharge of a bond, restraint, obligation, or barred use under statable terms. It identifies what was let go, by whom or through which procedure, and with what consequences for the affected finite whos. Release is not by itself repair, emancipation, forgiveness, or vindication. It may relieve one cost while exposing another.

**Refusal** names a sourced non-compliance with, withdrawal from, or rejection of a demand, participation, or promotion. The demand, the refusing party, the act, and the cost must be locatable. Silence, absence, or later non-participation cannot be promoted into refusal without evidence of the refusing act.

**Repair** keeps the meaning it was given in the last chapter: the restoration or transformation of routes and institutions for the sake of finite whos, without erasing attribution and without pretending the damage never occurred. It is defeated in one direction by cleansing — rewriting the record as though nothing happened — and in the other by destruction presented as healing. A route may also simply be relinquished; letting an archic organisation lapse is not made into repair merely because its continuation ceased.

The typology classifies dated event-forms. It does not write the volume's plot in advance. Nothing in it requires tether to become capture, severance to produce release, refusal to precede repair, or repair to close an episode. Those sequences, if any, belong to the sources and dates of particular cases.

## 3.4 Repetition Without Descent

Across cases, this book allows itself one kind of comparative sentence freely: **the same received structure appears here and there** — a claim of **structural repetition**, made only after both ends of the comparison have been reconstructed from their own sources, and carrying, by deliberate design, no assertion of descent. Three inferences are blocked from resemblance alone: **transmission** (that the later configuration received the form from the earlier), **influence** (that the earlier shaped the later through an effective mediation), and **causal genealogy** (that a chain of efficacy connects the two across their transformations). Each of those is a perfectly admissible historical claim — and each must be established separately, by documents, reception records, institutional continuities, copied formulae, or named mediations, at the strength the evidence permits. Analogy supplies neither ancestry nor a presumption of ancestry; and the grand narrative sentence — that a sequence proves decline, progress, secular destiny, or a hidden constant — is barred unless independently argued at the corresponding historical scale, which this book nowhere attempts.

This discipline does not forbid asking why a structure recurs. It forbids answering the question with the recurrence itself. Within an episode, routes, incentives, offices, permissions, records, and conflicts may explain the organisation at issue. Across episodes, independently sourced common conditions may be compared. What may not happen is the slide from **we can describe the same structure twice** to **we have found one structure travelling through history**. The cost of the discipline is narrow: it gives up the explanatory comfort of an unsourced lineage, not historical explanation as such. A recurrence without shown contact remains a recurrence, unless and until transmission is documented. A documented line of reception is stated as reception. And a specific comparison may change status when new documents appear — the rule is satisfied, not defeated, by that correction, because its entire office is to keep structure and transmission apart.

## 3.5 The Neighbours

The nearest literatures earn their place here because each sees something this volume needs and each joins that seeing to a historical form this volume does not simply adopt. These engagements are boundaries of method, not verdicts on any of our cases.

**Schmitt.** The famous sentence in the third chapter of **Political Theology** says that all significant concepts of the modern doctrine of the state are secularised theological concepts. Schmitt's account joins a historical-sociological claim about their development to a systematic analogy: the omnipotent God and the omnipotent lawgiver, miracle and exception.[6] The strength of the intervention is its refusal to treat juridical concepts as self-contained. This volume refuses the universal form of the inference. A structural correspondence between theological and political-economic concepts becomes a candidate comparison only after both ends are sourced; historical transfer requires its own evidence. Schmitt's thesis may orient a question, but it cannot classify a case before the case is read.

**Benjamin.** The 1921 fragment "Capitalism as Religion" names capitalism a cult religion: without dogma, continuously celebrated, guilt-producing rather than atoning.[7] Its strength is diagnostic compression. It binds economy, cult, and cost without allowing capitalism's self-description to settle what it does. Its limit for this volume is equally exact: a fragment that proposes a comprehensive diagnosis does not supply the dated joints, source classes, case boundaries, or contrary results a controlled trial requires. We do not reject the diagnosis in advance; we refuse to count its reach as the historical work by which any case would confirm it.

**Löwith and Blumenberg.** Löwith reads modern philosophies of history through their transformation of Christian eschatological patterns; Blumenberg's reply denies that modernity's legitimacy is exhausted by secularisation and develops reoccupation and self-assertion as a different account of the transition.[8] The dispute matters here because both sides ask what follows when a position, question, or expectation appears across an epochal break. This volume takes no general verdict on the legitimacy of modernity. Against a substantial secularisation thesis, it does not infer a persisting theological content from structural resemblance. Against a general reoccupation thesis, it does not infer an epochal logic from the recurrence of a functional position. It asks the smaller questions first: what position was available; who or what occupied it; which warrant operated there; how costs and answers were routed; and whether a transmission can be shown. Repeated occupation may be written before the history is made to decide the metaphysics of an age.

**Agamben. The Kingdom and the Glory** traces **oikonomia** through Trinitarian government, providence, angelic administration, glory, and modern governance.[9] Its proximity to this book is not merely verbal: it makes economy and acclamation internal to a history of governing power, and treats signatures as capable of surviving transformations not reducible to simple identity. The boundary should not be caricatured as a dispute between continuity and discontinuity; it concerns evidential jurisdiction. In this volume, a signature or structural persistence can open a comparison; it cannot relieve the comparison of dating its cases, distinguishing their institutions, or sourcing any claimed mediation between them. Agamben's patristic citations, moreover, reach us at second hand, and nothing here rests on them as independently established patristic facts.

The resulting position is intentionally narrower than every neighbour's largest claim. This volume can confirm a local transmission without becoming a secularisation history, identify a reoccupied office without adopting an epochal theory of reoccupation, diagnose cultic capture without declaring one cult everywhere, and compare a signature without turning it into the subject of a descent.

## 3.6 The Boundary with Broken Hegemonies, and a Debt

Schürmann requires a section of his own, because the relation is double: a boundary in historical form, and a debt.

The boundary first. **Broken Hegemonies** reads Western history through hegemonic epochs governed by sovereign referents whose normative force orders the phenomena of an age until destitution breaks the arrangement.[10] This volume does not adopt that periodisation. Its units are episodes, not epochs; it need not show that an age has one dominant measure, that measures succeed one another as regimes, or that Schürmann's Greek, Latin, and modern divisions cut the material at the joints relevant to the sacred economy. Where one of our cases discloses a dominant measure, that result remains dated and scoped to the case.

The debt belongs to a different inquiry — the first of the two side inquiries described in the last chapter — and is recorded here without moving anything in the main trial. In Schürmann's account, the hegemonic fantasm **holds the warrant** under which singular beings enter an epoch's constituted world as particulars: it justifies what may appear, classifies and inscribes, and imposes the reigning sense of being — while producing nothing, and while remaining capable of losing its seat, whereupon the singular remains, available to count again under another warrant.

The present literature search has identified this as its first instance of **title-holding without conceptual isolation**: something counting on a warrant held elsewhere, exhibited by an author who never isolated the relation he was exhibiting — never separated the title from the holder's authority, never distinguished holder and beneficiary as two places in an allocation. He supplies the instance; the articulation belongs to this series. Three cautions travel with the debt: the holder of such a warrant need not be an entity or an agent — a regime of sense can occupy the seat; a usurped or forged title still has a location, since where a title sits and whether it is rightly held are different questions; and the instance licenses no descent — it classifies none of our cases and shows no later configuration inheriting the fantasm's structure. This volume declines Schürmann's map and receives his exhibit.

## 3.7 A Particular Line

One avowal completes the historical form. The route this volume follows — Athens and the Aegean sanctuaries, Rome, Jerusalem, the Constantinian Mediterranean, the Latin and European monetary worlds, and the selected contemporary exhibits — is **particular, not universal**. It was chosen because the sources and the case-design make that line available to a controlled trial. The choice does not assert that the history of the archic fold is Mediterranean or European, that the six event-words exhaust every sacred-economic history, or that an unsampled region repeats — or fails to repeat — the structures found here.

This limitation is not repaired by a paragraph of global comparanda. A non-Mediterranean case used only to ornament a conclusion drawn elsewhere would widen the rhetoric without widening the test. Other lines require their own source competence, their own registered samples, their own power to restrict the instrument. The sample's edges are the claims' edges: where the line itself contains a documented reception, the relation may be sourced; where it presents only a recurrence, recurrence is all that is said; and no modern configuration is called the inheritor of an ancient instrument merely because the two can be described in the same grammar. Non-examination licenses openness — not universality of either sign.

## 3.8 The Chance to Lose

What can this historical form actually do to the instruments it serves? At the level of a case: confirm, restrict, leave undecided, defeat, or find the record insufficient — with every confirmation naming its own possible defeat. At the level of the event-vocabulary: a repeated inability to classify otherwise well-sourced events would put pressure on the six words themselves, and that pressure would be reported as a finding about the instruments, not silenced by minting a seventh word on the spot. At the level of comparison: a documented transmission turns a resemblance into history; an undocumented one remains a resemblance unless and until transmission is documented. And at the level of the units: a registered family whose members cannot be told apart at the grain their verdict requires returns **not tried** — never a synthetic verdict assembled from its neighbours.

The road now needs its first encounter. Part II opens with material this volume inherits from its predecessor's own doorstep: the coin, the sacred mint, and the treasury of the god. There the instruments of these two chapters meet evidence that owes them nothing — and acquire, for the first time in this volume, the chance to lose.

[6] Carl Schmitt, *Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität* (1922), ch. 3; 7th ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996), p. 43; trans. George Schwab, *Political Theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 36.

[7] Walter Benjamin, "Kapitalismus als Religion" (1921), *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. VI, ed. Tiedemann and Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), pp. 100–103. The summary is confined to the fragment's own diagnostic claims.

[8] Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), chs. 1–2; Hans Blumenberg, *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966; rev. ed. 1988), Parts I–II; trans. Robert M. Wallace, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983). No legitimacy verdict is imported from their dispute.

[9] Giorgio Agamben, *Il regno e la gloria* (2007); trans. Lorenzo Chiesa, *The Kingdom and the Glory* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), chs. 1, 3, and 6.

[10] Reiner Schürmann, *Des hégémonies brisées* (Mauvezin: Trans-Europ-Repress, 1996); trans. Reginald Lilly, *Broken Hegemonies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), General Introduction.

# PART II — THE TETHERED ECONOMY: THE POLIS-JOINT IN METAL

**The Volume I deposit is opened here.** The predecessor closed its Delphi analysis with a sentence addressed to this book: “What sacred wealth bought, funded, and authorised, and at whose expense, belongs to the next volume and is deposited to it unopened.” Part II receives that deposit and begins at its most concrete surface: the coin.

# Chapter 4 — The Coin and the Sacred Mint

## 4.1 The Object on the Table

Begin with the object. A silver tetradrachm of Athens, of the classical series: on the obverse, the helmeted head of Athena; on the reverse, an owl, an olive sprig, a crescent, and three letters — ΑΘΕ. Roughly seventeen grams of silver, struck to a stable standard, it travelled through Mediterranean and Black Sea exchange, entered hoards, attracted imitations, and was sometimes cut to test its metal.[11] It is among the most recognisable manufactured objects of the ancient Mediterranean. It is also the predecessor's deposit made small enough to hold: divine image, civic legend, mined silver, regulated weight, and fiscal institutions impressed into one disc.

The face of the coin opens the question of this Part. The image is Athena's; the legend is civic; the silver came from extractive labour and a mine; the weight belonged to an administered standard; the coin's acceptance depended on practices extending beyond any one hand. None of those relations is yet an ownership verdict in the categorial sense. ΑΘΕ is conventionally read as the civic genitive, "of the Athenians." On this object the civic name and Athena's image are joined without becoming identical, and the abbreviation's visual proximity to the goddess's name supplies a structural crossing — without turning the legend into a lexical ambiguity, and without any assertion about what the die-cutter intended.

The chapter therefore does not ask the coin to contain its explanation. It reconstructs the institutional field in which Athenian silver was struck, tested, stored, lent, inventoried, converted, and answered for; it then distinguishes the strata gathered on the object and asks this book's fixed questions of the case. Rome supplies a second episode: divine types on Republican coins, Caesar's lifetime portrait, the posthumous **DIVOS IVLIVS**, and the bounded evidence for the Moneta mint–temple association. In each, the sources speak first; the structural reading follows; and the two results, as we shall see, refuse to be added together.

## 4.2 Athena's Silver

**The coinage.** Athens began striking silver coin in the sixth century. The owl types — Athena's head, owl and olive, ΑΘΕ — stabilised near the century's end and then persisted, with marked stylistic conservatism, for much of the next three centuries. The date and circumstances of the series' beginning remain contested, and we print the contest rather than settle it: the conventional account connected inception and expansion with Laurion silver and the fleet decision of the 480s; recent isotopic analysis separates the metal-source question from that later exploitation surge and leaves open whether the series began under the tyranny or the early democracy.[12] What the record securely supplies is a durable Athenian silver type, widely received beyond Athens and maintained by a civic order whose fiscal reserve and sacred treasuries were administered on the Acropolis.

**The making-good.** The law of Nikophon (375/4) — later than the chapter's fifth-century fiscal core, but the fullest surviving statement of the monetary testing machinery — stations a public tester, a **dokimastes**, "among the tables" each day. It requires acceptance of Attic silver when the piece is silver and bears the public stamp; orders plated or counterfeit pieces cut through, consecrated to the Mother of the Gods, and deposited with the Council; and supports the procedure with confiscation, graded jurisdiction, sanctions against a negligent tester, and a second tester in the Piraeus for merchants, seated by the stele of Poseidon.[13] One clause — the treatment of foreign coins of Attic type — remains textually disputed, and nothing below depends on resolving it.

The secure clauses show that monetary reliability was administered through public office, funded procedure, inspection, sanction, and record. They also show a specific sacred interface: the rejected counterfeit left circulation through consecration and civic deposit. The law is evidence for the fourth century and for the machinery it names; it is not projected clause by clause into earlier periods.

**The mint.** The place where the owls were struck has not been identified. The excavated building long called the Mint at the Agora's southeast corner is demonstrably a bronze-working mint from the fourth century onward; its excavators state plainly that the principal silver coinage was not struck there and that the **argyrokopeion** must be sought elsewhere.[14] The institution is nevertheless textually visible. Publicly funded mint-workers appear in Nikophon's law as the funding benchmark for the Piraeus tester, and a fourth-century reminting decree — known so far from a preliminary publication — places public slaves in the mint under appointed supervisors for the duration of a programme. No standing mint magistracy appears in the surviving constitutional survey of offices. The silver mint of Athens is therefore documentarily attested without a securely identified building.

**The sacred fiscal order.** Thucydides has Pericles inventory the city's war resources in 431: six hundred talents of annual tribute; six thousand talents of coined silver then on the Acropolis, from a maximum of nine thousand seven hundred; at least five hundred talents in uncoined gold and silver, private and public dedications, and sacred equipment; and the removable gold of Athena's statue — forty talents of refined gold, to be replaced in no smaller quantity if used in extremity.[15]

The constitutional survey identifies the human offices administering this joined wealth: ten treasurers of Athena, one allotted from each tribe, receiving the statue, the golden Nikai, equipment, and funds in the presence of the Council; sellers; receivers cancelling payments in the Council chamber; accountants for each prytany; auditors and assessors; and annual accountants before whom outgoing officials rendered account.[16] The records do not reduce the treasury to individual custody. They locate different acts at constituted offices whose authorised occupants and procedures made the acts attributable.

The Kallias decrees organise repayment of monies owed "to the gods," centralise sacred funds on the Acropolis, and constitute treasurers for the Other Gods alongside Athena's. Their date and internal order are a live scholarly matter: the conventional presentation dates two decrees to 434/3 and orders them A then B; a modern autopsy of the stone confirms the damaged prescript of face B and supports enactment under the same proposer and one-day chairman, while the proposed reversal of the faces and the refined date in spring 433 remain reconstructions rather than settled results.[17]

The fiscal traffic also ran from sacred treasury to civic expenditure. The accountants' records preserve state borrowing from Athena and the Other Gods, with principal and interest computed treasury by treasury; and at the end of the century, golden Nikai from the Acropolis were melted for emergency gold coinage — the latter carried here at the more guarded strength its evidence supports.[18] These operations did not erase the formulas under which the funds were kept. Borrowing, interest, replacement, and conversion were administered within them.

**The formulas.** Athenian usage distinguished sacred monies and the property of city and goddess. Plato's tyrant reaches first for **hiera chremata**, "sacred monies," if the city has them; Demosthenes pairs those who make away with the city's property and those who commit sacrilege against the goddess's.[19] The precise inscriptional distribution requires care — the fullest Attic parallel for "sacred monies" is a restored text, and Attic treasury documents often prefer neighbouring constructions such as "the monies of the gods" — but at the level warranted here, sacred property was a juridically distinct category: administered by boards, protected through special rules, lent under recorded obligations, and carried through inventories and handovers.

## 4.3 A Tether Without Capture

Athena’s name, head, owl, and civic-cultic iconography provide transmissible **public forms** through which the coin is recognised — forms that prove neither a divine someone nor a civic someone. Treasuries, testers, receivers, accountants, auditors, Council, Assembly, and courts are **institutional loci** carrying different indexed answers; their coordination does not turn them into one lived subject. Whether the Athenaic configuration — coin, cult, treasury, law, festival — constitutes a **who** of a civic or cultic kind may be posed as a question only under the inherited guards; this chapter neither fulfils nor defeats that candidacy, because coinage shows institutional enactment, not whohood. The formulas and practices presuppose a **properly divine claim** — that wealth can be Athena’s, that sacred funds can be owed and repaid, that consecration changes a coin’s standing; the claim is historically inhabited, and its truth or falsity is not established by the accounts. And the miners, enslaved workers where the evidence establishes them, public slaves, office-holders, merchants, tribute-payers, dedicators, and sanctioned officials belong to the historical configuration at the strength their sources support — they are not a seventh sacred stratum, and their costs may not be inferred from their mention alone. Two refusals complete the map: legally sacred property does not by itself disclose an ownerless sacred condition, since juridical consecration is not identical with the ownerless regional manner secured in Volume I; and nothing in the episode requires a perimetralised finite who among its operative seats.

The coin's crossed, non-proprietary genitive can now be stated precisely. The civic legend identifies the issuing community; the divine iconography presents Athena; neither relation says that coin, goddess, or city is an owner in the categorial sense. The phrase "property of the goddess," by contrast, does operate — as juridical and fiscal grammar: it affects administration, custody, permitted use, liability, account, and restitution. That operation neither proves divine possession as a categorial fact nor reduces the formula to decorative speech. The records locate actions and answers without deciding every addressee. Treasurers received; testers examined; accountants computed; civic bodies authorised; courts and audits supplied review. Those are institutional termini, not one common answerer; Athena's name and fiscal standing are load-bearing within the arrangement, and the arrangement's institutional completeness establishes neither the goddess's actuality nor her absence.

**What the record positively yields.** Athena's public form and juridical standing were repeatedly installed and maintained at the monetary-fiscal grain — elevation in the descriptive sense, with nothing showing that her form, the civic plural, or the coinage occupied the archic office. The sources themselves keep the layers apart: divine-property formulas, civic property, public offices, physical coin, and divine claim remain distinguishable throughout, and assembly, law, audit, and court remain visible routes of authorisation and challenge. That is not proof that every sacred claim was corrigible; it is the narrower finding that no candidate in this record authorises the whole field, terminates the question of right, and exempts itself. The record also names costs — tribute, debt, interest, replacement duties, sanctions, specific administrative liabilities — and identifies multiple termini at which indexed answers ended. But those two successes of localisation do not establish convergence: a cost-bearer need not be an answerer, and locatability alone neither proves nor defeats capture. The fuller allocation of costs belongs to the sanctuary-finance case two chapters ahead.

**The contrary, and why the record prevents it.** The contrary result would have been a monetary order in which sacred and civic layers remained institutionally separate at this grain: coinage administered without a sacred fiscal interface, sacred treasuries outside civic borrowing and audit, no documented passage between monetary regulation and consecration. The record forecloses it. Nikophon's law directs rejected coin into consecration and civic custody; the civic reserve is inventoried on the Acropolis beside dedications and sacred equipment; the city borrows from sacred treasuries under recorded obligations; the Kallias decrees join civic enactment to the organisation of divine funds; and the emergency conversion of the Nikai, at the guarded strength retained above, shows sacred metal entering coinage. Any one interface would require analysis; together they rule out a reconstruction of parallel, non-interlocking orders.

**The finding.** Against its registered contrary, the episode establishes a series of dated practices in which sacred and civic orders were institutionally **joined** in Athenian monetary practice — the event this book calls a tether. Two limits are the ones most likely to be forgotten. The result does not include capture, and it does not include the claim that cost and answer coincided: the tether is neither a golden age nor, on this evidence, an archic seizure. And the joining is established as a series of dated interfaces drawn from different fifth- and fourth-century materials — not as demonstrated continuous maintenance across the interval.

One dating observation closes the file. The classical owls retained archaic stylistic features long after other Athenian arts had changed: the coin's appearance of immemorial stability was materially manufactured, through repeated die-work. The record supports a connection between conservatism and recognisability; any stronger claim about the issuer's intention or the precise causal contribution to market trust remains exactly at the strength of the numismatic scholarship.[20]

## 4.4 Caesar's Face on the Coin

**Divine types.** Republican Roman money carried divine figures from its early issues: Janus, Jupiter, Roma, the Dioscuri, and later gods, ancestors, foundation scenes, and temples selected by the moneyers. Divine iconography belonged to the ordinary repertory of civic coinage; it did not by itself assign a living Roman's portrait to the money.[21]

**The lifetime portrait.** In 44 BCE, issues struck under the four moneyers Mettius, Buca, Macer, and Maridianus placed Caesar's portrait on denarii during his lifetime — the first such placement for a living Roman — under legends including CAESAR DICT QVART and CAESAR DICT PERPETVO. The series is secure at its edges and contested in its middle, and the contest is printed here as it stands: portrait issues through the **dictator perpetuo** group precede the Ides; the CAESAR IMPER and PARENS PATRIAE groups have been dated immediately after death in the standard catalogue and argued to be possibly or probably lifetime by later scholarship; the **Clementia** temple and veiled-Antony issues are post-assassination. Veiling is not by itself a posthumous marker, because veiled portraits occur within lifetime issues.[22]

**The divus legend.** Coins of 38 BCE name the dead dictator DIVOS IVLIVS and identify Octavian as DIVI F. Bronzes carry DIVOS / IVLIVS. By 36 BCE a coin presents the promised temple façade, DIVO IVL on the architrave, and the comet-star in the pediment.[23] The dated coinage therefore documents a change of public form and standing across a bounded sequence: established divine images on civic money; a living ruler's portrait and perpetual dictatorship; the dead ruler's image and **divus** title; the living successor's filiation from that title; and a temple represented on coin. The sequence does not show that coins caused apotheosis or that the divine claim arose from money. It shows coinage carrying, differentiating, and circulating claims made operative through a wider institutional process.

**Moneta.** The mint–temple relation is as strong, and as limited, as its sources. Livy places the temple and workshop — **aedes atque officina** — of Moneta on the former house-site of Manlius Capitolinus and dates the vow and dedication of Juno Moneta's temple on the Arx to 345–344. Cicero connects the epithet with divine warning; the Suda explains Moneta as "counsellor" and says Roman coin was ordained to be struck in her sanctuary. From the association, **moneta** entered the monetary vocabulary that eventually supplies our words for mint and money.[24] Modern assessment treats the association as literarily explicit and the topographic vicinity as reasonably secure; no mint building has been identified archaeologically; and no ancient source connects Juno Moneta's epithet with the Capitol's geese. Our claim closes at exactly that width: literary association, probable vicinity, archaeological non-identification, and no warrant for the later geese etymology.

## 4.5 A Date Inside Perpetuity

The Roman evidence is especially useful for separation because its stages can be dated without being turned into a necessary progression. Caesar lived and died: his finite having-been is not altered by a later legend. His portrait, name, offices, and titles travelled on coins before and after death: formal continuity establishes neither continued living presence nor same-who passage. DIVOS predicates divine standing of the dead Caesar, and DIVI F makes that standing available within a succession formula: the claim is historically operative without being decided, as true or false, by any coin. The moneyers and the constituted organs authorising coinage and honours are the kinds of institutional terminus this evidence may identify; the coin and the temple building are material routes or objects, not answer-loci merely because acts concern them; and we do not infer a complete institutional chain where the sources supply none. Apotheosis, temple, cult, and filiation inhabit a properly divine claim whose enacted public standing and whose categorial truth remain different questions.

The source sequence blocks two symmetrical reductions, and both controls fire. The divine title is not evidence that a divine someone has been established. And an institutional account of honours and coin production does not establish that the claim was empty or cynical.

**What the episode establishes — and what it leaves open.** Caesar's public form receives exceptional lifetime and posthumous standing: perpetual dictatorship, divine title, succession formula, temple representation. That is documented elevation; whether it is archic promotion remains the question. The coins bring finite ruler, portrait, offices, divine title, filiation, and temple into one monetary series, but because their dates and legends distinguish the stages, the evidence does not require their collapse. Coin evidence alone establishes none of the three archic marks — authorisation of the whole field, termination of right, immunity — and the wider machinery of decree, consecration, cult, and honours would have to be examined at its own source-grain before that question could be settled. The coin series likewise provides no sufficient distribution of finite costs and answer-termini for any capture verdict: silence at that grain is not convergence. And no restraint or repair is established by the coins; the influential status-and-honours interpretation of the divinisation evidence is an important negative control on an archic reading, not itself a sourced repair.[25]

**The strongest reading against an archic conclusion — and its own limit.** The registered contrary would show **divus** vocabulary functioning as bounded, contestable, institutionally conferred status or honour, never occupying the archic office. The status-and-honours scholarship supplies serious evidence in that direction, and the coins themselves show standing, succession, memory, and public cultic form without displaying the three marks. But the absence of those marks **from coin evidence** is not yet evidence that they were absent from the wider divinisation machinery. The contrary is live and partly supported; it is not established.

**The finding, at its exact width:** the episode demonstrates that finite ruler, transmissible form, institutional routes, passage claim, succession formula, and properly divine claim can be read separately — and it settles nothing about whether the divinised-ruler form occupied the archic office. **Undecided** is the verdict, and it is the only one; the stratum separation is a finding within the analysis, not a second verdict smuggled beside the openness.

The dating discipline has one exact word to add. PERPETVO was struck shortly before Caesar's death and continued to exist on coins after the office-holder was killed. The dated series bounds the style's claim without refuting every juridical meaning of **perpetuo**: the asserted perpetuity receives a date from the very objects that carry it.[26]

## 4.6 Two Coins, Two Results

The chapter closes on a discipline: its two results must remain non-cumulative. Athens returns a confirmation — sacred and civic orders institutionally joined in the registered monetary practice, the contrary of parallel non-interlocking orders foreclosed, with capture and cost/answer convergence expressly **not** returned. Rome returns an open question — public elevation and an inhabited passage claim secured at coin-grain, the wider archic question unsettled, the contrary live. The Athenian confirmation cannot make Rome confirm. Rome's openness cannot restrict the Athenian tether. The shared presence of divine form on money is a comparison available only after each file closes, and it establishes no descent between them.

The chapter also fixes its boundaries forward. The next chapter will ask whether coinage opened repeatable exchange among strangers through failable public making-good; this chapter has established relevant material — weight, stamp, testing, office, sanction, record — without returning that verdict in advance. The chapter after will ask what sanctuary wealth funded and at whose expense; this chapter has identified treasury, borrowing, interest, conversion, and liability without performing that cost allocation.

The coin moved because people accepted it; its acceptance was maintained through material and institutional practices that could succeed or fail. The next chapter asks what kind of common route that made available. The **dokimastes** is already seated among the tables — but his office has not yet answered the question.

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[11] Owl types, weight standard, circulation, hoards, imitations, and test-cuts: C. M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*; Peter van Alfen, "The Coinage of Athens," in W. E. Metcalf, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage* (2012), 88–104.

[12] The conventional Laurion/fleet chronology per Kraay and successors; the isotopic separation per Davis et al. 2025. Tyranny-versus-democracy inception remains unresolved.

[13] SEG 26.72 (R. S. Stroud, *Hesperia* 43 [1974], 157–188): acceptance and tester, ll. 3–8; counterfeits cut, consecrated, deposited, ll. 10–13; compulsory acceptance and confiscation, ll. 16–18; sanctions and jurisdiction, ll. 13–15, 23–36; the Piraeus tester by Poseidon's stele, ll. 37–55. The disputed foreign-coin clause is ll. 8–10 (Stroud's mandatory-tender reading against Matthaiou's test-cut restoration and Buttrey's non-legal-tender interpretation).

[14] J. McK. Camp II and J. H. Kroll, *Hesperia* 70 (2001): bronze function, 127, 139–160; the silver *argyrokopeion* to be sought elsewhere, 144. The 353 reminting programme: Agora I 7495 per Kroll, *Hesperia* 80 (2011), 239, 242 (preliminary publication). No mint magistracy in *Athenaion Politeia* 47–54.

[15] Thucydides 2.13.3–5 (Jones–Powell OCT).

[16] *Athenaion Politeia* 47.1–2, 48.1, 48.3–4, 54.2 (Kenyon).

[17] IG I³ 52: conventional order and dating per AIO; autopsy and same-day enactment per Lotz and Prignitz, *Chiron* 54 (2024), 131–197; the B-before-A order and spring 433 remain reconstructions.

[18] Loans: IG I³ 369. The melting of the golden Nikai and the exact attribution of the emergency issues are carried at the differentiated strengths of the underlying evidence.

[19] Plato, *Republic* 8.568d; Demosthenes 24.122. The restored Attic parallel is IG II² 1635, ll. 52–53; preserved non-Attic instances IG XII,7 515 and ID 1416.

[20] Deliberate archaism and durable types per Kraay and van Alfen.

[21] Michael Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage* (RRC), for the Republican repertory and the moneyers' commemorative turn.

[22] RRC 480 with Crawford I, 487–495; the contested middle chronology per Bernhard Woytek, *Arma et nummi* (2003), 414–435; veiled lifetime issues RRC 480/12–14.

[23] RRC 534/2, 535/1–2, 540/1–2; Crawford I, 535, 537.

[24] Livy 6.20.13, 7.28.4–6; Cicero, *De divinatione* 1.101; Suda μ 1220; A. Meadows and J. Williams, *JRS* 91 (2001), 27–28, 32 n. 30.

[25] Ittai Gradel, *Emperor Worship and Roman Religion* — used as a control against equating honours with archic office, not as a verdict on the entire divinisation machinery.

[26] The dated PERPETVO series against the assassination boundary and the posthumous issues; the audit dates the claim without treating Caesar's death as a semantic refutation of the constitutional title.

# Chapter 5 — Coinage as Common Possibility

## 5.1 Among the Tables

The previous chapter left a public tester seated among the bankers' and money-changers' tables. We return to him because his office makes several relations visible at once. In Athens in 375/4, the law proposed by Nikophon required acceptance of Attic silver when the piece was judged to be silver and bore the public stamp. The public **dokimastes** sat among the tables on ordinary days and in the Council chamber when public money was deposited. A plated, bronze-cored, lead-cored, or debased piece was cut through, consecrated to the Mother of the Gods, and deposited with the Council. A seller who refused a coin the tester approved forfeited the goods offered for sale that day. If the tester failed to sit or failed to test according to law, the public conveners imposed fifty lashes. In the Piraeus a second public slave served shipowners, merchants, and others by the stele of Poseidon; copies of the law stood at both sites; and the new tester's future pay was assigned from the same source as that of the mint-workers.[27]

The arrangement did not gather every monetary relation into one man. The tester judged coins under stated criteria; market officials and courts received different classes of dispute; the Council received rejected pieces; other officials arranged the Piraeus appointment and funding. The tester's body also bore a cost that cannot be redescribed as a virtue of the procedure. The law attributed a technical act and imposed a sanction — but sanction is not by itself proof of an open answer, and public accountability does not make enslavement just.

What the scene does show is narrower and sufficient for entry. A transaction between strangers could be interrupted by doubt about the token. Material, public sign, skilled examination, written rule, official placement, and routes of challenge made that doubt decidable for specified purposes. The office did not create every exchange it regulated. It supplied a public terminus within an exchange order already operating.

This chapter asks what kind of route coinage carried and extended. One exchange occurs between these parties now. Exchangeability names the repeatable route under which another suitable token may pass between other parties later. The route exceeds any transaction without floating above its carriers. Coins, scales, stamps, tests, habits, records, offices, and judgments sustain it in different ways. The historical question is therefore twofold: how did coinage carry exchange beyond one encounter, and what does the evidence permit us to say about the dependence of that route on public making-good?

## 5.2 Many Beginnings

**A plural beginning.** The earliest securely contextualised coinages in the western tradition are electrum, an alloy of gold and silver, struck in western Anatolia in the seventh century BCE. Herodotus preserves a fifth-century attribution of the first striking and use of gold and silver coin to the Lydians, whom he also calls the first retail traders known to him — evidence for a Greek historical tradition, not a signature identifying the issuers of every anonymous early electrum series.[28] The Artemision at Ephesus supplies the decisive archaeological context: coins, blanks, several denominations, and many types in sanctuary deposits whose key contextual horizon is argued at approximately 640–620 BCE. The assemblage yields no self-identifying first coin, no recoverable first mint, no documented first purpose.[29] And the material sharpens rather than settles the institutional question: early electrum varied in gold-silver composition, with deliberate alloy adjustment attested in the scholarship, so that visual inspection could not disclose exact intrinsic content — a condition that made weight, sign, reputation, assay, acceptance practice, and issuing authority all relevant, without proving which one first supplied confidence or why coinage began.

The origin explanations must therefore remain a map. Royal or civic control, issuer profit, stabilisation of electrum value, public payments, mercenary pay, sanctuary distribution, commercial convenience, and prestige gifts developing into payment each have defenders; each may illuminate a function or a local series; the surviving record does not identify one of them as the intention governing the entire beginning. Where, period, and material can be stated within the evidence's limits; issuer and purpose remain plural or unresolved. Later utility is not evidence of first intention.[30]

**Retrospective ancient theory.** Aristotle supplies a fourth-century account, not a contemporary report of seventh-century invention. In the **Politics**, exchange over distance leads traders to use a portable valuable; metal is first measured by size and weight, and later stamped so that repeated measurement becomes unnecessary. In the **Nicomachean Ethics**, money is a middle term and common measure of exchange, need is the underlying measure, and **nomisma** exists by convention rather than nature — such that those who use the convention can alter it and make it unusable.[31] These passages name features the historical record also requires us to analyse: portability, measurement, public sign, common measure, alterability. They do not retrospectively decide the beginning. The distance between the first electrum deposits and Aristotle's explanation is itself part of the evidence: his account shows one ancient theory of money already interpreting coinage through exchange and convention, and it cannot be used as a transparent report of the first issuers' motive.

**The Athenian public backstop.** The tester is already seated among the tables from the previous chapter; what matters here is the division of labour his law reveals. The criteria joined material and sign: a piece qualified for compulsory acceptance when judged to be silver **and** to bear the public stamp — while older, non-official practices of testing by cut, sight, touch, smell, and sound are independently attested at various dates and strengths. The disputed clause on foreign coins of Attic type stays open here. The bad piece left circulation by being cut through, consecrated, and deposited. Sanction ran in two directions: the refusing seller's goods, the derelict tester's flesh. Jurisdiction was graded, from named market officials to the courts above the law's monetary thresholds; and the Piraeus extension carried the machinery to the import-export setting.[32]

These components did not perform one function. Weight and material concern the token's physical profile; stamp concerns public identification; test concerns classification; office, jurisdiction, and record make acts and disputes traceable; consecration removes a rejected piece under a sacred-civic formula; sanction allocates consequences. The coin did not contain this machinery, and the machinery did not become one subject merely because one law coordinated it.

The limit is as important as the machinery. The law **presupposes** bankers, money-changers, foreign coin, private presentation, and substantial markets. It adds or restates a public approval route within practices already under way. The inscription therefore proves neither that the polis invented stranger exchange nor that every taking of coin required prior public approval. The Piraeus appointment may have widened access to a public backstop; it does not transform the backstop into the origin of every transaction.[33]

## 5.3 Route, Token, and Home

This section reads the reconstruction through the grammar received from **Positive No-Ground**. It adds no historical fact.

**Exchangeability without an autonomous realm.** A common possibility is a historically available and socially articulated route of intelligibility and enactment not enclosed within one bearer. Coinage fits that description at the level the sources permit. A token can be tendered again; a denomination can be recognised on another occasion; a practice of weighing, counting, testing, accepting, refusing, or challenging can be learned and repeated. No one transaction exhausts the route, and no holder encloses it by possessing a coin.

The distinction is between exchange and exchangeability — not between concrete money and an autonomous monetary realm. Exchangeability exists only through material and social carriage. Metal, shape, denomination, stamp, issuer-recognition, testing practice, market custom, record, office, and sanction need not be present in identical form at every time and place: they are heterogeneous carriers whose configurations differ. What extends beyond one polis is therefore not a fused super-institution. Coin types travel, are imitated, weighed, discounted, test-cut, accepted, or refused across overlapping routes; extension can occur through partial recognition and negotiated difference as well as through uniform rule.

The first electrum and the Athenian counterfeit disclose fallibility in different registers. Variable alloy makes value-assessment difficult; a plated piece defeats the material criterion while borrowing a public form; an imitation may contain good silver yet fail the compulsory-acceptance rule on one reading of the law. These are not one kind of failure. Nor does the existence of bad pieces create the common possibility. They show that finite carriage can fail, and that practices establish criteria for what counts as a usable token in a specified relation. A route carried through tokens and judgments is neither infallible nor self-validating.

**Making-good in several forms.** **Making-good** names several practices, not one, and the phrase earns its keep only if it is held narrow enough to keep them apart. A test-cut reveals a core; it does not itself answer a claim. A merchant's acceptance may rest on habit or reputation without identifying any public answer-place. A stamp can mark an issuing authority without guaranteeing every holder against loss. Public approval, by contrast, classifies a presented piece under a rule and routes a dispute through offices and courts. These practices can support the same exchange route without being interchangeable.

The Athenian law establishes answerable public making-good **for the acts it assigns**. The tester's determination, the officials' jurisdiction, the court route, the Council's custody, the appointment, the funding, and the inscribed law make specified deeds and answers traceable. That finding should not be widened into the proposition that all reliable exchange is public, or that every private technique already constitutes institutional answerability. The record instead displays a passage from distributed practices of assessment to a formal public backstop — while leaving the precise chronology and causal pressure of that passage open. The common can be carried technically, practically, and institutionally; only some relations become attributable at a terminus. Reliability and answerability may support one another, but they are not synonyms. A coin may pass because a taker recognises the type, trusts the presenter, discounts the risk, tests the metal, or expects recourse — and which ground operated in a particular taking must be shown; it cannot be supplied by the concept of exchangeability.

**The polis-joint and its homes.** The book's plan calls the coin the **polis-joint**: a portable common route with a necessary home and no proprietor. The formula is sound only if **home** is read functionally, and in the plural where the record requires it. The material token carries a civic sign beyond the place of issue; it does not carry one undivided civic subject inside it. Nor does the route as a whole have a single office from which every monetary act proceeds. At the issuing side, mint-workers, supervisors, standards, dies, and records can make coin production institutionally attributable — in that indexed relation, the minting organisation may be a genuine institutional terminus, without a building becoming one and without mint-workers becoming one collective life. At the acceptance side, Nikophon's law identifies different termini for different questions: the tester for approval, named officials for complaints, courts for larger claims, the Council for custody, constituted organs for appointment and funding. Forwarding a complaint from tester to mint — or from a market official to the abstract idea of coinage — would change the question. The necessary home belongs to the indexed answer, not to exchangeability as a hidden owner.

The possibility therefore has homes without having a proprietor. A holder owns this token under the applicable law; an issuing authority maintains this standard; an institution answers for this decision. None of those relations encloses the repeatable possibility of monetary exchange. The goddess whose image appears, the city named by the stamp, the office that tests, and the trader who takes the coin occupy distinct positions. The common route persists only through such finite and institutional carriage — and it is the private property of none of its carriers.

The enslaved tester remains the scene's ethical obstruction. His office helps make a public answer findable, while his body is exposed to a punishment imposed by the polity that owns him. The chapter may identify the institutional achievement without converting the cost of its operation into evidence of justice. Answerability explains where a specified determination belongs; it does not absolve the order that arranged the answer through domination.

## 5.4 The Neighbouring Accounts

Four scholarly conversations clarify the chapter's scope. None supplies its verdict.

**Seaford** argues that pervasive monetisation habituated Greeks to a value at once homogeneous, impersonal, unlimited, materially embodied, and abstract, and that this experience contributed to forms of Presocratic cosmology and tragic alienation.[34] The proposal sees, rightly, that coinage reorganises relations beyond a single exchange. Its causal mechanism remains contested: structural correspondence does not by itself establish projection, and value-bearing signs precede coined money. This chapter does not need a claim about unconscious transfer from monetary experience into cosmology; it asks how exchangeability was carried and answered for in the institutions under examination.

**Von Reden** refuses to treat money as a culturally independent cause: monetary meanings and effects are organised within civic, legal, sacrificial, and commercial practices, and coinage can carry civic obligation and impersonal private exchange without those functions becoming one.[35] That methodological caution supports the present separation of route, token, public sign, and institution. It does not decide the ontological reading in advance.

**Kurke and the adverse control.** Kurke's cultural-political account reads civic silver and the public stamp against elite gift exchange; Figueira objects that the ideological thesis rests on a narrow literary corpus and underuses hoards, metrology, denominations, and law.[36] The dispute is retained as a control on selection. The chapter does not reduce coinage to egalitarian ideology, and does not reduce cultural meaning to metal and distribution; each claim must remain at the source class that supports it.

**Mauss** distinguishes the apparent voluntariness of gifts from the obligations to give, receive, and return — and himself marks a boundary between the institutions he studies and money in the strict sense. His grammar is a comparative neighbour, not evidence for Lydia or Ionia; and the recent proposal that prestige gifts developed into early payment remains one origin hypothesis among several, not adopted here.[37]

Together the neighbours prevent two shortcuts. Coinage is not an autonomous cause whose abstraction migrates by assertion into philosophy and society. Nor is it merely neutral metal whose meaning lies outside the monetary route. Its commonality is materially, practically, and institutionally carried; the form and effects of that carriage remain historically variable.

## 5.5 What the Public Backstop Did Not Found

The positive result can be said in one movement. Repeatable monetary exchange among strangers was carried through fallible tokens, recognitional practices, tests, standards, signs, records, and institutions; and the Athenian law elevated the public stamp and the approved material standard into criteria of compulsory acceptance, giving public approval authority over specified disputes. That is descriptive elevation, not seizure: the law authorises a monetary standard and terminates particular disputes without establishing authority over the whole field of right; its officials remain assigned, sanctioned, and contestable through other organs; and the costs it names — the enslaved tester's flogging, the refusing seller's forfeited goods, the presenter's cut and confiscated piece, the public funds behind the Piraeus post — sit beside several answer-termini without automatically coinciding with them. The case concerns the opening and maintenance of a route, not a severance, tether, release, refusal, or repair.

The strongest case against the stronger claim is the history itself. Distributed assessment — weighing, testing, reputation, private practice — functioned before the office and outside it; substantial exchange demonstrably proceeded among strangers whom no public approval yet protected; and the law's own text presupposes bankers, changers, foreign coin, and running markets rather than founding them. The public office made some monetary doubts answerable; it did not found every exchange it could later judge.

**The finding — and it is less than the claim.** The evidence does not show that coinage originated stranger exchange, or that public making-good was a necessary condition of every monetary taking. The episode thereby restricts this volume's expanded application — the one that made public answerability a necessary condition of the route — and the restriction is returned to the doctrine as a result, not absorbed. The underlying grammar of common possibility survives, because it already distinguishes heterogeneous carriage from conditional localisation at an institutional terminus. Here the history corrects the stronger instrument the volume brought to it.

The dating discipline closes the file with the same restraint. Aristotle's exchange account is dated fourth-century theory: it may illuminate how one ancient author rendered money intelligible; it may not be carried backward as the first issuers' motive, or forward as the necessary explanation of all coinage. The historical beginning remains plural at the strength the sources recover.

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The route is repeatable, fallible, and unowned. Its public homes are real, but no one public office created every taking that preceded or exceeded it. The next episode follows money into sanctuary accounts, loans, leases, inventories, seizures, and conversions. There the question is no longer only how a coin becomes usable between strangers. It is how money remained holy while institutions put it to work — and where the costs of that tether fell.

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[27] SEG 26.72 = RO 25 = AIO 819 (Agora I 7180; Stroud, *Hesperia* 43 [1974], 157–188): acceptance criteria and city tester, ll. 3–8; cutting, consecration, and deposit, ll. 10–13; tester's punishment and seller's forfeit, ll. 13–18; jurisdiction, ll. 18–36; the Piraeus tester, ll. 36–44; inscription and pay, ll. 44–55.

[28] Hdt. 1.94.1 (Godley) — a fifth-century literary attribution, not direct evidence for the issuers of anonymous early electrum.

[29] Kerschner and Konuk, "Electrum Coins and Their Archaeological Context: The Case of the Artemision of Ephesus," in *White Gold* (2020), 83–190 — carried here at second hand through the published scholarship; the deposit count, contextual date, and issuer inference are held, permanently in this edition, at that carrier strength.

[30] The origins map: Herodotus and Pollux; the Artemision context; Aristotle and the commercial accounts; Kroll and von Reden on public responsibility; Wallace, Cook, and van Alfen on stabilisation, authority, and profit; Price on military payment; Seaford on sanctuary distribution; the gift-to-payment proposal (disputed). No single origin is established.

[31] Arist. *Pol.* 1.1257a31–b1; *EN* 5.5, 1133a19–31. Paraphrase is used so that no translation-dependent quotation carries the argument.

[32] SEG 26.72 / AIO 819 at the loci in note 1; the foreign same-type clause (ll. 8–10) disputed among Stroud's approval-or-tender reading, Buttrey's exclusion reading, and Matthaiou's test-cut restoration. Non-official testing: *Frogs* 723; [Arrian], *Epictetus* 1.20.7–9; physical test-cuts.

[33] The law's presupposition of established markets and private presentation; AIO commentary treats the Piraeus post as the principal or possibly only innovation. Ober's transaction-cost and access account remains a modern reconstruction rather than the inscription's stated motive.

[34] Seaford, *Money and the Early Greek Mind* (2004) — the thesis attributed at second hand and held at that carrier strength; the mechanism objection and pre-coinage sign evidence per Reynolds's review (2004).

[35] Von Reden, *Exchange in Ancient Greece* (1997), esp. 154 on money as no culturally independent cause, with the civic/impersonal tension at 168–69.

[36] Kurke, *Coins, Bodies, Games, and Gold* (1999/2021); Figueira (2000), 642–46, for the corpus objection.

[37] Mauss, *The Gift* (Guyer tr.), 57–59, 73–75 — a comparative neighbour supplying no historical evidence for Anatolian coinage.

# Chapter 6 — Keeping Money Holy

## 6.1 The Jars of the God

On Delos, in 179 BCE, an incoming board of **hieropoioi** received Apollo's sacred fortune from the outgoing board, and the transfer was inscribed. The accounts distinguish sacred chests from public chests, record what the new officials received, itemise receipts and expenditures, and inventory dedications.[38] A modern synthesis places that inscription within roughly five hundred surviving financial texts from the sanctuary: coin stored in sealed jars, labels identifying funds and administrative periods, and balances carried across years and changes of political control.[39]

The jars matter because they make the keeping concrete. Sacred money was not preserved by remaining inert. It was sorted, counted, lent, received back, spent, converted, and transferred under rules that kept funds distinguishable. The names of officials do not dissolve the divine-property formula, and the formula does not perform the officials' acts. Formula, asset, office, record, and use remain connected without becoming one thing.

This chapter therefore asks a narrower question than whether consecration founded ancient exchange — the previous chapter has already cut that claim down to size. The question here is how sanctuary wealth was administered under sacred title-language; what uses were barred or conditioned; what the wealth bought, funded, and authorised; where liabilities and losses were placed; and what seizure or conversion did to an arrangement whose ownership formulas could persist through it all. The case is sanctuary finance in the classical–Hellenistic Mediterranean. Later Roman material serves only as comparison and does not contribute to the conclusion.

## 6.2 Three Sanctuaries

**Selection and limits.** Three sanctuary complexes carry the reconstruction. Delos supplies an account and inventory series of the span the case requires. Athens connects sacred funds to civic borrowing and to the coinage material of Chapter 4. Delphi supplies interstate reconstruction finance, sacred debts, audits, seizure, and reparation. The selection is analytical, not representative: it warrants findings about these documented arrangements, not about every Greek sanctuary or “the ancient economy” without qualification; the three sites were selected for the density and span of their documentation, and no rank claim about evidential superiority is made. And the evidence in hand does not discharge everything this chapter was asked to try: the available evidence does not permit sacred monopoly, fiscal privilege, or relief expenditure to be tried at publication strength, so those lines do not contribute to this chapter’s finding.

**Delos: a working portfolio.** The Athenian Amphiktyons' account of 377/6–374/3 records interest from ten island communities and from individual borrowers; rents from sacred estates on Rheneia and Delos and from houses; and court and confiscation receipts. Expenditures include a crown, tripods, support for sacred delegates and choirs, cattle, sacrifice, transport, fodder, and tax.[40] The property register includes potteries, a bronze foundry, and a fuller's shop among Apollo's income-producing buildings; some properties still carry former owners' names. New borrowers receive the god's funds "on the same terms as the others," and the arrears columns show uneven repayment by cities and individuals alike.

The lease regulation states the administrative mechanism. Rent and arrears are payable **to the god**. The **hieropoioi** account monthly to the Sacred Chest. On default they may sell crops, livestock, and slaves, proceed against property, and inscribe the lessee as debtor. Lessees, guarantors, and officials responsible for non-collection can all have property made answerable under the regulation; negligent officials can themselves become debtors to the god.[41] The formula names Apollo as landlord and creditor. The operative acts — leasing, accounting, collecting, seizing, selling, inscribing — belong to constituted human offices, with specified liabilities. Neither side cancels the other.

Nor did keeping mean that no asset could ever change form. In 278 BCE the administrators recorded 180 drachmas from the auction of a collapsed house that had been dedicated to Apollo; the proceeds entered the accounts.[42] The entry establishes an authorised sale of a ruined dedicated asset — in this instance, and no further: no general power of alienation follows, and the available carrier does not settle the buyer's subsequent legal position.

**Athens: sacred credit within civic finance.** Between 434/3 and 340/39, separate boards of treasurers for Athena and for the Other Gods managed and recorded money and dedications. The Kallias framework ordered repayment of sums owed **to the gods**, prescribed joint opening and sealing of the Opisthodomos, and required gold and silver to be counted and weighed god by god under reporting and audit. Loan accounts record Athena Polias, Athena Nike, and the Other Gods lending through their treasurers to military officials, with principal and interest calculated separately.[43] The evidence shows sacred funds used as credit within the polity while retaining differentiated accounts and debt-language. It does not show a sanctuary acting independently of civic institutions, and it does not decide the properly divine actuality of the named creditor.

**Delphi: rebuilding, debt, and audit.** Fourth-century temple reconstruction drew on voluntary contributions from states and individuals, an Amphictyonic levy of an obol per person, and credit advanced to the building commission — distinct flows that may not be collapsed into one "temple tax."[44] In 273 BCE an inscription records that Diopeithes held eight talents of Apollo's sacred money, that the **hieromnemones** adjudicated, that the debt was owed **to the god**, and that informants received a reward. The Amphictyonic dossier of 117/6 registers deficits in sacred treasury money, land, and flocks, names punished Delphians, and honours informants — and a deficit records a shortfall and its treatment; it does not prove theft in every entry.[45]

**Seizure and conversion.** This evidence belongs to a different source class, and is read accordingly. Diodorus narrates the Third Sacred War retrospectively and with a moralising frame. He connects the opening conflict to fines for cultivating consecrated land and payment demanded **to the god**; reports Philomelus's seizure of the oracle; distinguishes his initial treatment of dedications from the conversions attributed to Onomarchus and Phayllus; and describes precious offerings turned into weapons, coin, mercenary pay, and political inducement. The transmitted aggregate exceeds ten thousand talents — but its basis is disputed, and neither that figure nor the smaller modern estimate is used here as audited fact.[46]

The settlement of 346 BCE disarmed and dispersed the Phocians and imposed an annual payment of sixty talents **to the god** until the registered sums were repaid, the payments associated with the Amphictyonic rebuilding programme.[47] This is not restitution of identical objects. It is a collective reparation imposed on Phocian communities and routed through an interstate institution, after conversions attributed to commanders. The record thereby distinguishes deed-agents, later payers, named creditor, administering body, and benefited building programme. What it does not disclose is how the collective levy was distributed among particular households — a silence we will need again below.

One later Roman lexical control earns its sentence: Caesar's taking of the **aerarium sanctius** — public money held at Saturn's temple under a conditional curse, in Appian's description — shows that sacred location plus sacral protection do not by themselves make a reserve the god's property.[48]

## 6.3 Formula, Office, and Permitted Use

The working rule is sound once stated without a proprietary shortcut: where a document says “the god’s property,” the formula must be kept distinct from at least four further questions — who administers, which cultic or civic use benefits, who enforces, and what transfers or conversions are permitted. The title-language itself settles none of them.

The Delian regulation makes the distinction visible. Apollo is named as landlord and creditor. A board leases, accounts, collects, and records. Cult operations receive some revenues; borrowers receive temporary use of funds; courts, officials, guarantors, and property provide routes of enforcement. The collapsed-house entry shows one authorised conversion. The answers are connected, but they are not interchangeable — and in particular, a statement that rent is due **to the god** is not yet a statement that a properly divine someone receives payment in the ontological sense. The document secures the juridical direction of the debt and the institutional route of receipt; the divine verdict remains open.

A later Roman-law comparison reaches the same caution through different title-language: the juristic materials place **res sacrae** outside private patrimony — **nullius in bonis**, “in no one’s estate” — and that formula should not be translated without argument into ownership by a divine juristic person; the comparison supplies no evidence for the Greek episode and no verdict about the addressee.[49]

Keeping, moreover, is not a synonym for absolute inalienability. The documented arrangements include leases, loans, temporary enjoyment, enforcement against property, and the sale of a ruined dedicated asset. At the width the primary sources earn, consecration maintained a tether by **differentiating** funds and **conditioning** uses — through records, offices, prohibitions, liabilities, and authorised conversions. A tether can carry circulation as well as limit it.

That description is not yet a claim that the tether restrained a demonstrated capture. No joint seizure of authorisation, termination, and immunity has been established in this case. The evidence shows maintained constraints and institutional differentiation; it also shows that conversion could occur — through authorised sale, civic borrowing, wartime seizure, and reparation. Consecration was neither an inert wall nor a guarantee of justice.

One warning from Volume I's own sacred trials enters here, as a stratum caution only: a cultic form may be institutionally secured while properly divine actuality — and every modal verdict — remains open. Delos supplies dense evidence of administrative continuity: recurring boards, handed-over balances, durable title-language, repeated procedures. That continuity is evidence of offices and records. It does not disclose a cultic institution living a life, and no **who** is assigned or denied on the strength of documentary density.

## 6.4 Where the Cost Fell

The evidence must do more here than in the previous cases: locate the costs, class by fiscal class — and say, for each, what evidence would have located them elsewhere. "Cost" must therefore be used at an identified grain. An inscription may name the immediate payer, the liable property, the depleted fund, or the assessed community without revealing the final incidence among particular finite lives. Asset source is not loss-bearer; legal liability is not economic incidence; and an institutional fund can bear a recorded loss without becoming a who.

For the Delian leases and arrears, the documents place immediate liability with considerable precision: defaulting lessees and their guarantors, specified property, and — where the regulation attaches it — the negligent officials themselves, with the board's accounting, seizure and sale powers, and debtor inscription as the answer-routes. Had the regulation provided remission as the norm, or charged defaults to the sacred fund, or omitted guarantor and official liability, the immediate cost would have sat elsewhere; the regulation states the opposite. What no line recovers is the household distribution and the downstream effects of an executed seizure.

For the Delian and Athenian loans, borrowers owe principal and, where recorded, interest; arrears leave the lending fund without timely return; treasurers, account series, repayment decrees, and debtor records carry the answers. A grant with no repayment, or a write-off absorbed by the sacred fund, would have moved the cost onto the fund; the cited records maintain debt and repayment. But arrears do not by themselves quantify opportunity cost, and the final tax or household incidence of civic repayment is not shown.

For cult and building expenditure, the accounts name the funds drawn — rents, interest, contributions, levies, other receipts — and the levy and contribution records identify distinct immediate sources, administered by boards, the building commission, and the Amphictyonic organs. Endowment income alone would have been a different answer, and the records prevent it only for the specified flows. A contributing base, however, is not yet a list of finite cost-bearers: voluntariness, incidence, and benefit differ flow by flow.

For official deficits and enforcement, the dossiers name debtors, punished officials, recoverable property, or the treasury's recorded shortfall, with the **hieromnemones**, informant rewards, audits, sanctions, and inscription as routes. An unallocated deficit — no debtor, no sanction, no recovery — would have left the cost on the fund alone; the dossiers allocate some shortfalls and not every one. "Deficit" does not prove theft, and not every line identifies a final bearer.

For the Third Sacred War conversions and the settlement, the narratives place the immediate loss on the offerings and sanctuary assets converted, and the settlement places the reparation collectively on the Phocian communities — sixty talents a year, **to the god**, through the Amphictyonic administration, toward the rebuilding. Recovery from the commanders' estates, from the mercenaries paid, or from another polity would have placed it elsewhere; the reported settlement assigns it as it does. And here the record's silence becomes the finding: the sources do not identify household incidence, and nothing in them justifies saying which particular later payers bore their dead commanders' debt.

The evidence yields a mixed result, and the mixture is the point. For leases, loans, and some defaults, immediate legal liability is located with precision. For collective contributions, expenditure, seizure, and reparation, the documents more often reach a fund, a community, or an asset class than the finite person on whom the eventual burden fell. That is still historical information. What it does not warrant is the stronger claim that every cost of the tether has been followed to a determinate finite who.

The distinction matters for this book's double question. In the Phocian settlement, deed-agents and collective payers differ, while adjudication and repayment remain institutionally routed. That is cost displacement — a hard datum. It is not yet the divergence this book tests for, because the answer has not been shown to disappear into a promoted form that authorises the field, terminates right, and exempts itself. No capture verdict follows from collective liability alone.

## 6.5 Some Payers, Not All

What the record positively establishes can be said without the questionnaire that produced it. Divine-title formulas, the continuity of sacred funds, and the authority of constituted boards and interstate procedures were elevated and maintained at the fiscal grain. The documents themselves keep the layers apart: sacred and public chests are distinguished, gods are accounted for separately, and title, administration, benefit, enforcement, and permitted transfer receive different answers — while the Roman public-reserve control keeps sacred **location** from collapsing into sacred **title**, and the documents may leave the divine addressee open without the formula becoming empty. Boards and assemblies authorise specified acts; courts, audits, and settlements terminate specified disputes; records, seals, differentiated chests, use restrictions, guarantees, and authorised procedures maintain the binding between sacred title and fiscal use. That binding is the tether, again — and nothing in it shows one candidate authorising the whole field, terminating right, and standing immune. The wartime conversions are seizures **within** the episode; the settlement of 346, reparation though it is, does not satisfy this book's definition of repair for the sake of finite whos.

The strongest case against each allocation was asked directly: what evidence would have placed the burden elsewhere? Sacred funds absorbing default rather than lessees and guarantors; grants rather than repayable loans; endowment income rather than contributions and levy; commanders rather than communities bearing reparation. The documents prevent those contrary allocations — but only in the fiscal classes, and at the immediate levels, specified. They do not prevent the remaining possibility that ultimate incidence among finite whos is, in several classes, unrecoverable. That limit is printed rather than absorbed, and it becomes the finding.

**The finding — again less than the claim.** The case establishes a maintained sacred-fiscal tether, and the usefulness of separating divine title-language from administration, benefit, enforcement, and transfer. It establishes that some immediate liabilities can be located exactly. And it **restricts** the stronger move this chapter was built to attempt — the passage, without remainder, from an accounted fund, a liable property, or an assessed community to "the finite whos who paid." In several fiscal classes the surviving record does not recover that final incidence. The restriction applies to the breadth of the cost claim; the who/locus separation, the open divine verdict, and the tether classification stand. The Phocian annuity — the sample's strongest displacement — remains what it was: a hard datum of cost displacement, not a capture verdict.

The dating discipline has the last methodological word. Sacred title-language appears in a durative present — the estate **is** the god's; the debt **is** to the god. Each occurrence, however, is housed in a dated lease, account, decree, audit, or settlement, carried from one board to the next. The grammar's durability is a historical fact about repeated institutional use. It is not proof of timeless title, an unchanged metaphysical addressee, or intention persisting without carriers.

The Part's canonical must therefore be printed with its evidential boundary visible:

> **At these sanctuary complexes, consecration constrained fiscal use and maintained a tether between sacred title and administered wealth. Some of its costs are traceable to finite whos; others remain aggregated in funds, properties, and communities. There is nothing here to restore; there is a structure to learn.**

The canonical now carries its own truth conditions, and its office is unchanged: it governs the Part's refusal of nostalgia.

A tether can be broken by profaning the sacred, sacralising the profane, or severing the two. Part III begins with the temple-cleansing tradition: a scene in which money-changing and sacred space are made to confront one another. That episode must be reconstructed at its own grain — and nothing established here announces its verdict.

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[38] ID 442 A–B (179 BCE): sacred and public chests distinguished; predecessor takeover; receipts, expenditures, and dedication inventory.

[39] Chankowski, *Parasites of the God* (2023) — the corpus count and the traceability architecture of jars, labels, funds, periods, officials, and balances; carried at second hand, and "bank" is not used here as a claim that the sanctuary was a commercial bank.

[40] IDelos 98 = IG II² 1635 = RO 28, face A: interest from ten communities, ll. 11–15; private interest, ll. 15–24; rents and receipts, ll. 25–29; festival expenditure, ll. 30–40; loans "on the same terms," face A 50–55; the face B property register, with former owners' names not treated as current title.

[41] ID 503 = IG XI.2 287, ll. 15–34 (the *Hiera Syngraphē*): rent to the god; monthly accounting; enforcement; guarantor liability; official liability. Kent's translation is the carrier of record in this edition; no direct Greek collation is claimed.

[42] IG XI.2 162 A, ll. 42–43, with Migeotte's analysis — defeating absolute inalienability in this instance only.

[43] Boards and span per the Athenian record; IG I³ 52 A, ll. 1–30 (repayment, joint opening and sealing, god-by-god weighing; dating disputed as in Chapter 4); IG I³ 369, ll. 65–87 (loans to military officials; principal and interest separate).

[44] CID II 1–32, carried at second hand; no direct collation is claimed.

[45] FD III.2 205 (273 BCE), ll. 1–18; CID IV 119 = Syll.³ 826 (117/6), documents D–J.

[46] Diod. Sic. 16.23.2–5; 16.30.1; 16.33.1; 16.36.1; 16.56.5–7. Neither the transmitted aggregate nor the smaller modern reconstruction is used as audited fact.

[47] Diod. Sic. 16.60.2; the relation to the rebuilding programme carried at the mixed strength of its secondary carriers; no primary collation is claimed. "Reparation" does not mean return of identical objects.

[48] Caes. *BC* 1.14.1; App. *BCiv.* 2.41; Plut. *Caes.* 35.3–4; Cass. Dio 41.17. The public-reserve classification is Appian's description. (The Sulla and Nero comparison materials, second-hand and literary, are held in the Trial Record and contribute nothing here.)

[49] The juristic dossier (*res sacrae*, *religiosae*, *sanctae*; *nullius in bonis*; public consecration; interdictal protection; gods as heirs) is cited at handbook width (De Zulueta, Krueger–Mommsen, Kaser, and Watson) without independent collation; no Greek inference and no finding depends on it.

# PART III — SEVERANCE UNDER TRIAL: JERUSALEM AND THE HYPERBOLIC BOND

**Entry phenomenon of the Part:** the overturning of the money-changers' tables. The gesture appears to part what the tethered economy joined. Whether it did so historically, whether the texts make it do so, and whether a structural severance may be read from them are different questions. This Part must earn each answer rather than inherit one from its title.

# Chapter 7 — Jesus in the Temple

## 7.1 The Tables

Mark presents Jesus entering the temple precinct during the final week of the narrative and beginning to drive out those selling and buying there. He overturns the tables of the money-changers and the seats of the dove-sellers, and he does not allow anyone to carry a vessel (σκεῦος) through the temple. He then teaches by joining Isaiah and Jeremiah: “My house shall be called a house of prayer for all the nations (πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν)”; “you have made it a den of robbers (σπήλαιον λῃστῶν).” In Mark’s sequence, the chief priests and scribes hear and seek a way to destroy him.[50]

The scene enters exactly where Part II ended. That Part found several forms in which money could be carried within a sacred order: marked, administered, accounted for, and restrained. The Gospel scene places an act of interruption at a temple-fiscal interface. That description is deliberately narrower than “the severance.” It names what the text depicts without deciding what the historical act was, what its target meant, or what kind of act, if any, the scene can sustain.

Those decisions cannot be borrowed from one another. What each text **presents**, what event — if any — can be **reconstructed**, and what structures the presentations can **sustain** are three different questions, and this chapter keeps them apart throughout. The distinction matters here with particular force, because two captures are live at once: a favourable theology can turn the scene into the result it wants, while a hostile reconstruction can do the same in reverse. The three strands are allowed to converge only where their warrants converge.

## 7.2 The Texts

This section records the textual presentations before any reconstruction or classification.

**Four canonical presentations.** The synoptics place the action in the final Jerusalem sequence: Mark 11:15–19, Matthew 21:12–17, Luke 19:45–48. Mark interleaves it with the fig-tree episode. Luke's critical text compresses the action and names sellers only; readings that add buyers, tables, and dove-sellers' seats are harmonising variants and may not be supplied from Mark. John 2:13–22 places a related action near the beginning of the ministry and adds elements absent from the synoptics: a whip of cords, sheep and oxen, coins poured out, and the command not to make the Father's house a "house of trade" (οἶκον ἐμπορίου). The difference in placement and detail is itself the datum. Whether it reflects one event variously placed, more than one event, literary dependence, or theological relocation belongs to reconstruction — and remains disputed.[51]

**Words placed over the act.** Mark joins Isaiah 56:7, retaining "for all the nations," with Jeremiah 7:11's "den of robbers." The scriptural conjunction can support more than one narrative force: restoration of the house to its stated purpose, judgement upon its use, or a symbolic threat against the institution. John does not place a prophetic citation in Jesus' command; the narrator instead adds the disciples' later recollection of Psalm 69:9 and interprets the saying about destroying and raising the temple through Jesus' body and resurrection.

**The Caesar scene.** In Mark 12:13–17 and its synoptic parallels, the question is framed as a trap: "Is it lawful to pay the census-tax (κῆνσος) to Caesar, or not?" Jesus asks to see a denarius. The questioners produce it. He asks whose image (εἰκών) and inscription (ἐπιγραφή) it bears; they answer, "Caesar's." He replies: "Give back to Caesar the things of Caesar, and to God the things of God" (τὰ Καίσαρος ἀπόδοτε Καίσαρι καὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῷ Θεῷ). The scene closes with astonishment.[52]

Three textual features set the limits of every later reading. First, the imperative ἀπόδοτε governs both clauses: the saying does not merely discard the coin and then fall silent about God. Second, the plural phrases "the things of Caesar" and "the things of God" are not allocated by any explicit criterion; the image-and-inscription question identifies the coin's presented association, but the text does not enumerate either domain. Third, astonishment closes the controversy without turning the saying into a schedule of rates, jurisdictions, exemptions, or priorities. The text has fiscal force; it does not contain a fiscal system.

One grammatical echo deserves notice — and only notice. Mark's τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ recalls, at the level of construction, the Athenian formula met in Chapter 4: τὰ τῆς θεοῦ, "the things of the goddess." Each is a substantivised neuter plural with a possessive genitive. In the Attic phrase Athena is named by the common-gender noun θεός with a feminine article; in Mark the God of Israel takes the masculine. The resemblance is exact enough to notice and too slight to bear an argument: it establishes neither transmission nor a common monetary doctrine.[53]

**Continuity texts.** The case against a severance reading must be identified within the same corpus, and it is there. Matthew 17:24–27 presents Peter affirming payment of the two-drachma temple tax (τὰ δίδραχμα); Jesus' saying distinguishes "sons" from "others," yet the narrative pays "lest we cause offence" (ἵνα δὲ μὴ σκανδαλίσωμεν αὐτούς), with a stater covering Peter and Jesus. Luke places Jesus' presentation and childhood visit in the temple. Acts presents the earliest Jerusalem community attending the temple, and Peter and John going up at the hour of prayer.[54] These passages do not settle the meaning of the table action. They do prevent the transmitting corpus from being described as though it simply abandoned temple, contribution, and cultic attendance.

## 7.3 The Temple-Fiscal Background

The administrative record behind the scene is thinner than the scene's fame suggests, and its limits are findings.

The annual contribution associated with the half-shekel was scripturally related to Exodus 30:13 and, at a different rate, Nehemiah 10:32–33. Josephus attests contribution practices in the first century, while the post-70 Roman redirection of the payment belongs to the later **fiscus Judaicus** history and must not be projected backward. The available evidence supports reckoning in a Tyrian weight-and-value standard and the extensive circulation of Tyrian silver. It does **not** establish a rule requiring exclusively Tyrian-minted pieces — and the distinction matters: a standard of account, the ordinary coinage available to meet it, and a legal restriction to one mint are three different claims, and only the first two are supported.[55]

The Mishnah's later date limits what can be drawn from it. **Bekhorot** 8:7 supplies direct evidence for its rabbinic formulation of the Tyrian standard and for coin payment in the case specified; it is indirect evidence for pre-70 administration. **Sheqalim** 1 supplies later rabbinic evidence about changers and their surcharge, the **kollybos** — but the rates, stations, personnel, and exact pre-70 arrangements cannot be reconstructed: the surviving evidence does not permit a unified account of the court economy's rates, personnel, locations, and scale, and that documented non-closure is itself a result, not a gap to be papered over. Likewise the Gospel identifies the coin in the Caesar scene only as a denarius. A Tiberian denarius is an illustrative modern candidate, not a recovered identification; the famous "tribute penny" cannot be recovered from the pericope, and no argument below depends on choosing a type.[56]

At the strength available, the background establishes less than legend and enough for the trial: sale, purchase, exchange, and contribution were not, merely by occurring in connection with the temple, self-evidently external to its cultic-fiscal operation. The tables can therefore be described as an institutionally ordinary interface subject to contest, regulation, misuse, or prophetic judgement. They cannot be described, on the present record, either as demonstrably corrupt or as demonstrably innocent. The gesture is directed at an operating interface; what that direction signifies remains the question.

## 7.4 The Historical Dispute

The canonical tradition preserves more than one textual presentation of a temple action. That fact does not by itself yield two independent historical witnesses: the literary relation between John and the synoptic tradition is contested, and the differences in placement, scale, object, and saying are part of the reconstruction problem rather than a way around it. The hearing scene in Mark includes a temple-related accusation, and Jesus' execution under Roman authority belongs to the securely recoverable frame. Neither fact fixes the occurrence, scale, intention, or causal role of the action narrated in Mark 11 and John 2.

Nor is the historiography a sequence of increasingly complete versions of one consensus. Sanders rejects the explanation by dishonest trade — sale, exchange, and sacrifice were normal temple functions — and reads a symbolic demonstration of destruction and eschatological replacement. Fredriksen questions the historicity and scale of the scene and rejects the Markan causal sequence in favour of a Roman crowd-management explanation of the execution. Other reconstructions place perceived priestly corruption, a limited prophetic demonstration, eschatological restoration, a critique of animal sacrifice, exploitation, or a currency dispute at the centre; the most recent currency-specific proposal is one reconstruction among others, not a closure of the field.[57]

What follows from that dispute is fixed by the evidence, not by preference: because occurrence, scale, target, and intention cannot be recovered at the required grain, the historical question stops here — **not tried** — rather than being resolved toward whichever reading best suits the book's thesis. The dispute remains material at every verdict-bearing point: whether an event occurred in approximately the narrated form; what was targeted; whether the action was limited or large; whether its force was reform, restoration, judgement, destruction, or something else.

Accordingly, **the event-level question returns: not tried here — historically underdetermined at the required grain.** This is an evidential outcome only. It does not establish that no action occurred; it does not establish severance, continuity, or doctrinal failure; and it may not be counted as evidence for any side. The textual question remains open for trial, because texts can be examined even where events cannot.

## 7.5 The Structural Trial

What follows operates on the textual presentations of §7.2 and converts none of them into historical findings.

**The severance reading.** Several textual features sustain it. The tables are overturned rather than inspected. Sellers and, in Mark and Matthew, buyers are displaced; John includes animals and poured coin. John's "house of trade" formula places the house's named filial relation against its commercial use. Read beside the Caesar scene, the material can figure a parting between the holy and the coin — the ancient solution, **money kept holy so that it cannot be profaned**, meeting a proposed counter-solution, **money made profane so that it cannot profane the holy**. But the reading must remain at its actual width. John's command contests the making of **this house** into a house of trade; it does not state a universal ban on trade. The Caesar saying associates the displayed coin with Caesar; it does not say that money as such belongs outside God's claim. "The coin is dismissed to Caesar" is one possible construal of ἀπόδοτε, not the text's uncontested result. The severance is genuinely sustained as a structural possibility — and it is not secured by these texts alone.

**The continuity-as-restoration reading.** The same corpus sustains it. Mark's Isaiah citation names what the house "shall be called"; Jeremiah's temple sermon condemns conduct under appeal to the house's claim rather than supplying, by quotation alone, a programme for ending cult. Matthew's temple-tax scene culminates in payment, even though the saying problematises the obligation. Luke–Acts continues to locate prayer and communal attendance in the temple. On this reading the action is an internal prophetic interruption: a refusal or repair undertaken at the institution's centre and in the name of its stated purpose. The analogy with Chapter 6 is structural, not genealogical: as sanctuary treasuries could be investigated without ceasing to be sanctuary treasuries, a temple-fiscal interface could be judged without the judgement itself abolishing the tether.

Neither reading can dismiss the other as an external correction. The severance reading has overturned tables, displaced exchange, and John's opposition between the Father's house and trade. The restoration reading has the house's own vocation, the temple-tax payment, and continued attendance in Luke–Acts. The same corpus therefore presents interruption and continued inhabitation together. It does not tell us whether the interruption abolishes the tether or calls it back to its stated purpose. A text-level confirmation of severance would have required the continuity reading to fail — no restorative appeal to the house's vocation, no narrated payment of the temple tax, no continued temple attendance — and the actual corpus does not permit that result.

Nor does the material disclose the wider structure needed for capture. It names immediate bearers of interruption — sellers, buyers, changers, dove-sellers, carriers — but not the distribution of cost beyond them or the historical administration's terminal place of answer. Exchange and temple administration are interrogated; neither is shown authorising the whole field, ending the question of right, and standing immune. The result is not a compromise but a limit imposed by the evidence: undecided between severance and repair.

**The textual verdict is therefore: undecided between severance and repair.** This is not a compromise between readings. It is the determinate result of finding both readings supported and neither able to exclude the other at the required grain.

**The limit of the Caesar saying.** The Caesar saying carries a different and narrower question — what it can and cannot bear as monetary doctrine — and the answer is bounded on both sides. It can carry a refusal of the trap's offered alternatives, and an imperative that leaves some claim to Caesar in the sentence while subordinating neither clause through an explicit allocation rule. It can disclose that the displayed coin's image and inscription matter to the answer. It can place Caesar's claim and God's claim in a paired but non-exhaustively-partitioned field whose extent remains unspecified. It cannot, by itself, supply a systematic fiscal theology. The text does not define the contents of either plural domain, explain overlap or conflict, state the scope of political jurisdiction, provide a rule for identifying legitimate exactions, or settle the order of claims when they collide. Scholarly and confessional readings have accordingly drawn materially divergent fiscal consequences from the same compact saying — which is not proof that the text means nothing, but evidence that movement from the saying to a system requires premises the pericope does not state.[58]

**The finding.** Within the pericope, the answer performs a refusal: it refuses the trap's offered alternatives, and it refuses the founding role later systems assign the saying. That refusal is a fact about the text, not a classified historical occurrence. The verdict is a **confirmation**, bounded to exactly that: the registered limits-claim holds. The saying bears fiscal and theological content, and it does not alone found a systematic monetary doctrine. The contrary would have been a pericope that itself supplied the allocation later systems need — determinate contents for "Caesar's" and "God's," a rule for overlap and conflict, the scope and legitimacy of fiscal authority. The evidence preventing that result is the text's unallocated plurals, its absence of a jurisdictional rule, and the documented availability of materially different fiscal readings of the same saying.

**Three guards.** No divine verdict: the chapter classifies textual and historical presentations; it neither confirms nor denies the properly divine claims made for Jesus, and where the event-level line returns no trial, the action may not be quietly secured by redescribing the actor. No founder-causation: Jesus enters this volume as a hinge only in the minimal sense that later traditions organise themselves through these texts and claims; nothing here derives Christianity's economic history, modern capitalism, or a general sacred/profane settlement from one scene or one saying. No evacuation: even if later chapters establish a severance, severance of sacred and monetary housing would not show that sacred conditions had disappeared — the house-of-prayer citation itself prevents that inference at the present textual grain.

## 7.6 What the Chapter Returns

Three results, at three widths. The temple action, at event level: **not tried here** — historically underdetermined, an evidential limit supplying evidence to no side. The temple action, at text level: **undecided between severance and repair** — both readings supported, neither excluding the other. The Caesar saying: **refusal, confirmed at its bounded width** — fiscal force without a fiscal system.

One retrospective costume must be named before the Part proceeds. A recurrent reading treats the table action as the already-complete beginning of an inevitable separation of religion and economy. The event-level verdict refuses to date a beginning that cannot be reconstructed at the required grain; the text-level verdict finds the canonical corpus still carrying restoration, contribution, and temple attendance alongside interruption. Any severance established later in this volume must be dated through later episodes and their institutions. It cannot be read backward as the necessary unfolding of this scene.[59]

The temple scene gives Part III its question but does not settle it. The next case turns from the disputed reconstruction of an act to a different textual field: enemy-love, non-resistance, mercy, and witness unto death. The chapter that follows must test what kind of position those demands present and whether they can be recruited as archic command — and it may not inherit "unoccupiable" as a result merely because that word stands in its title.

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[50] Mark 11:15–18 (NA28, collated against SBLGNT). Mark 11:16's prohibition on carrying a vessel is Markan only. "Temple precinct" renders ἱερόν without assigning the scene to a particular court Mark does not name.

[51] Mark 11:15–19; Matthew 21:12–17; Luke 19:45–48; John 2:13–22. Johannine particulars: φραγέλλιον (2:15), sheep and oxen, poured coin, οἶκον ἐμπορίου (2:16). At John 2:15 NA28 and SBLGNT differ in the coin and table-overturning readings; direct quotation follows NA28. Neither Johannine independence nor dependence is assumed.

[52] Mark 12:13–17; Matthew 22:15–22; Luke 20:20–26. Mark names κῆνσος, δηνάριον, εἰκών, ἐπιγραφή; ἀπόδοτε is the plural imperative governing the coordinated clauses.

[53] Mark 12:17 beside Demosthenes 24.122 (Chapter 4). In Attic official prose Athena may be named ἡ θεός; the genitive θεοῦ is morphologically the same while the articles carry gender. Only a grammatical echo is claimed.

[54] Matthew 17:24–27; Luke 2:22–38, 41–49; Acts 2:46; 3:1. These establish what the texts present, not the uniform practice of every early Jesus-group; the Matthean scene is textual continuity evidence, not unmediated historical evidence for Jesus' payment.

[55] Exodus 30:13; Nehemiah 10:32–33 (a third-shekel). The Tyrian-standard evidence: m. *Bekhorot* 8:7; D. T. Ariel, "A Survey of Coin Finds in Jerusalem," *Liber Annuus* 32 (1982), 273–326, at 284–85; Ariel and Fontanille, *The Coins of Herod* (2012), table 1. Legal exclusivity of Tyrian-minted pieces is negatively closed.

[56] The Gospel says only δηνάριον; RIC I² Tiberius 26/28/30 form a modern typological family, and the familiar reverse identification is iconographic, not an inscription.

[57] E. P. Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism* (1985), 61–76; P. Fredriksen, "Gospel Chronologies, the Scene in the Temple, and the Crucifixion of Jesus," in *Redefining First-Century Jewish and Christian Identities* (2008), 246–82; C. A. Evans, *Jesus and His Contemporaries* (1995), 319–44; T. Wardle, *The Jerusalem Temple and Early Christian Identity* (2010), 169–89; S. J. Joseph, *Jesus and the Temple* (2016), 133–66; Hallstrom (2024), 20–66, 239–42; Olshanetsky, Silverman, and Cosijns, "Turning the Tables," *Cogent Arts & Humanities* 13.1 (2026) — the last expressly a recent proposal, not a consensus.

[58] W. Carter, "The Things of Caesar: Mark-ing the Plural (Mark 12:13–17)," *HTS Teologiese Studies* 70.1 (2014) — cited as evidence that materially divergent allocations are available because the saying states no complete allocation rule; its redaction-historical conclusion is not adopted.

[59] The audit dates the retrospective reading-form, not the disputed event, and favours no reconstruction in §7.4.

# Chapter 8 — The Position Called Unoccupiable

## 8.1 A Small Courtroom

The **Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs** presents a hearing at Carthage on 17 July 180. Saturninus, the proconsul, offers the accused an imperial pardon if they return “to a good mind,” and later offers thirty days for reconsideration. Speratus refuses the offered political-religious alignment and names another lordship. The group refuses the required oath; it also refuses the delay. Saturninus reads the sentence from a tablet. The text closes with the condemned giving thanks to God and being executed.[60]

The act is among the earliest extant Christian Latin texts and carries a strong authenticity grade. That grade does not turn every speech into a transcript, establish a general history of persecution, or prove that the Gospel clauses examined below caused the refusal. The document is used at one grain only: it presents named finite people refusing a demand, bearing the immediate capital cost of that refusal, and having their answer attributed to them rather than to an institution speaking in their place.

That small scene supplies neither the chapter's conclusion nor a model to be admired into doctrine. It supplies a hard case. A position transmitted through commands of enemy-love, non-retaliation, mercy, self-denial, and possible loss of life can become answerable in a finite deed whose cost is not figurative. The question this chapter was set is whether that position can itself perform the archic function — authorise the whole normative field, terminate the question of right, and remain immune to the interrogation it directs elsewhere. The texts must be read before the classification is made.

## 8.2 The Texts

The translations follow the chapter's collation of the critical editions; textual differences are stated only at the width the trial needs.

**Non-retaliation.** Matthew 5:38–42 places the command inside the antitheses: "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' But I say to you, do not resist the evil one (μὴ ἀντιστῆναι τῷ πονηρῷ)"; the struck right cheek, the cloak, the second mile, the asker, and the borrower follow. The variants in 5:39 touch tense and possession, not the prohibition or the offered cheek. Matthew's compact prohibition has no exact Lukan equivalent — a redactional datum, not a gap to be harmonised.

**Enemy-love.** Matthew 5:43–44 opposes the heard formula to a new imperative: "Love your enemies (ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν) and pray for those who persecute you." Luke 6:27–28 supplies a longer behavioural series: love, do good, bless, pray. Later manuscript streams expand Matthew toward Luke; the shorter Matthean form and the core enemy-love demand remain secure.

**The paired measures.** Matthew 5:48 says, "Be perfect (τέλειοι), therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect." Luke 6:36 says, "Be merciful (οἰκτίρμονες), as your Father is merciful." Neither adjective is materially contested. The difference is therefore part of the literary record: Matthew and Luke do not provide one interchangeable summary term, though both relate the demanded conduct to the Father.

**Lending and reward.** Luke 6:34–35 contrasts reciprocal lending with the command to lend "hoping for nothing in return" (δανίζετε μηδὲν ἀπελπίζοντες) — and immediately promises that "your reward will be great" (ἔσται ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολύς) and that the addressees will be children of the Most High. The critical text reads μηδέν; a minority reading, μηδένα, changes the possible object from "nothing" to "no one" and supports a different construal; and the sense of the rare verb itself remains disputed. The chapter keeps the textual asymmetry in view: non-calculation in the commanded act stands beside reward in the promissory clause, and neither half may erase the other.[61]

**The cross sayings.** Mark 8:34–35 joins self-denial, taking up the cross, following, and losing one's life. Mark's "and the gospel's" has substantial omission evidence and is absent from Matthew's parallel; Luke's "daily" at 9:23 also has omission evidence. Across the parallel forms, self-denial, cross-bearing, following, and the save/lose reversal remain. The sayings make possible a demand borne unto death; they are not, by themselves, a command to seek martyrdom, nor proof that a later execution enacts them.[62]

**The origin clause.** John 18:36 twice denies that Jesus' kingship is from the present world: οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου; οὐκ ἔστιν ἐντεῦθεν. The grammar concerns origin. It does not say that the kingship has no worldly action or consequence, and the verse cannot be used as a ready-made doctrine of political absence.

## 8.3 What the Demands Do

Four features are visible in these texts — and each must be stated more narrowly than the chapter's title.

**Hostility ceases to be a sufficient exclusion from obligation.** Matthew names the friend/enemy division and refuses to let “enemy” end the addressee’s obligation. Luke gives that refusal behavioural form: the hater, curser, and abuser remain within the range of commanded response. This displaces the friend/enemy line as an automatic limit of the demanded conduct. It does not abolish every perimeter: the immediate addressees remain the hearers or followers addressed by the texts, and a later community may still administer who is bound by which command. What is displaced is exact and severe — hostility alone no longer licenses exclusion from concern.

**A finite deed does not exhaust the standing demand.** A cheek can be turned, a cloak given, a mile walked, a loan made, a prayer said. The chapter must not deny the finitude or possible completion of those acts. Yet no one of them exhausts enemy-love, mercy, or the continuing disposition the imperatives name. The contrast is therefore not between an unrealizable infinite and a worthless finite approximation. It is between an answerable deed at a determinate occasion and a demand-form that may address the holder again under another occasion. “Infinite,” where this book retains the word, names this lack of an internal exhaustion rule; it does not name a metaphysical magnitude or prove impossibility.

**The measure is not reduced to a rate — but it is not free of promised return.** The Father-comparisons do not state how much conduct counts as enough, what substitute act is equivalent, or which procedure certifies completion. Matthew’s “perfect” and Luke’s “merciful” must also remain distinct; neither word by itself establishes an asymptote that finite action can only approach. And beside them, Luke places reward and sonship. The transmitted complex therefore resists pricing without becoming simply non-reciprocal: it commands conduct without return-calculation, and promises a return whose equivalence, timing, and mode the passage does not specify.

**Immediate cost and deed-indexed answer can coincide without becoming identical offices.** The struck cheek, surrendered garment, compelled mile, unsecured loan, and lost life place an immediate burden on the addressed performer, and the grammar attributes the finite answer — compliance, refusal, or failure — to that performer. At this deed-indexed grain, the one who bears and the one who answers may coincide. The claimant-position remains different: the one who issues or grounds the demand is not therefore the one whose answer it is. Nor do the texts establish that all downstream costs fall only on the performer: a refusal, a loan, or non-retaliation may affect dependants, victims, institutions, and opponents in ways this corpus does not inventory. The Scillitan act presents the condemned bearing the immediate capital cost of their refusal; it does not warrant the larger claim that they "imposed on no one."

The archic test can now be applied without forcing the result. **Authorisation:** authorising force is present — “But I say to you” does not merely describe conduct; it commands it, and the Father-comparisons supply a warrant internal to the texts. What is not shown is authorisation of the **whole** normative field: the passages address specified practices and relations, and provide no complete jurisdiction, no allocation rule for every conflict, no authorised administrator of every application. **Termination:** within each presentation, the sayings can close a local dispute by placing the command in the speaker’s mouth; across the collated corpus, however, Matthew and Luke preserve different summaries, the lending clause preserves a material variant, and the relation between command, counsel, inward disposition, and particular act remains open to interpretation. The position does not arrive with a rule that terminates every question about what counts as its fulfilment. **Immunity:** the finite holder is not immune — the demand bears on the holder and exposes that holder to cost. The texts may present the speaker or Father as authoritative; but whether a properly divine claimant is actual is methodologically open, and textual authority cannot be converted into an ontological verdict. No human office or institution is supplied as an immune tribunal over the demand.

The joint result is narrower and more defensible than “the inverse of capture.” The corpus does not disclose a candidate that jointly seizes authorisation of the whole field, terminal right, and immunity — so it does not disclose an archic occupation by this position at the textual grain. Any later recruitment that adds a bounded membership, an equivalence or completion rule, a proxy performer, or a protected administrator adds something not supplied by these passages. That is enough to establish transformation as the condition of the later historical question. It is not enough to establish a modal impossibility of recruitment, or to say that the position “prices nothing, completes nothing, delegates nothing, and pays for itself entirely.”

Two guards remain binding. John's origin-language and the Father-comparisons make the demand-position available to reception as more than one finite teacher's ethic — an availability that can help explain later divinising readings without proving the truth or falsity of the divine claim, and without becoming a single-cause history of Christology. And the historical floor remains exactly where the previous chapter left it: a finite who lived and was executed under Roman authority. This chapter analyses transmitted demands; it does not recover the historical utterance of each saying, secure the temple action, or convert Gospel normativity into this book's technical notion of obligation.

## 8.4 The Contrary, Tried

The strongest case against the title is that the demand proves bounded, reciprocal, or institutionally performable. The honest answer is that the evidence does not permit all three limbs of that case simply to fail.

**Bounded?** At the textual level, enemy-status no longer excludes a person from commanded concern. But the commands are addressed to a determinate audience; they do not themselves say that every person or institution holds every demand in the same way. And at the reception level, the precept/counsel architecture did real classificatory work. Augustine reads enemy-love as the perfection of mercy. Aquinas treats love of enemies in general, and preparedness to assist, as preceptive — while distinguishing particular signs and acts outside necessity as belonging to perfection. Calvin's polemic records the contested possibility of converting common commands into a special estate. The result is not "medieval optionality" and it is not "no boundary": a major reception both universalised a core and bounded particular performance. That evidence restricts the absolute form of unboundedness, while the displacement of enemy-exclusion stands intact.[63]

**Exchangeable?** Luke’s reward clause is not incidental. It places demanded conduct within a promissory relation: act without calculating return from the borrower, and a great reward will follow. The text states no rate, price, equivalence, or discharge, and the variant affects how the non-return clause is construed. The chapter may therefore conclude that calculable exchange is not supplied. It may not conclude that exchange-structure is simply absent, or that “the unreckonable” is promised — those are interpretive additions. That evidence partially restricts the claim: promissory reciprocity is present; calculable equivalence is not established.

**Institutionally satisfiable?** Volume I expressly allows genuine institutional answering through records, procedures, authorised organs, and organised continuity. An institution can lend without seeking repayment, adopt non-retaliatory procedures, forgive a debt, or perform mercy through authorised acts; it need not possess a cheek in order to answer in its own register. The stronger question is whether such acts exhaust the whole demand-position — and here the corpus supplies no completion rule by which an office can certify that enemy-love or mercy has been discharged once for all. Institutional performance is possible at act-level; exhaustive institutional satisfaction is not shown. The contrary defeats the categorical claim that institutionalisation necessarily substitutes a durable performer for a mortal one; it does not show an institution completing the standing demand.

Stated without insulation: the findings that would have gone the other way were a boundary in the addressee or performance rule, a return-structure, and an institutionally attributable performance — and the evidence supplies all three **in limited form**: determinate addressees and a later precept/perfection allocation; Luke’s reward promise; institutionally performable acts under the inherited grammar. What the evidence does **not** supply is exclusion of enemies from concern, a calculable equivalence or discharge, a completed jurisdiction over the whole normative field, or an institutionally certifiable exhaustion of the demand. The episode therefore restricts, rather than confirms, the title’s strongest claim.

## 8.5 What the Chapter Returns

The passages command with real authority, but they do not install a human or institutional occupant over the whole normative field. They place immediate burdens on finite performers and make their deeds attributable without revealing every downstream cost. They offer practices of non-retaliation, lending, mercy, and refusal, yet no rule that certifies the demand as exhausted. The Scillitan act shows that a refusal can be performed by named people at mortal cost; it does not reduce the entire demand-complex to that one event or make the performers immune.

**The finding — less than the title.** The corpus does not disclose the demand-position jointly occupying the archic marks, and later archic administration would require added rules or offices these passages do not supply. But "unoccupiable" is not earned as an absolute property: local authorising force, promissory reward, bounded reception, and institutionally attributable acts prevent the stronger confirmation. What the chapter retains is conditional, and it is enough: **not disclosed as an archic occupation at this textual grain; not recruitable into one without interpretive or institutional addition shown elsewhere.**

The dating discipline applies to the demands themselves. The imperatives present continuing or recurrent demands, but grammar alone does not lift them outside history. Matthew's "perfect" and Luke's "merciful," the harmonising expansions, the variant at Luke 6:35, Mark's disputed phrase, and Luke's disputed "daily" disclose transmission and redaction. The chapter may speak of a standing demand because the texts can address another occasion. It may not turn that standing into a timeless object without a history of the reception that made it so.

The position has not vanished under restriction. Its severe finding is now more exact. Hostility does not end the demand; no finite deed exhausts every occasion on which it may return; and no administrator, equivalence rule, or completion certificate is supplied by the collated passages. Yet command, promise, interpretation, and institutional performance are already on the scene. The next chapter must therefore ask not how a pure non-exchange suddenly became exchange, but how a demand without a stated rate or exhaustion rule could be articulated as debt, satisfaction, payment, and bond — and what that articulation added.

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60 *Acta Martyrum Scillitanorum*, in Musurillo, *The Acts of the Christian Martyrs* — used, at its strong authenticity grade, for the document's presented demand-structure: the dated prescript, Saturninus's offers, the refusal, the sentence, the closing thanksgiving. "Transcript," a general persecution policy, and causal derivation from the Gospel corpus are not inferred.

61 Luke 6:34–35 (NA28): μηδέν, with μηδένα a minority reading with Syriac support; the reward clause (μισθός) retained as verdict-bearing evidence rather than redescribed as non-exchange by stipulation. The Greek semantics of ἀπελπίζοντες remain disputed in the scholarship; the reception history of the verse is taken up where the release archive is tried, later in this book.

62 Mark 8:34–35; Matthew 16:24–25; Luke 9:23–24. The omission evidence for Mark's καὶ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου and Luke's καθ' ἡμέραν is printed; textual availability for martyrdom reception is distinguished from a direct martyrdom command.

63 Augustine, *De sermone Domini in monte* I.21; Aquinas, *ST* II–II q.25 aa.8–9 with I–II q.108 a.4; Calvin, *Institutes* II.8. The evidence does not sustain a binary story of medieval optionality versus Reformation universality; Aquinas's general-precept/particular-performance distinction is itself a bounded institutional reception, and counts in the contrary.

# Chapter 9 — The Hyperbolic Bond

This chapter tries no historical case; it builds, in the open, the instrument the rest of the book will use. Anselm and Nietzsche supply the working material as neighbours, not defendants — and neither is evidence for what any institution later did. Capture-claims in this book are tested against institutional episodes only, never inferred from a doctrine or a genealogy; that rule is nowhere more binding than here.

## 9.1 A Translator's Problem

Begin with a word that will not sit still. In the second essay of **Zur Genealogie der Moral**, Nietzsche builds an argument on the German noun **Schuld** and its family, and the three English translations examined for this chapter cannot settle on one rendering. The Cambridge translation deliberately alternates "debt," "guilt," "indebtedness," and the doubled "debt/guilt," printing the German at hinges where one English choice would close the other sense. The Hackett translation tends to reserve "guilt" for the moral noun and "debt" or "debtor" for the material relation. Kaufmann–Hollingdale ranges across "guilt," "debt," and "guilty indebtedness," adding a note where the strain becomes decisive. One word-family, several responsible renderings: **Schuld** can keep together what an English analysis is tempted to separate — what is owed and what is culpable, ledger and conscience, sum and stain.[64]

That lexical fact is not yet a genealogy. It neither proves that moral guilt historically descended from material debt nor licenses the reverse reduction of every debt to guilt. It gives the chapter a disciplined question: what happens when an offer, demand, or standing relation that supplies no finite rule of completion is articulated through a vocabulary of debt, satisfaction, payment, discharge, and remainder?

The previous chapter examined a demand complex that states no rate and no exhaustion rule. Centuries later, a tradition carrying related promises and demands could articulate its founding act through **debitum**, **satisfactio**, and **solutio**. This chapter does not infer a continuous route from the Gospel materials to Anselm merely from that later vocabulary. Its narrower office is to formalise the grammar visible when the unbounded is rendered as a bond.

## 9.2 Bounded and Unbounded

A **bounded promise** supplies, within the practice that states it, a finite interface by which a specified performance can count as made good or failed. The interface need not be infallible, and every bounded promise need not carry a calendar date or numerical price. It must, however, state enough for an authorised and contestable judgment of **this** performance: delivery occurred or did not; the rent was paid or remained in arrears; the coin met the declared standard or failed it. Part II's monetary materials furnish the contrast because there the instance can be presented, tested, recorded, disputed, and, where procedures allow, made good. Particularity and plurality matter: one false coin does not render every coin false, and one satisfied obligation does not settle every other account.

An **unbounded promise** does not contain a comparable rule by which a finite public instance conclusively certifies the whole promise as fulfilled. In this chapter's material, forgiveness of sin, reconciliation with God, the promised reward without a stated measure, and life found through loss exceed any single performance offered as their decisive proof. Finite acts may still count as signs, testimonies, rites, obediences, or failures within a tradition. The definition denies only that one such act, by the promise's own terms, supplies a terminal public verification of the comprehensive standing at issue. "Unbounded" therefore names a missing internal terminus — not a metaphysical magnitude, not a judgment that the promise is false, not a proof that no institution can engage it.

The Part's canonical can now be printed:

> **A bounded promise supplies a finite interface at which a particular performance can count as kept or broken. An unbounded promise supplies no finite public instance that conclusively certifies its comprehensive fulfilment: it may be believed, contested, and institutionally carried. Such carriage is a sedimented fold. It becomes archic only when a finite proxy is promoted into terminal authority over access and right, while claiming immunity from the interrogation it applies elsewhere.**

Each clause requires a guard. **The distinction is not between belief and institution.** Belief may be learned through texts, rites, teachers, communities, and offices. The narrower distinction is between believing or inhabiting the promise and administering finite proxies for access, standing, interpretation, or certification in relation to it; no institutional carriage exhausts the believer's relation.

Administration likewise requires differentiation. Institutions may preserve texts, teach, adjudicate membership, maintain rites, record contributions, discipline office-holders, and repair harms without claiming to fulfil the unbounded promise. Those are finite, attributable acts and remain auditable as such. Administration in this broad historical sense is institutional carriage — a sedimented fold, and not yet an archic fold. The canonical now carries that distinction itself, and the gate restates it for use: **the archic fold begins when administration captures the hyperbolic** — when an institutional proxy for an unbounded standing is promoted into a terminal authority over access and right, and the promoting seat claims immunity from the interrogation it applies elsewhere.

The chapter therefore does not derive capture from unboundedness. It defines a field of risk and a historical test. The promise's comprehensive content lacks an internal finite terminus; the offices that carry it do not thereby become unanswerable. They can still be examined for scope, authorisation, revocability, plurality, enforcement, cost, appeal, and repair. Whether those controls remain operative is a question for the historical chapters — and for them alone.

## 9.3 Anselm: The Debt Booked

At the end of the eleventh century, Anselm of Canterbury gave the debt-articulation of satisfaction a notably exact argumentative form. Sin is defined as a failure of rendering: **Non est itaque aliud peccare quam non reddere deo debitum** — "to sin is nothing other than not to render to God what is owed." What is owed is the subjection of the rational will. Withholding it dishonours God, and satisfaction requires not bare return but the restoration of what was taken together with something beyond what was already owed: **et haec est satisfactio**. Anselm keeps the alternatives distinct: **aut ablatus honor solvatur aut poena sequatur** — either the honour taken is repaid or punishment follows. Later he glosses satisfaction as **debiti solutione spontanea**, voluntary payment of the debt.[65]

The surplus requirement drives the argument. What the debtor already owes cannot count as the additional gift. Anselm's scale passage is therefore stated carefully: one ought not commit even the least sin to preserve the whole created order — the passage is not a numerical price table in which a sin is measured against a universe. In the subsequent argument, what must be offered exceeds everything that is not God. Only God can make such an offering, while a human owes it; hence the God-man. When Anselm calls the sin **tam infinitum** and says that Christ's life answers the world's sins **plus … in infinitum**, the wording concerns the gravity under argument and the sufficiency of the life. **"Infinite debt" is modern shorthand, not Anselm's quoted noun phrase** — and this book records that the stronger attribution is not merely unmade here but barred: nothing in the cited text supports converting Anselm's argument into a doctrine of quantified infinite debt. Nor does "infinite" make the argument calculable. It marks the point at which ordinary created resources cannot close the account as Anselm has framed it.

The offer is voluntary: Christ gives what he does not owe. The gratuitous act calls for a reward, and Anselm assigns the fruit of that reward to those for whose salvation Christ acted. The sequence is therefore voluntary satisfaction, supererogatory gift, reward, and bestowal of its benefit. It should not be redescribed without remainder as transferred punishment — a bar the cited comparison supports at its own grain, while every broader claim about Anselm's relation to later penal doctrines is left to its own evidence. Satisfaction, punishment, gift, and reward remain distinguishable in the text.[66]

The wider corpus confirms the vocabulary while changing its setting. **De conceptu virginali** speaks of a **debitum satisfaciendi** borne with inherited nature; God demands no more than is owed, while Christ renders **plus quam debent** for all the saved. In **Oratio** 19, petitioner and enemy are asked together to **satisfaciamus** their good Lord beside reciprocal debt-forgiveness. The same word-family operates in systematic and devotional registers. The historical background remains disputed — an older interpretation foregrounds feudal honour and lordship; a more recent line stresses Benedictine and penitential settings and denies that wrath-appeasement governs the argument — and neither context is adopted here as an exclusive key.[67]

What the instrument may take from Anselm is formal and limited. His argument displays a debt whose ordinary debtor cannot discharge it from resources already owed, an offering that must come from the God-man, and a benefit assigned beyond the offerer. It is "booked" because the roles and relations are explicitly argued — not because the obligation is numerically quantified, and not because the theology has been institutionally realised. Anselm supplies no evidence that a later office monopolised interpretation, certified standing, priced access, terminated contest, or escaped repair. Those are questions for the historical chapters, and the governing rule forbids his conceptual structure from answering them in advance.

## 9.4 Nietzsche: The Debt Narrated

Eight centuries later, the second essay of Nietzsche's **Genealogy** turns from the logic of satisfaction to the emergence of guilt and debt. II.4 proposes that the moral concept **Schuld** has its origin in the material concept **Schulden**, in the creditor–debtor relation. II.5–8 develop the proposed economy of injury, equivalence, and the creditor's compensatory enjoyment of the debtor's suffering. II.19–20 extend indebtedness toward ancestors and gods as communal power grows. II.21–22 describe its moralisation into an obligation that becomes **unablösbar**, undischargeable, and read Christianity through the creditor who sacrifices himself for the debtor.

The narration must be used at its stated epistemic strength. II.6 says **Dies vermuthungsweise gesprochen** — this is said conjecturally — and the commentary is particularly restrictive at the ancestor projection of II.19. II.12 further distinguishes a thing's emergence from its later use and place within changing systems of purposes: a rule that does not cancel the essay's historical sequence but blocks any simple inference from a later use back to one original function, and warns against treating every stage as one purpose steadily unfolding. The interpretive field remains divided among historical-naturalistic, fictionalist, critical, deconstructive, and source-critical readings. That division is printed here rather than resolved — and one use is barred outright: Nietzsche's conjecture is not adopted as this volume's historical chronology, and no settled anthropology of debt is taken from it.[68]

The translator's problem now yields two exact controls. Nietzsche's **Genugthuung** in II.6 — the creditor's satisfaction in the debtor's suffering — cannot be silently equated with Anselm's technical **satisfactio**: the lexical correspondence is real; the argumentative roles differ. Any later chapter that meets "satisfaction" must establish which grammar its source carries rather than borrowing one from an English cognate. Likewise **Ablösung** and its family — **ablösen**, **unablösbar**, **Unabzahlbarkeit** — cannot be translated as "redemption" in every occurrence without importing a theological outcome into Nietzsche's analysis. These are translation controls, not doctrinal verdicts.

The influence question has a bounded answer. No Anselm title appears in the searched catalogue of Nietzsche's surviving personal library; the apparent "Anselm" occurrence names the jurist Paul Johann Anselm Feuerbach. A catalogue zero does not establish that Nietzsche lacked knowledge acquired through unowned books, lectures, correspondence, or intermediaries. It defeats only the claim that an Anselm title appears in the searched catalogue — and that is all this book claims.[69]

The relation between the neighbours is therefore comparative and structural. Anselm argues how satisfaction can be made where ordinary human resources cannot supply it; Nietzsche conjectures how guilt could be produced from creditor–debtor relations and made undischargeable. From two opposed constructions the chapter may extract questions — deficit, discharge, surplus, benefit, standing, and the keeper of the account. It may not infer a law that every unbounded promise "attracts" debt-language, claim a documented channel between the authors, or make either text evidence that an institution later captured the bond. One is doctrine under argument; the other is genealogy marked at crucial points as conjecture. The refusal of a single genealogy, argued early in this book, governs both.

## 9.5 The Instrument

The hyperbolic bond can now be formalised in five clauses. Each is a reading instrument for the chapters ahead — not a verdict about the neighbours, and not a verdict about the institutions to come.

**(1) Grammar.** A **hyperbolic bond** is an offer–promise–obligation complex whose comprehensive fulfilment or standing is not conclusively decidable by a finite public instance under criteria internal to the bond. "Hyperbolic" names this excess over an internally terminal verification interface. It does not mean metaphysically infinite, necessarily divine, false, impossible to enact in any respect, or incapable of finite signs.

**(2) Contrast-class.** A bounded bond states a finite performance and an interface at which this performance can count as made good, failed, or disputed. Its judgments may be fallible, but they concern particular instances and can be publicly revised. Bounded and hyperbolic are analytical contrast-classes, not historical stages. Their co-presence in a society does not establish a route from coin to creed or creed to coin.

**(3) Faith and carriage.** Faith in a hyperbolic bond is not identical with its institutional carriage. Faith may be institutionally mediated, and institutions may teach, transmit, interpret, ritualise, and contest the bond. None of those acts, by itself, proves that an office fulfils the promise or owns the believer's relation to it. The finite acts of carriage remain attributable and auditable even where the promise's comprehensive truth or fulfilment does not.

**(4) Administration and capture.** Administration begins where institutions govern finite proxies for relation to the bond — membership, confession, rite, discipline, remission, certification, benefit, or exclusion. Such governance is not automatically archic. Capture requires an episode to show the joint promotion: a proxy or administering form authorises the wider normative field, terminates the question of right, and exempts its own standing from the interrogation it directs elsewhere. Inherited folds carry; archic folds usurp. Which occurred must be established through evidence of office, scope, revocability, plural interpretation, enforcement, cost, appeal, and repair.

**(5) Fuel-thesis.** The hyperbolic can feed an archic fold because the bond itself supplies no finite instance capable of finally certifying the comprehensive standing at stake. This creates room for finite proxies to be treated as if they closed what they only carry: a rite as proof of ultimate standing, an entry as possession of the promise, an office's judgment as the end of right, a payment as exhaustive discharge. The inference is a risk condition — not a verdict, and not a causal law. Administration remains auditable at its own finite grain even when the promise is not: one can ask who created the proxy, who applies it, who bears its cost, who may contest it, what reverses its decision, and where repair terminates. The fold-fuel lies not in the disappearance of audit but in the possible promotion of a corrigible proxy into an incorrigible terminus.

This formulation preserves the hyperbolic without condemning it, and institutions without absolving them. A promise may exceed finite verification without licensing anyone to speak in its name. An office may organise finite practices around that promise without claiming the archic seat. Conversely, an institution does not escape the trial by saying that its object is uncheckable: its own offices, records, sanctions, distributions, and repairs are historical acts with finite places of answer.

## 9.6 What Would Show the Instrument Wrong

The gate requires a genuine contrary: what would show an unbounded promise remaining institutionally non-captured? The previous chapter's restriction governs the answer. The contrary cannot demand the absence of all offices, registers, interpretation, discipline, or certification — that would define ordinary institutional existence as capture and make non-capture available only to a promise with no durable public carriage.

The evidence that would go the other way is therefore institutional evidence of **non-terminal administration**. A tradition may maintain texts, rites, offices, membership practices, and judgments while keeping their scope finite: several authorised interpretations remain possible; offices are removable or jurisdictionally limited; judgments can be appealed, reversed, or repaired; registers record a standing without claiming to constitute the promise's ultimate truth; rites are treated as practices or signs rather than self-certifying possession; enforcement answers to identified norms and identified places; costs remain traceable; and no office converts its role in carriage into immunity from question. A particularly strong contrary would be a documented internal refusal of terminalisation — an instance in which participants reject the claim that a payment exhausts the bond, that a register owns its benefit, or that one office may close interpretation for the whole field.

These conditions do not predict what the historical chapters will return. They specify findings that could restrict or defeat a capture claim even where administration is dense. They also leave room for mixed results: an office may be revocable but its sanctions unappealable; interpretation may be plural while access is monopolised; a register may be corrigible while its costs are displaced. The episodes must determine whether such mixtures amount to restriction, openness, failure, no trial, or — in a properly supported case — confirmation. Anselm and Nietzsche contribute no evidence to that determination.

One dating observation closes the chapter. Anselm’s argument can be received as though its debt were simply timeless; Nietzsche’s sequence can be received as though the development were inevitable. Neither reception follows from the cited texts. Anselm argues through staged premises and objections in datable prose; Nietzsche marks a crucial proposal as conjecture and separates emergence from later use. The chapters ahead inherit the narrower audit: when a source or an institution presents the bond as always already in force, or its administration as the only possible outcome, the claim must be dated to its carrier and tested against counter-practice.

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Part III closes with a disputed gesture, a demand whose supposed unoccupiability did not survive unchanged, and an instrument that can be defeated by historical evidence. The next Part must ask how bonds were actually carried — in practices, offices, formulas, and memberships — before any Constantinian verdict can be returned. Chapter 10 therefore begins with **religio**: a word for binding and keeping whose history must be tested at its own grain. Nothing in the hyperbolic instrument preclassifies that history as capture.

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[64] Direct inspection of Diethe (Cambridge revised edition), Clark–Swensen (Hackett), and Kaufmann–Hollingdale against the critical German text (KGW VI/2, with the KSA 5 page map) for GM II.4–22. The *Schuld/Schulden* relation is Nietzsche's pivot at II.4.

[65] Anselm, *Cur Deus homo*, ed. Schmitt, *Opera omnia* II: I.11 (68.10; 69.1–2); I.12–15 (69.11–13; 71.24–26); I.19 (85.28–30); I.20–21 (84–90); II.6–7 (101.3–21); II.14 (113.21–24; 114.29–33).

[66] *Cur Deus homo* II.18 (127.27–30; 129.5–15); II.19 (130.4–131). The penal-doctrine differentiation follows Sutherland, *Saint Anselm Journal* 13.1 (2017), 98–108; non-identity is stated at the cited textual grain only.

[67] *De conceptu virginali* 2 (II 141.16–25) and 22–23 (162–166); *Oratio* 19 (III 73–75, at 74.30–43). The background dispute per Visser–Williams, *Anselm* (2009), 213–232, and van Willigenburg, *Saint Anselm Journal* 18.1 (2022), 67–92; neither position adopted exclusively.

[68] KGW VI/2, 313–349 (KSA 5, 291–334 as page map): II.4, II.6, II.12, II.19–22. The interpretive map per Janaway, Owen, Kail, Sommer, and Prescott-Couch — printed as a division, not resolved.

[69] Campioni et al., *Nietzsches persönliche Bibliothek* (2003), catalogue pp. 97–713; the Feuerbach false positive at p. 224. The negative is bounded to the searched surviving catalogue.

# PART IV — THE BOND AND THE SLOT: RELIGIO AND THE CONSTANTINIAN QUESTION

Here **slot** names the bounded institutional place through which attachment is named, tested, certified, disciplined, or sanctioned. The Part asks whether such a place remains an answerable locus for specified acts or is promoted into an archic seat; the title decides neither result. A single Latin noun enters this Part carrying several ancient stories about its own origin. Who told each story, when, and for what argumentative purpose opens the larger question: how inherited public cultic practices met affiliations that Roman and Christian institutions increasingly named, tested, and disciplined.

# Chapter 10 — Religio: Keeping, Binding, and the Tested Name

## 10.1 A Word with Rival Stories

In the second book of Cicero's **De natura deorum**, the Stoic spokesman Balbus derives **religiosi** from careful reconsideration: **qui autem omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent diligenter retractarent et tamquam relegerent, sunt dicti religiosi ex relegendo** — those who diligently went over again all that pertained to the worship of the gods, and as it were re-read it, were called **religiosi**, from **relegere**.[70] More than three centuries later Lactantius quotes the passage in order to reverse it: **hoc uinculo pietatis obstricti deo et religati sumus, unde ipsa religio nomen accepit** — by this bond of piety we are tied and bound (**religati**) to God, whence **religio** itself received its name.[71] Careful reconsideration against binding; a speaker's account of scrupulous cultic attention against an apologist's exclusive attachment to one God. The opposition is genuine. It is not yet a history.

That distinction governs the chapter. The first case registered the **relegere/religare** opposition as an index of a larger movement — from embedded, practice-primary membership toward portable, confession-primary belonging. The evidence, as we shall see, restricts the index: the two etymologies are datable argumentative interventions, but the usage record does not reproduce their clean succession. The second case must therefore be tried on the documents that can bear a membership claim — interrogations, ritual tests, certificates, refusals, disciplinary distinctions, and paths of return — without making the etymology do historical work it cannot perform.

## 10.2 What the Texts Show

**Cicero's derivation.** The **relegere** derivation stands in Ax's text at **ND** 2.72 with no material variant altering its semantic claim. It also stands in a dialogue, in the mouth of Balbus, whose Stoic theology Cotta subjects to Academic criticism in Book 3. "Performed keeping" is therefore a compact paraphrase of this speaker's etymological figure. It is not a settled republican essence, a complete definition of Roman cult, or Cicero's unqualified last word — and it may not be read as empty externalism. The account adopted here from Scheid fixes the phrase's admissible sense for this chapter: Roman cult was obligatory, meaning-bearing practice — rites that controlled and generated emotion, embodied a shared ritual truth, and possessed intelligible meanings while permitting multiple, non-binding interpretations; the one collectively binding truth was the obligation to perform. Where this chapter says "performed keeping," it means binding, repeatedly maintained practice whose meanings were plural rather than doctrinally uniform — never mere outward performance or absence of reflection.[72]

The republican lexical evidence is broader than the figure. The republican dictionaries record that pre-Christian **religio** ranges across constraint and prohibition, scruple and impediment, divine sanction, awe or fear, sanctity, ritual observance, cult, and conscientious regard; **religiosus** ranges from taboo and sacred place to scrupulous conduct. These ranges defeat a narrow starting field: the evidence rules out a single exclusive republican meaning or one linear starting sense. The range evidence does not by itself establish frequency, chronology, or the absence of all semantic change; no count or succession claim is inferred from dictionary glosses, and none is needed — the polysemous baseline is the finding.[73]

**Lactantius's bond.** The **religare** derivation stands at **Div. inst.** 4.28.3–12 in Heck–Wlosok's text. The reported variants — **obligati** for **religati** and a **relegando/religando** branch — do not erase Lactantius's opposition to Cicero. Its context also prevents a familiar simplification. True **religio** involves recognition, worship, service, and obedience toward the true God. Practice is retained within the bond. The exclusivity concerns the bond's claimed object and truth — not an escape from embodied cult into a private interiority.[74]

**The counter-arrow.** Three controls prevent these two etymologies from becoming a semantic timeline.

First, Tertullian writes before Lactantius and already uses **religio** in arguments about named Christian adherence, differentiated **religiones**, and the wrongness of compelled worship. **Religionis libertatem** and **religionis non est cogere religionem** are ancient polemical formulations in a Roman juridical and apologetic setting; they are not silently translated into the full modern category "religious freedom." Their chronological force is narrower — and sufficient: usages commonly assigned to the supposed later field already operate **before** Lactantius's binding derivation, and **religio** remains only one term among **disciplina**, **fides**, and others in Tertullian's own repertoire.[75]

Second, Augustine multiplies rather than settles the wordplay. **De vera religione** uses the binding figure — **ei uni religantes animas nostras … unde religio dicta creditur**, and **Religet ergo nos religio**. **De civitate Dei** 10.3 instead plays **eligentes**, **religentes**, and **neglegentes**: choosing, choosing again or recovering, and having neglected. This is not simply Cicero's re-reading etymology restored. It is another Christian intervention — and **creditur** and **perhibetur** mark the derivations as reported accounts.[76]

Third, the modern philology remains deliberately non-final. Benveniste argues morphologically for **relegere** and against **religare**; Ernout–Meillet ends **Pas de certitude**; Walde–Hofmann surveys and declines; de Vaan's placement under **ligāre** is tentative; and the morphology raises difficulties for deriving **religio** straightforwardly from **religare** and for explaining **religens**. One point stands on its own: Weiss derives **religiosus** from **religio** as a denominative possessive adjective in **-ōsus**, glossing the Plautine pair "superstitious"/"superstition" — a morphology of the derivative, expressly not an adjudication of **relegere** against **religare**, and no replacement for the comparative dictionaries or the ancient witnesses. The chapter therefore calls Cicero's, Lactantius's, and Augustine's proposals **ancient etymologies**, and promotes none of them into a linguistic conclusion. A fourth ancient witness, the etymology transmitted under Servius's name, cannot be assigned to a securely isolated textual stratum, and is not used.[77]

**What "religion" can mean here.** The ancient materials may not be converted into the modern bounded generic "religion" — and this caution is a documented two-position dispute among scholars, not a private methodological preference. The strongest case is Nongbri's: the target is the modern genus — private inward faith imagined as separable from politics and other secular domains; descriptive and redescriptive categories must be distinguished, and a redescriptive use is legitimate only if acknowledged as such; ancient **religio** ranged across scruple, rule, rite, worship, and boundary-making without delineating a modern religious/secular sphere. The serious contrary is Scheid's: rejecting an inward, revelation-centred essence of Religion — itself a Christian theological inheritance — does not require refusing all comparative use of the word; socially embedded civic ritual had rules, meanings, reflection, individual participation, and change, and treating ritual, communal, state-entangled systems as "non-religions" repeats the very essentialism under critique. His translator's foreword maps the further objections — North, Woolf, Bendlin — that religious activity and individual choice were not exhausted by state cult. The positions disagree about category use; they converge against treating modern private belief as the ancient default. This book adopts the convergence and declares its own usage: "religion" appears here only as an analytic convenience; the ancient legal, civic, ethnic, cultic, and confessional nouns are preserved at the point of evidence; the absence of a modern category is never converted into the absence of gods, rites, or obligations; and the claim that imperial law administered a ready-made transhistorical object called "religion" is barred. "Cultic order," "membership," "attachment," and "bond" remain working descriptions, not names of two civilisational essences.[78]

## 10.3 Origin Stories Are Dated Arguments

The etymological story would fail if the usage evidence showed the semantic field **not** shifting as claimed — and the available evidence reaches that counter-evidence far enough to defeat the clean arrow, not far enough to prove that no semantic change occurred.

The republican field is already too broad to supply a narrow baseline of “performed keeping.” Tertullian’s pre-Lactantian usage prevents exclusive attachment, differentiated adherence, or anti-compulsion argument from being dated to Lactantius’s etymology. Lactantius retains worship and obedience within binding. Augustine later deploys more than one Christian etymological figure rather than completing a linear succession. The rival derivations are therefore evidence of dated **normative etymologising**: each author recruits an origin-story to articulate what **religio** should mean within the present argument. They are not adequate proxies for the usage history they claim to explain.

**The finding — less than the claim.** The dispute over the word is a datum within the larger transformation; the two-word derivational sequence is not a sufficient index of that transformation. The broader diachronic question remains open by the nature of the surviving evidence — the closed range material fixes the polysemous baseline without supplying a dated succession — and the restriction does not harden into proof that no semantic change occurred.

Dating each derivation changes what it can show. Each ancient etymology presents a contemporary argumentative allocation as though it were the word’s immemorial content. Dating the carrier removes that costume: Balbus’s figure belongs to a Ciceronian dialogue of the 40s BCE; Lactantius’s reversal to an early fourth-century apologetic project; Augustine’s wordplays to later Christian arguments that do not even choose one route consistently. The apparent origin is a sequence of dated claims about origin.

## 10.4 Membership: The Documentary Interface

Four strata are held apart throughout this reconstruction — the finite person, the public form of address, the institution, and the claimed divine addressee. They are analytical distinctions applied to the documents, not distinctions attributed to Roman officials or Christian authors.

**Two histories that must not become essences.** Earlier Parts documented civic and cultic practices organised through rite, locality, calendar, temple, office, endowment, and public verification. Those findings permit an embedded profile at their established width. They do not license "paganism" as an essence, or the claim that every ancient affiliation was local, inherited, and merely performative. The larger historical claim is likewise a question, not a premise: whether confession, conversion, mission, and translocal community displaced rite, locality, and ancestry. The present record bears directly on named adherence, compulsory performance, refusal, and institutional discipline. It bears only indirectly — and at several points not at all — on the rest of that registered sequence.

**Pliny: a name tested by performances.** In Bithynia around 112, Pliny asks whether punishment attaches to **nomen ipsum**, the name itself, or to **flagitia cohaerentia nomini**, crimes adhering to the name. His improvised procedure repeatedly asks the accused whether they are Christians. Those who persist are punished or, where Roman citizenship intervenes, referred onward; those who deny are required to invoke the gods, offer incense and wine before the emperor's image, and curse Christ — acts Pliny says genuine Christians cannot be compelled to perform. Trajan rejects anonymous accusations and refuses a universal form while approving the procedure's practical direction.[79]

The document does not show confession replacing performance. It shows the two joined administratively: a named adherence is elicited in speech and tested by public acts. Nor does **nomen** by itself prove a modern portable identity. What the letter securely shows is that refusal of civic cult had become a governmental problem attached to a named class — and that a Roman governor used repeatable acts to decide whether a person's asserted or imputed attachment persisted. There was no named anti-Christian statute behind him that the evidence recovers; his procedure is a governor's **cognitio**, and it must not be fused with what came later.

**Decius: performance certified.** In 250 the interface differs. The lost order is reconstructed from an empire-wide requirement to sacrifice, taste, and obtain certification before local commissioners. The published corpus used in this chapter contains forty-six **libelli**, thirty-four from the Theadelphia archive, several produced by professional scribes from shared models and countersigned by officials. One certificate records Aurelius Sakis, with his children Aion and Heras, declaring that he had always sacrificed and had now sacrificed, poured a libation, and tasted the offerings in the commissioners' presence; witness-hands attest what they saw.[80]

The papyri establish an administrative form and individual performances. They do not identify every certificate-holder as Christian, and their survival pattern is not a denominator for Christian compliance: Christian participation, evasion, and refusal must be established from the Christian and judicial dossiers, not read out of forty-six Egyptian certificates. The purpose of the lost order also stays where the evidence leaves it — anti-Christian design, traditional restoration, supplication for imperial welfare, and administrative universalism remain ranked interpretations, with any single-purpose thesis barred. Pliny's provincial **cognitio** and the Decian certification system are two dates, two procedures, and two source problems, and they are kept so.[81]

**Refusals, graded.** The judicial and martyrological materials differ in strength, and the strongest cores are these: the Scillitan hearing of 180 (strong core); Cyprian's 257 hearing and 258 trial and execution (strong cores); Perpetua (good composite); Polycarp (graded, its chronology disputed — though the text of its crucial chapters is now directly secured, with the date and compositional strata still contested). At their secure cores they present named finite persons who refuse an oath, sacrifice, delay, or release-test under immediate threat, imprisonment, or execution.[82] These are **refusals** in this book's exact sense wherever the dated act, the offered exit, the refusal, and the cost are recoverable. Effects on households, congregations, dependants, and unnamed others remain real possibilities the sources do not inventory.

**Cyprian: compliance and return administered.** Cyprian's **De lapsis** and the letter to Antonianus distinguish sacrifice from certificate-procurement and refuse to level every form of lapse: eager sacrifice, sacrifice after resistance or compulsion, action taken for a household, and a purchased **libellus** obtained to avoid the altar do not receive one undifferentiated treatment. The discipline ranges from prolonged penance through communion in danger of death to eventual restoration.[83]

This material supplies the strongest case-level evidence for an exclusive boundary in the whole dossier: an act performed before Roman officials, or a certificate obtained without the act, becomes a differentiated problem of ecclesial communion. Yet even here the formulation must remain exact. The sources show bishops and communities administering lapse and return across correspondence and councils. They do not, by themselves, establish the whole registered displacement of locality and ancestry, or a complete history of conversion, mission, and translocal organisation. What is documented is a double administration: Roman institutions test and certify public performance; Christian institutions grade what those performances and certificates mean for continued communion.

## 10.5 A Boundary Crossed and Administered

The documents do not describe a single passage from rite to confession. They show institutions making particular signs do new work. Pliny turns invocation, sacrifice, wine, and a curse into a test of whether a named adherence persists. The Decian procedure turns witnessed performance and official attestation into evidence of compliance. Cyprian and the councils make sacrifice, purchased certification, penance, and return bear differently upon communion. Name and act are joined in these procedures, but they do not become identical; neither a church, an empire, nor the name "Christian" thereby becomes a person.

The authority disclosed here is real and bounded. Governors order dispositions, the emperor answers a governor, commissioners attest performances, and bishops and councils decide particular questions of communion. Sentences, certificates, and readmission judgments close particular procedures. They do not reveal one office in which authorisation, termination, and immunity are joined. Trajan's refusal of a universal rule, the variation among procedures, the controversy over the lapsed, and the graded routes of return all prevent administration from being redescribed as capture. They do not prove that confession is incapable of archic use; they show only that such a use has not been established here.

The immediate costs are borne by the named people whom the strongest records allow us to identify: interrogation, imprisonment, exclusion, penance, and execution. The wider incidence upon households, congregations, dependants, and others remains unmeasured. Nor is every documentary interface a place of final answer. A countersignature proves that an act was witnessed; it does not make the commissioner answer for imperial policy. A bishop or council answers for a disciplinary judgment at the grain preserved by its letters; it does not thereby answer for the whole history of the bond.

The centuries-long transformation is not itself one act. Within it, some dated proceedings are refusals because the demanded act, the offered exit, the refusal, and the cost can be recovered. Cyprian's penance and return are genuine practices of restoration, but the present sources do not disclose enough about beneficiaries and distributed costs to classify them as repair in this book's stricter sense.

The strongest evidence against exclusive rebinding is not marginal. Roman authorities continue to demand cultic performance; some Christians sacrifice, obtain certificates, or act for households; and communities receive at least some of the lapsed through differentiated discipline. The boundary is crossed and administered rather than uniformly obeyed. Yet additive participation has not remained normatively unmarked within Christian communion: the refusals, the distinction between sacrifice and certificate, penance, and adjudicated return make the boundary real.

The result is therefore narrower than the original claim. These documents establish named adherence tested through civic performance and a differentiated Christian administration of lapse and return. They do not establish that confession, conversion, mission, and translocal community displaced rite, locality, and ancestry across the period. The transformation this chapter can document is a double administration: Roman institutions make civic performance a test of named adherence, while Christian institutions make performance, evasion, lapse, and return questions of communion. The word-stories do not prove a semantic history; the documents prove a narrower double administration.

Chapter 10 leaves three historical handles in view: a name interrogated, a rite used as a test, and compliance certified or disciplined. It does not yet show those handles joined in one immune and terminal seat. The next chapter must therefore ask a new question of new documents: whether imperial coordination of doctrine and institutions joins authorisation, termination, and immunity strongly enough to constitute the Constantinian type. Nothing in **religio**'s etymology, and nothing in portable attachment by itself, decides that trial.

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[70] Cic. *ND* 2.72 (Ax, 77–78); no material variant alters the semantic claim. Balbus is the named Stoic spokesman; Book 3 supplies Cotta's Academic criticism.

[71] Lact. *Div. inst.* 4.28.3–12 (Heck–Wlosok, 424–427); variants *obligati* and the *relegando/religando* branch; translation control Bowen–Garnsey, 275–277.

[72] The ritual-performance qualification: John Scheid, *The Gods, the State, and the Individual*, trans. Clifford Ando (Penn, 2016), 113–124, esp. 118, 121–124 — the one collectively binding truth was the obligation to perform; interpretations were plural and non-binding.

[73] OLD (1968), s.v. *religio*, senses 1–10, and *religiosus*, senses 1–8; TLL, same lemmata. Any single or exclusive republican meaning is negatively closed; the range is retained without frequency or corpus-count claims.

[74] Recognition, worship, service, and obedience remain inside Lactantius's bond (Bowen–Garnsey, 275–277).

[75] Tert. *Apol.* 24 (*religionis libertatem*, at CCSL 1); *Ad Scap.* 2 (*religionis non est cogere religionem*). Used as chronological counterexamples, not as the modern generic "religion" or a complete doctrine of religious freedom; the *disciplina/fides* repertoire per Barton–Boyarin.

[76] Aug. *De vera religione* 55.111–113 (CCSL 32, 259); *De civ. Dei* 10.3 (CCSL 47, 275): *eligentes uel potius religentes (amiseramus enim neglegentes)*. Augustine's *religentes* is not collapsed into Cicero's *relegere*.

[77] Benveniste II, 265–272; Ernout–Meillet, 1004–1005; Walde–Hofmann I, 351–353; de Vaan, 341; van Beek on the morphology. Michael Weiss, *Outline of the Historical and Comparative Grammar of Latin* (Beech Stave Press, 2009 — the first edition), p. 296, §II.B.23 with nn. 156–158: *religiosus* ← *religio* only. The Servian etymology (ad *Aen.* 8.349) cannot be assigned to a securely isolated stratum.

[78] Brent Nongbri, *Before Religion* (Yale, 2013), 15–24 and 25–45, esp. 18–24 and 26–30; Scheid, *The Gods, the State, and the Individual*, xix–xxiii, 1–4, 113–124, with Ando's foreword xi–xvi (North, Woolf, Bendlin mapped); Barton–Boyarin, *Imagine No Religion*, chs. 3–7, the registered parallel critique.

[79] Plin. *Ep.* 10.96–97 (Mynors, 338–340); Sherwin-White, 691–712, the legal-historical control. The *nomen* question is not turned into proof of modern identity, or of confession replacing rite.

[80] The Decian system per Rives, *JRS* 89 (1999), 135–141, and Schubert, *JRS* 106 (2016), 172–194; P.Mich. III 157 (Aurelius Sakis, Theadelphia, 17 June 250); P.Oxy. IV 658. The certificates prove the procedure and named performances, not forty-six identified Christian lapses.

[81] The motive question: Rives, 147, 151–152; Schubert, 173; ranked interpretations per Keresztes, Potter, and Ando. *Cognitio* and certification system are never merged.

[82] Register grades: Scillitan A−; Cyprian's proceeding cores A−; Perpetua B+; Polycarp B, chronology disputed — chapters 9–10 text-direct, date and strata contested; not a stenographic transcript.

[83] Cypr. *De laps.* 27; Ep. 55 (= 51 in the supplied collection), 13–17 and 28–29. No population-scale rate and no complete translocal history is inferred.

# Chapter 11 — The Constantinian Configuration

This chapter's title names what the evidence earns: a configuration — coordinated institutions carrying a bond — and not a capture. Whether the configuration became an archic fold is precisely what the chapter must decide from the evidence, and its answer is not preinstalled by the title.

## 11.1 An Emperor Moves a Meeting

A letter of Constantine often cited as the convocation of Nicaea survives in Syriac. At the document's own grain it performs a narrower act. The letter — Urkunde 20 in the older numbering, document 30 in the **Fontes Nicaenae Synodi** — presupposes a large synod already agreed for Ancyra and directs that it meet instead at Nicaea. The emperor gives practical reasons: the city's accessibility for bishops arriving from the western provinces, its climate, and his wish to be present as observer and participant.[84]

The correction matters because it prevents an origin story. The letter does not show the emperor inventing a council or creating the dispute that occasioned it. It shows an ecclesial synodal process already under way, and an imperial intervention capable of relocating that process, attaching the emperor's presence to it, and supplying a new civic setting. The two initiatives remain distinct even as their instruments meet.[85] Nicaea is therefore approached here as a documented **imperial–conciliar configuration** — not as a scene in which one collective subject conquers another.

The case carries four separable lines: imperial involvement in doctrinal unity; the treatment of heretic or dissident as a political category; the proposed scaling routes; and the Constantinian type as a structural definition. The contrary registered against them asks what would show doctrinal plurality remaining politically non-terminal and institutionally non-immunised. No line borrows a verdict from another.

## 11.2 The Documentary Floor

The principal floor is the eighty-document collection extending from the Meletian opening of 304/5 to Constantine's death in 337, printed in the original languages with apparatus and the Opitz concordances — inspected throughout in its Italian edition of record.[86] It is not a transcript of the council. No complete Acts survive, the subscription evidence is incomplete, and the later narrative witnesses require their own grading. What does survive is nevertheless sufficient for several narrower trials.

The council's own instruments include the creed with its anathemas, whose variants are printed rather than harmonised; the twenty canons, with later accretions kept out of the 325 floor; the synodal and imperial communications; Eusebius of Caesarea's letter to his church explaining his subscription; and the surviving subscription evidence — which supports near-general assent with named exceptions (Theonas and Secundus are identified as non-signers) but does not support the reconstruction of one pristine complete roll.

The anti-Arius edict orders Arius's writings burned, directs that his followers be called **Porphyrians**, and states capital punishment for concealment of the condemned writings. Its exact position and date within the documentary sequence remain a printed dispute; modern chronologies do not all place it at the same point. This chapter therefore uses it only for the proposition its text can bear across that dispute: a Constantinian imperial instrument applied naming, confiscatory destruction, and a stated civil penalty to a doctrinal classification. It does not infer an execution from a threatened penalty, and it does not date the edict as an immediate effect measured in months from the council.[87]

On presidency, the dispute has a firm negative edge. The unnamed opening speaker in Eusebius's account is probably Ossius of Corduba — expressly possibly another bishop; and Eusebius's plural, οἱ τῆς συνόδου πρόεδροι, names **presidents** of the synod rather than one demonstrable presiding officer. Neither sole procedural presidency by Constantine nor one recoverable ecclesiastical president is established. The governing formula is therefore: **venue transfer and convocation-support, patronage, mediation, presence, and sanction — not demonstrable sole procedural presidency**.[88]

Two further bars close the floor. First, **Cunctos populos** dates to Thessalonica, 27 February 380, and is locally addressed — **ad populum urbis Constantinopolitanae** — while its universalising opening creates a real and printed scope dispute. Neither its naming nor its standing formula is projected into 325 or Constantine's reign. The wider legal record is now available as a dated-and-bounded sequence — the privilege series and coercive classifications enacted over time, the **episcopalis audientia** materials divided over consent, appeal, enforcement, and the authenticity of the Sirmondian evidence, the Sunday and Easter provisions with distinct histories — and it enters this chapter only under a binding rule: no law later than 325 may be used as the council's legal environment without an explicit later-date flag. It supplies context for the aftermath, and no verdict here.[89] Second, the **Vita Constantini** documents an authorised resource route — imperial instruction, provincial officials, access to the treasury, episcopal specification of need, and prefectural compliance. It does not establish a universal funding system or identify the funded phase of any excavated building; and that limit is a closed negative, not a pending inquiry: the surviving sources cannot recover a universal archaeological funding chain, so the route is cited as a legal-administrative possibility, never as automatic provenance for masonry.[90]

## 11.3 Involvement and Civil Enforcement

**The first line — imperial involvement in doctrinal unity — is confirmed at instrument width.** The evidence is not the venue-transfer letter alone. It is the conjunction of relocation, Constantine's documented presence and opening intervention, post-conciliar communications recommending or pressing the settlement, and imperial sanctions attached to doctrinal and episcopal outcomes. The confirmation does not establish sole presidency, authorship of the creed, creation of the synodal process, or unilateral control of every outcome. Had imperial action been limited to hospitality or logistics, with no intervention in settlement or sanction, this line would have failed at its registered width; the presence, the interventions, the unity communications, and the exiles prevent that result.

**The second line — heretic or dissident as a political category — is also confirmed, but only at the width of the Arius dossier.** Doctrinal classification entered civil administration when imperial instruments attached exile to named persons, ordered writings destroyed, threatened capital punishment for concealment, and imposed the name **Porphyrians** on Arius's adherents. These acts show more than ecclesial censure: they show a bounded doctrinal classification becoming an object of imperial command, penalty, and official naming.[91] The limit is as important as the finding. This dossier does not establish that every heresy, every dissident, or every doctrinal difference in Constantine's reign had become one general political category; nor does the order prove that the threatened capital penalty was executed. Had doctrinal exclusion remained wholly ecclesial — no civil penalty, no destruction order, no official naming — the line would have returned empty; the exile, the edict, and the imposed name prevent that result.

## 11.4 Reversal and the Two Senses of Termination

The registered contrary receives substantial support from the reversals. Eusebius of Nicomedia and Theognis, exiled after the settlement, were recalled and restored. Eustathius of Antioch was later deposed. Arius was summoned, submitted a profession, and was ordered toward readmission — the readmission not completed before his death. At Tyre in 335, a synodal judgment against Athanasius was followed by imperial exile. After Constantine's death, exiled bishops were permitted to return. The controversy continued through later councils and formulas beyond the chronological floor of this trial.[92]

This sequence establishes that the 325 settlement did not make doctrinal plurality politically final. Persons, formulas, and episcopal outcomes remained revisable; related combinations of synodal judgment and imperial action were used in changing directions. It does **not** show that Nicaea invented synods, subscription, episcopal discipline, or imperial adjudication. The narrower historical finding is that the Constantinian period made an imperial–conciliar machinery repeatedly available across reversals.

Two meanings of "termination" must now be held apart. In the registered contrary, **politically non-terminal** asks whether one doctrinal settlement ended the controversy as a historical sequence. It did not. In this book's inherited test, **termination** asks whether a promoted office or form closes a particular question of right. Exile, deposition, exclusion, and ordered readmission did terminate particular questions for particular persons at particular moments — even when a later instrument reversed them. Later correction is evidence of revisability; it is not proof that the earlier act never terminated anything. The accurate result is therefore the more difficult one: **successive terminal acts occurred inside a politically non-final controversy.** That finding weakens claims of durable doctrinal finality while preserving the local termination mark at the acts where it is actually evidenced.

The same discipline applies to immunity. Reversal shows that doctrinal outcomes and office-holders were not simply beyond change. It does not by itself show that the imperial power to sanction, or the imperial–conciliar configuration as a whole, was subjected to the same interrogation it directed at doctrinal parties. The sources used here do not establish immunity — and neither do the reversals defeat it at the relevant structural seat. The mark remains underdetermined, and the honest word for the larger question will therefore be **undecided**.

## 11.5 The Scaling Routes

The registered list of candidate scaling routes named titles, imperial-cult inheritances, **koina**, festivals, councils, episcopal institutions, and local administration. The sources reach only part of that list, and the unreached part is reported as unreached.

**Councils and episcopal institutions: confirmed at canon grain.** Canons 4 and 5 organise episcopal ordination, metropolitan ratification, excommunication review, and twice-yearly provincial synods through the categories of province and metropolitan. Canon 6 preserves ancient jurisdictional customs; canon 7 accords honour to Aelia while preserving metropolitan dignity. The canons evidence a church order capable of provincial coordination and scheduled review. They do not by themselves prove that the church copied an imperial template or "adopted the empire as its skeleton": correspondence with provincial geography is established; causal borrowing remains untried.[93]

**The local administrative and resource route: confirmed at authorised-route width.** The **Vita**'s chain links imperial command, governors, treasury, prefect, and episcopally specified building need. The finding is a route of coordination — not a universal fiscal system, and not an archaeological attribution.

**Titles, imperial-cult inheritances, koina, and festivals: not tried here.** The sources do not carry these candidate routes at the grain a verdict requires. They remain untried in this execution, and any later reclassification requires a documented reopening — never an analogy from the two routes that did reach.

## 11.6 A Configuration That Does Not Yet Classify Itself

The registered definition can now be stated without pre-judging its classification:

> **The Constantinian configuration is an imperial–confessional coordination in which a bond whose comprehensive truth is not conclusively decidable by the finite political instruments examined here is administered through a bounded sovereign order, and doctrinal dissent is translated into an object of civil threat. Whether this configuration becomes an archic fold is precisely the open question of the trial.**

At the present grain, the first term is inherited from Chapter 9's instrument, not re-proved as a complete social history by Chapter 10. The second and third terms are documented here through imperial–conciliar coordination and the Arius enforcement dossier. The configuration names carriage and administration. Whether it becomes an archic fold must still be tried; the definition does not answer its own test.

The Constantinian configuration joined three previously distinct kinds of act at bounded interfaces. A confession became a subscription-tested public form; synodal judgments became objects of imperial communication and sanction; and a doctrinal classification entered civil administration through exile, destruction order, imposed naming, and penal threat. This is enough to establish carriage and coordination. It is not enough to decide, by definition, that the configuration had captured an archic seat.

The danger appears where an ecclesial judgment about confession or communion becomes a civil disposition. Yet the analysis must not repeat the collapse it describes. The creed answers neither for exile nor for the truth of the belief it states; the council answers for its doctrinal and disciplinary acts; the emperor answers for imperial commands and sanctions; and the persons reached by those acts bear the finite costs the sources identify. No composite church–empire subject is needed to explain the configuration.

Two archic marks are visible, but only locally. Councils, bishops, and imperial commands authorise standing within their administered fields. Subscription, exclusion, exile, deposition, and ordered readmission terminate particular questions for particular persons, even when later instruments reverse them. The third mark — immunity — remains unresolved. Reversals show that outcomes and several office-holders were corrigible; they do not show that the sanctioning configuration itself was exposed to the interrogation it directed at others.

The distribution of cost and answer changes from act to act. Arius, Theonas, Secundus, Eusebius of Nicomedia, Theognis, Athanasius, and other named parties bear only the costs the instruments permit us to identify. Councils and bishops answer for creed, communion, profession, deposition, and admission; the emperor answers for exile, recall, summons, destruction order, imposed name, and penal threat. Household and community incidence remains largely unknown, and no threatened capital penalty is converted into an execution.

The reversals are therefore neither trivial nor exculpatory. They show that no settlement made the controversy politically final: councils competed, professions changed, bishops resisted, exiles returned, and offices altered course. But successive acts still closed real questions while they stood. The strongest contrary is partly realised — plurality remained politically non-final and many outcomes were revisable — without establishing the non-immunity of the sanctioning seat.

## 11.7 What the Chapter Returns

Nicaea and its aftermath thus yield a configuration, not a conquest story and not a capture verdict. Imperial involvement is established at the instruments examined; a bounded Arius dossier became an object of civil command; provincial conciliar coordination and one authorised resource route are evidenced; titles, cult inheritances, **koina**, and festivals remain untried. The larger archic classification stays undecided. Nothing later in this book may cite this chapter as proof that it has been won.

Part IV closes with a configuration rather than a conquest story. A synodal process already under way entered an imperial setting in which creed, subscription, judgment, resources, exile, destruction order, recall, and readmission could be carried through distinct but coordinated offices. The arrangement issued real closures and real penalties, yet it did not end the controversy whose boundaries it repeatedly administered. Whether later sacred wealth, fiscal privilege, property formula, and exchange routes intensified, redistributed, or resisted that configuration is not decided here. It is the work of the next Part.

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[84] Urk. 20 = FNS 30, Syriac text and translation in Fernández–Contini, *Le fonti antiche sul Concilio di Nicea* (Città Nuova, 2025) — cited here and throughout expressly as the Italian edition, the inspected edition of record — with the carriers Opitz AW 3.1.1, 41–42, and Schulthess 1908. The imperial posting system is not inferred from this letter alone.

[86] Fernández–Contini: the creed and anathemas (FNS 32); the twenty canons (FNS 33); the synodal and imperial communications and Eusebius's letter (FNS 34–37); the subscription field at FNS 34.5 n. 310 and 36.8 n. 327. A documentary corpus — not surviving complete conciliar Acts.

[87] The edict is commonly identified as Urk. 33 / Dok. 28; its item-level position in the Italian sequence and its date are carried as disputed. The text supplies destruction, the *Porphyrians* naming, and the stated capital penalty for concealment; the threatened penalty is distinguished from any evidenced execution.

[88] Fernández, *Nicaea 325* (Brill Schöningh, 2025), 189–91, esp. 190 nn. 97–104: the opening speaker probably Ossius, possibly another; οἱ τῆς συνόδου πρόεδροι as Ossius, Eustathius, Alexander "and others."

[89] CTh 16.1.2 (Mommsen–Meyer; Pharr control): Thessalonica, 27 Feb. 380, *ad populum urbis Constantinopolitanae*; the scope dispute printed. The wider dated sequence — 16.1.3, the 16.2 series, 16.5.1, 1.27.1, Sirm. 1, CJ 3.12.2, and the computus carriers — is bounded, disputed at reach and at the *audientia* reconstruction, and enters only under the later-date flag rule.

[90] *VC* 2.45–46 (Winkelmann; Cameron–Hall). The universal archaeological funding chain is negatively closed; the route is a legal-administrative possibility only.

[91] The enforcement dossier at its grades: imperial exile attached to named doctrinal and episcopal targets; the edict's destruction, naming, and concealment provisions. No general Constantinian law of heresy, and no execution under the edict, is inferred.

[92] The instrument corpus via FNS 31–80, with reconstruction-dependent chronology marked as such: exile and recall; Antioch; Arius's summons and proposed readmission; Tyre; Athanasius's exile; the post-Constantine returns. Continuation beyond 337 is survey context.

[93] FNS 33: canons 4–7. The scaling classification is structural; causal borrowing is not established by formal correspondence alone.

[85] The two-sided initiative record: the pre-existing synodal agreement (n. 1) and the Donatist parties' earlier resort to Constantine. The point is not causal priority for either "church" or "empire," but the preservation of distinct initiatives within the configuration.

# PART V — TETHERS AND DETACHMENTS: COIN, CREDIT, RESTRAINT, AND RELEASE

**Entry phenomenon of the Part:** money becoming operable without a material instance in transit, an issuer's face, a sacred enclosure, or an immediately visible place of answer. These are candidate detachments, not one achieved sequence. Each receives a date and a source-width below — or is returned untried.

# Chapter 12 — No Single Untethering

## 12.1 A King Promises a Mint

On 1 June 833, at Worms, Louis the Pious issued an original diploma for Corvey. Because the region lacked a **locus mercationis**, the act provided a **moneta publica** and assigned the public revenues arising from it for the monastery's benefit.[94] The modern institutional reading adds a decisive qualification: the diploma should be read as a promise to establish a **royal mint whose benefit would accrue to Corvey** — not as a delegation of autonomous ecclesiastical die-control. And whether coins were in fact struck at Corvey before the eleventh century cannot presently be demonstrated from the uniform Carolingian types.[95]

The document defeats two easy stories without proving their opposites. It is not evidence that a church independently seized coinage. It is also not evidence that royal money had left sacred institutions behind. Royal monetary authority, market provision, public revenue, and monastic benefit are brought into one dated legal arrangement while their offices remain differentiated. Nothing in the diploma establishes a prior local separation and subsequent reunion: **cross-institutional tether** is the source-borne description, whereas **re-entanglement** would import an unproved local sequence.

The case tried in this chapter is a family of such bounded events. Its registered list — coin from temple, value from metal, exchange from material instance, number from immediately answerable issuer, sacred formulas through property conversion, debasement, paper, banking, state credit, fiat, digital representation — is not itself a chronology. A source may close one item, restrict another, and leave the rest untouched. The chapter therefore does not turn the list into a staircase.

## 12.2 No Staircase

Three propositions must be kept apart. First, a transition may have occurred at a particular place and time. Second, later narration may arrange several transitions into one necessary route. Third, an institution may present its present arrangement as the only possible one. Evidence for the first proves neither the second nor the third. Conversely, the failure of a progress story does not prove decline, and the failure of a decline story does not prove emancipation.

"Abstraction" is used here in a deliberately thin historical sense: a transaction or monetary form no longer requires one earlier carrier, material content, or institutional conjunction in the same way. It does **not** mean disappearance of embodiment, record, office, cost, or answerability. A paper order has paper, names, offices, and a place of payment. A public debt has revenue provisions and institutions. A marked coin remains an object. The inquiry is therefore not whether matter vanished, but **which tether ceased to be required, which new relations were instituted, who bore their costs, and where the relevant answers terminated**.

Simmel's movement toward money as pure function and Polanyi's account of embedding, disembedding, and the double movement remain named neighbours. Neither supplies the connective tissue between the episodes below.[96]

## 12.3 Coin and Sanctuary

**The finding here is a restriction.** The available material supports differentiated and cross-institutional arrangements; it does not support one completed transition called “coin from temple.”

Part II established, at its printed widths, Greek cases in which civic minting and the administration of sacred wealth occupied different offices, while inventories, leases, loans, and arrears connected sanctuary finance to civic institutions.[97] Those cases establish differentiation. They do not, without an earlier local state and a dated transition, establish an episode in which coinage departed from a temple.

The Roman workshop question sharpens the restriction from the other end. Republican mint administration and production are securely reconstructed at the documentary level, yet no excavated Republican workshop has been identified, and the modern topographic reconstructions of the Capitoline/Tabularium area are mutually incompatible — the hypotheses must be kept separated, not averaged. For the imperial mint, the San Clemente excavations directly secure fabric and stratigraphy while the excavators themselves preserve the alternative — **horrea, o officina monetaria che fosse** — so that the mint identification rests on a strong epigraphic-numismatic argument, not an archaeologically labelled workshop. The temple-adjacent minting of Chapter 4’s Moneta dossier therefore remains what it was: literary association and probable vicinity without an identified building. At both ends of the Roman evidence, coin production is institutionally documented and topographically disputed — which is itself a bar against any clean spatial story of coinage leaving the sacred precinct.[98]

Corvey supplies a later and differently configured control. In 833 royal monetary authority and monastic benefit were joined by diploma, without autonomous monastic minting being established. The result is not a pendulum from fusion to separation and back. It is a restriction of the registered stage: **coin and sanctuary can be institutionally differentiated and legally tethered in more than one arrangement, and the surviving cases do not yield a single direction of travel.** The event at Corvey is a **tether**, bounded to the royal grant of monetary benefit; the Greek differentiations are assigned no event-word, because the cited material establishes arrangements rather than the dated transitions by which they arose.

## 12.4 Metal, Tariff, and Mark

**The finding here is double: confirmation at metrological and reform-mark width; restriction at answerability width.**

Walker's dataset documents the declining weight and fineness of Roman silver coinage through 253, including the antoninianus after its introduction. What the dataset measures is metallic content. It does not by itself establish a coin's legally fixed face value at every date, the public's valuation, or what the coin "said" — so the familiar opposition between what the coin said and what it was is not used here.[99]

The Aurelianic material supplies a second dated line. In 274 a reformed radiate coinage was introduced with the marks **XXI** in Latin mints and **KA** in Greek ones. The assay record distinguishes pre- and post-reform material and preserves mint-resolved post-reform means, and those figures are retained in the note at their reported strength — but their difference is not used to prove a uniform rise until the open question of surface-versus-bulk assay comparability is closed.[100] The introduction of a marked reform is independently secure.

The mark's interpretation remains a printed dispute, with each side's data base identified and no silent synthesis: one reading takes "20 for 1" as a guarantee of five per cent silver; the other prints competing alloy-ratio and value readings and declines to treat the sign as self-interpreting.[101] Both sides permit the modest conclusion that the administration placed a ratio-mark on the reformed issue. They do not jointly establish that ordinary users could assay it, challenge it, obtain correction, or identify an office bound to answer a discrepancy. A public mark is a **declarative** interface; it becomes an **answerability** interface only when procedures of inspection, contest, enforcement, and repair are evidenced. The registered contrary is therefore partly but not fully met: the mark restricts any claim that monetary abstraction necessarily proceeds by concealment; it does not yet prove that abstraction increased answerability. Whether the reform was a **repair** in this book's sense remains undecided — that word would require evidence of the failure addressed, the mechanism of correction, and its effective finite reach.

## 12.5 The Bill: Exchange without Coin in Transit

**The finding here: confirmation at analytical carrier width; untried at instrument grain.**

The standard analytical model describes the medieval bill of exchange as a four-role arrangement — deliverer, taker or drawer, payer or drawee, and payee — combining remittance with credit. Payment occurs at another place, after a term, and in another money; exchange and rechange can return funds without shipping the original specie between the two cities.[102] At that width, the bill confirms a dated form in which the performance of exchange no longer requires the same coin to travel with the claim.

The model does not establish four distinct persons in every transaction, four signatures on one instrument, or a complete chain of recourse. Roles can be combined, and recourse, protest, acceptance, assignability, forum, and enforceable redemption are instrument-level questions. The cartulary of Giovanni Scriba, 1154–1164, locates an early surviving notarial register — but its acts have not been sampled, so “multiplied names,” “more signatures,” and “recourse relations” would exceed the present evidence.[103]

The answerability side of this stage therefore stands untried: analytical role-differentiation makes answerability **researchable**, but it does not prove that the bill increased restraint or gave an injured party an effective place of answer. That determination awaits dated instruments showing acceptance, default, protest, forum, and recovery. At carrier width the event is a **severance** — the claim can move without the original material instance in transit — and no archic inference follows from a carrier change.

## 12.6 The Statute: Public Credit with Differentiated Loci

**The finding here: confirmation at enacted statutory width; untried for note issue, suspension, resumption, and the full issuer-detachment arc.**

On 25 April 1694 royal assent was given to the war-finance statute now conventionally called the Bank of England Act. The Act granted tonnage and liquor duties, required a yearly fund to be kept apart in the Exchequer, authorised transfer of the subscribed capital and annuity, and authorised incorporation of the subscribers as the Governor and Company of the Bank of England — with perpetual succession, a common seal, and the capacity to sue and be sued.[104]

This is the chapter's principal closed contrary-control, but only if its places of answer are not collapsed. The incorporated company is the organised creditor-body and a legal answer-place for **its own** corporate acts. It is not thereby the answerer for the Crown's debt. The statutory payment obligation terminates at the public offices charged with the fund and the Exchequer payments; the subscribed creditors hold the benefit; the corporation receives and administers the corporate position. The Act thus makes public credit traceable through differentiated legal seats rather than replacing all of them with "the Bank."

The cost side is also bounded. The statute names the duties from which the fund was to be supplied and the public revenues from which deficiencies were to be made good. It does not, by itself, establish the final economic incidence of those duties on particular finite persons. Legal charge and lived cost are not interchangeable.

At this width, non-coin public credit is instituted with named and differentiated legal places of answer: an appropriated fund, charged public offices, transfer and registration rules, and a corporation answerable for its own acts. The Act does not by itself establish the effectiveness of every remedy or the final incidence of the duties. The event is a **tether** at statutory width. That co-institution does not yet prove a comparative **increase** in answerability, because the antecedent borrowing regime has not been tried. Nor does the Act by itself establish circulating banknotes, number detached from an immediately answerable issuer, the effects of the 1797 restriction, resumption, or the transformation associated with 1844. Those lines remain untried.[105]

## 12.7 The Dissolution: Conversion Machinery Found, Formula Claim Untried

**The finding here: confirmation of the conversion machinery; the formula question untried — and barred at its stronger form.**

The Court of Augmentations, erected in 1536, gives the dissolution of the monasteries an administrative address. The institutional history identifies the offices and record series through which dissolved property was received, managed, adjudicated, and alienated, including surrender deeds and particulars for grants.[106] This confirms a dedicated conversion apparatus and identifies where a same-asset inquiry could be conducted.

The registered claim is narrower and harder: whether sacred property formulas survived conversion into new fiscal or sovereign uses. A list of record series cannot answer that question. It requires a preselected asset followed through surrender, grant, lease, sale, and litigation, with the wording compared at each transfer. No such chain is closed — and the refusal now carries a printed bar: **wording alone cannot establish persistence or extinction of legal effect, and no sentence of this volume may move from a surviving sacred formula to a surviving title effect.** The formula question returns untried with the bar printed; the archive route located here is a proposed future case study, nothing more. Nor does the administrative map identify the finite cost-bearers of particular conversions; those require asset- and claimant-level records.

## 12.8 What Remains Untried

The open material is itemised rather than compressed into a count, because several registered terms overlap — and every refusal is printed as a result. The medieval mutations (Philip IV and a second region): the comparative corpus is not closed. Sterling's stability-and-departure history: the source sequence is not closed. The bill at instrument grain: primary acts unsampled for acceptance, protest, recourse, forum, or redemption. Paper money and banknote issue: the 1694 statute establishes public credit and incorporation, not the later note-issue history. The 1704–1709 banking instruments: the dossier remains open. Suspension and resumption, 1797–1844: the governing instruments and incidence record are not closed. Number detached from an immediately answerable issuer: no source-closed episode establishes the detachment or identifies the displaced answer-place. Sacred formula survival through dissolution: no same-asset chain executed, the stronger claim barred. Twentieth-century fiat: the term is registered; its documentary field is unopened here. Digital representation: the contemporary evidence belongs to the next Part's separately dated class and is not imported backward.

These refusals prevent the tried lines from borrowing one another's dates. They also prevent the Part's heading from becoming a conclusion: the chapter establishes several detachments and tethers — not one completed untethering.

## 12.9 What Changed — and What Did Not

The episodes do not form one ascent. They disclose several local changes, each made by a different instrument. A royal diploma joined monetary provision to monastic benefit; an imperial reform placed a disputed ratio-mark on a new issue; the bill carried a claim across place, term, and currency without requiring the same coin to travel; the 1694 statute organised public credit through a fund, public payment offices, transferable interests, and a corporation; the Court of Augmentations gave the conversion of monastic property an administrative address. No one of these acts supplies the missing history of the others.

Nor does the disappearance of one carrier reveal, by itself, whether answerability increased. The Aurelianic mark made an official declaration visible without proving assay, contest, correction, or repair. The bill's differentiated roles make recourse researchable without proving four persons, four signatures, or an effective chain of recovery. The 1694 Act goes further: it institutes non-coin public credit with named legal places of answer. Even there, the corporation answers for its own acts rather than for the Crown's debt, and the named duties do not disclose their final incidence on finite persons.

The same restraint governs the event words. Corvey and the 1694 statute are tethers at their legal widths. The bill is a severance only at carrier width. The Aurelianic reform remains undecided as repair. The Greek arrangements and the dissolution dossier receive no transition-word because the dated change or same-asset chain has not been shown. No release, refusal, or capture belongs to the family as a whole.

The strongest evidence against a simple abstraction-equals-absence thesis is therefore the statutory case: public credit could be instituted together with appropriated revenues, transfer rules, court capacity, and differentiated offices. That does not establish a comparative increase, since the antecedent borrowing regime has not been reconstructed. The public mark restricts a concealment thesis; the bill restricts a same-carrier thesis; neither proves effective answerability.

Two larger histories are now closed against. The surviving monetary material cannot sustain a universal linear passage through ancient debasement, medieval mutation, sterling, paper, suspension, resumption, fiat, and digital form at one evidential grain. Nor is there a document-by-document instrument chain from Scriba through Datini and the later banking acts. These are separate experiments and counter-paths, not one irreversible event.

The result is narrower and stronger than “tether lost, tether made.” Losing one tether does not entail making another; a mark or a set of roles does not by itself create a place of answer. The chapter establishes several detachments, several tethers, and one statutory co-institution of non-coin credit with explicit legal places of answer. It does not establish whether abstraction generally increased answerability, decreased it, or moved cost and answer together. That question passes to the chapters on restraint, release, and the economic fold.

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[94] DLdF 328 (olim BM² 922), original, Worms, 1 June 833: *locus mercationis*, *moneta publica*, and the assignment of public revenues for Corvey's benefit; Theo Kölzer et al., eds., *Die Urkunden Ludwigs des Frommen* (MGH DD Kar. 2, 2016), no. 328; RI I no. 922.

[95] Heike Bartel, "Das Münzprivileg Ludwigs des Frommen für Corvey (BM² 922)," *Archiv für Diplomatik* 58 (2012), 147–168, at 166 — an institutional reading of the diploma, not wording found in the act itself; uniform Carolingian types prevent demonstration of pre-eleventh-century Corvey production.

[96] Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*; Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* — neighbouring narrations, supplying no verdict.

[97] Chapters 4–6 at their printed widths; no Part II result is widened into a universal Greek system or a dated origin-transition.

[98] Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage* II, 598–620 and the technical chapters (administration; no excavated workshop); Tucci, "A New Look at the Tabularium and the Capitoline Hill," 43–73, against Contrafatto, "Il Tabularium di Roma" (incompatible reconstructions, kept separated); Guidobaldi et al., "San Clemente," 390–415, esp. 390–392 (fabric and stratigraphy direct; *horrea — o officina monetaria che fosse* preserved); Woytek with Guidobaldi → Coarelli for the disputed functional identification.

[99] D. R. Walker, *The Metrology of the Roman Silver Coinage*, pt. III (BAR Suppl. 40, 1978), figures and tables for AD 207–253; used for weight and fineness only.

[100] Jean-Pierre Callu, *La politique monétaire des empereurs romains de 238 à 311* (1969), 323–29, esp. 324–27: 220 reported pre-reform specimens averaging 34.9‰ silver; 337 post-reform averaging 41‰; mint means Ticinum 44.7 ‰ (116), Rome 38.4 ‰ (63), Siscia 39.7 ‰ (104), Cyzicus 36.9 ‰ (44), Antioch 44.5‰ (10); 555 post-reform specimens averaging 3.77 g. Preserved as reported; cross-set causal inference withheld because assay-method comparability is not established.

[101] Callu, loc. cit., against Estiot and Mairat, "Monetary system," MER–RIC V.1/2 Online ("20 for 1" as a five-per-cent guarantee). The marks and their connection to the reform are secure; their precise signification is a printed dispute with the data bases identified.

[102] Raymond de Roover, "New Interpretations of the History of Banking," in *Business, Banking, and Economic Thought*, 200–238, esp. 210–12, and "Cambium ad Venetias": the four-role model, exchange-plus-credit, place/term/currency differences, rechange — analytical evidence about the instrument-form, not a substitute for sampled acts.

[103] The cartulary of Giovanni Scriba, 1154–1164 — an early surviving Western notarial register, located but unsampled.

[104] 5 & 6 Will. & Mar. c. 20, as enacted: section XVII (the separate yearly fund); section XIX (transfer, incorporation, perpetual succession, common seal, property capacity, capacity to sue and be sued); sections XXVI–XXVII (trading limits). The long title supplies the war-finance setting; the modern short title is a convention.

[105] The 1844 endpoint is located only at indirect width and carries no verdict weight; the 1704–1709 documents, the 1797 restriction, resumption instruments, note-issue history, and incidence questions remain open.

[106] Walter C. Richardson, *History of the Court of Augmentations, 1536–1554* (1961), esp. chs. 9–14 and the archival guide; 27 Hen. VIII c.28 and 31 Hen. VIII c.13 for the statutory machinery.

# Chapter 13 — Restraints and Releases

## 13.1 A Clause in a Loan Deed

In the second year of Nero — between October 55 and October 56 — a man in Judaea acknowledged a debt of twenty denarii. The deed survives from the Murabbaʿat caves. In its editors' constituted text, failure to pay at the due date brings an added fifth, and the obligation reaches present and future property — ושנת שמטה דה, in the editors' rendering, "even if it is a sabbatical year."[107]

The clause is strong evidence, but for less than its first appearance promises. It shows that the sabbatical year was relevant enough to this transaction to be addressed in advance. It records one debtor accepting a formulation intended to preserve the creditor's claim across that year. It does not by itself establish the release's general legal force, the frequency or enforceability of such waivers, the actual year in which performance fell due, or the economic incidence of the clause after default. A precautionary term can answer uncertainty as well as a regularly enforced rule. The deed therefore cannot prove that the release was generally observed, or that its cost was lawfully and effectively displaced onto debtors as a class.

Three limits travel with the exhibit. The reading is the editors' restoration of a damaged document, not an independently certain autograph. The deed's date does not make 55/56 itself a sabbatical year; the clause is prospective. And the formula is not the prosbul described by the Mishnah. Those limits do not empty the document. They identify exactly what it can confirm: **one dated contractual effort to protect a debt against the possible operation of sabbatical release.**

The case tried in this chapter asks a larger question. Usury rules, **ribā** doctrines, sabbatical release, Jubilee, debt instruments, judicial devices, and charitable lenders are not one institution and do not share one fate. They will be compared without turning any of them into a ready-made solution, without converting doctrinal articulation into enforcement, and without confusing release with pardon or interpersonal forgiveness. One caution governs the comparison: **a norm can be read before its practice can be measured. Where the practice record is absent, the absence limits the historical claim; it does not itself prove a gap.**

## 13.2 Six Scriptural Institutions

The Hebrew materials first impose a taxonomic restraint. The expressions often compressed into a single biblical ban belong, at the collated textual grain, to six distinguishable institutions. Exodus 22:24 addresses creditor conduct and imposed increment in lending to “my people,” especially “the poor with you” — an interest restraint. Leviticus 25:1–7 governs cultivation and produce in the seventh year — a land sabbath, not a monetary-debt rule. Leviticus 25:8–55 is the Jubilee complex: proclamation, land return, redemption and pricing, kin-support, dependency limits, and stated exceptions — with no clause cancelling every monetary debt. Deuteronomy 15:1–11 is the seventh-year release of claims, šĕmiṭṭâ, bounded by the kin/foreigner distinction and accompanied by a warning against withholding loans. Deuteronomy 15:12–18 releases the servant after six years — presented beside, but not identical with, debt release. And Deuteronomy 23:20–21 bars interest within the brother relation while permitting it toward the foreigner — a scope-bounded rule, not a universal one. The relevant textual variants do not erase these differences.[108] Jubilee must therefore remain a major part of the chapter without ever becoming a synonym for sabbatical debt release.

Two scholarly readings of the release itself stay printed and unblended. Otto reads Deuteronomy 15:1–3 as a full release of debt: a legal reinterpretation of the older fallow, integrated with other protections and with the warning that approaching release may contract credit. Milgrom treats the language as ambivalent between remission and suspension, notes early support for remission, and leaves early observance open. On Jubilee, Milgrom reports no evidence of national observance — while refusing to infer from that absence that the legislation was not law.[109]

The evidential result must be stated with care. The textual articulation is confirmed. National Jubilee observance is **not** disproved; it is historically underdetermined in the surviving record. A scholar's report that no evidence is known cannot be converted into a documented practice of non-observance. Nor does the legislation's textual standing establish its executed scope. What the chapter has is a norm/practice **question** — not yet a measured gap.

Luke 6:35 supplies a separate Christian textual problem, and its evidential state can now be printed exactly. The reading μηδὲν ἀπελπίζοντες is textually secure (the well-attested μηδένα judged secondary), and the verse's ancient reception is directly established: Chrysostom quotes the command as Δανείζετε γὰρ, φησὶ, παρ᾽ ὧν μὴ προσδοκᾶτε λήψεσθαι — "lend to those from whom you do not expect to receive back" — and treats God as the lender's debtor and guarantor, while the Latin tradition moves from the Vetus Latina's **nihil desperantes** to the Vulgate-type **nihil inde sperantes**. The Greek sense itself remains a two-sided scholarly dispute, printed here unharmonised. One serious reading is contextual: Bovon, weighing four explanations, concludes that Luke's reciprocity context strongly favours "lend, expecting nothing in return," while granting that ἀπελπίζω ordinarily means to despair. The other is Adrian's non-loss reading: the earlier attested senses support "despair" or "give up hope of"; a meaning "expect back" is, on his account, first attested only from Chrysostom's time; the clause then reads "lend, whereby you lose nothing," with the promised reward and divine sonship relocating recompense to the divine and communal level — an assurance, with a Senecan parallel, that enemy-directed lending is not ultimate loss. The verse is cited in this chapter only at the width the dispute permits, and it is not harmonised with the Hebrew release rules or with the later Latin jurisprudence.[110]

## 13.3 Warning, Clause, and Prosbul

Three sources place the release beside the problem of credit — at three different evidential levels, which must not be averaged.

**The warning is legislation speaking prospectively.** Deuteronomy 15:9–10 warns against refusing a needy borrower because the year of release is near.[111] It establishes that the legislation **anticipates** a possible deterrent effect. It does not document the rate, frequency, or historical incidence of withheld loans. The would-be borrower is a cost-bearer posited by the norm — not yet a sampled person in a lending archive.

**The clause is one executed instrument.** The Murabbaʿat deed shows a particular debt written so as to survive a sabbatical year, with an added fifth after default and recourse to property. The clause confirms contractual anticipation of release in this transaction. Without litigation, repayment, or comparable deeds, it does not establish whether the clause was enforceable, common, effective, or more costly than the available alternative.

**The prosbul is a legal form with an attributed rationale.** At the carrier used here, the Mishnah says that Hillel instituted the prosbul after seeing people withhold loans and thereby transgress the Deuteronomic warning; the following passage supplies the declaration by which the creditor delivers the debt to a court so that it may be collected.[112] This confirms the Mishnah's account of the device and the rationale it attributes to Hillel. It does not, by itself, prove the historical incidence of loan withholding before the device, the date and diffusion of the institution, or the effectiveness of collection afterward.

The court must also be described precisely. The prosbul locates a juridical form at a court and preserves a creditor's claim through that form. Lodgment is not yet proof that the court became the terminal place of answer for every subsequent dispute, enforcement act, or failure of recovery — those functions require evidence of jurisdiction in use, contest, judgment, and execution. The source confirms **formal rerouting through a court**, not a completed answerability chain.

The three sources can therefore be placed in sequence only as texts and carriers: anticipated credit deterrence in legislation; one debt instrument drafted against sabbatical release; a later legal device justified by the withholding problem. They do not yet compose a continuous historical career. The Babylonian comparison now has its texts: the Ammi-ṣaduqa editions establish that royal remission decrees contain scope limits and anti-evasion provisions rather than costless universal cancellation. Their translation differences, however, bar any synthetic clause-by-clause paraphrase, so the comparison enters only as a comparison among separately evidenced mechanisms — and the three-archive displaced-cost pattern remains untried.[113]

## 13.4 The Latin Doctrinal Architecture

One bar governs the whole Latin dossier before its first text is read: the sequence is a history of changing rules and workaround tests, and **these sources cannot support any universal enforcement or final-incidence claim** — clerical prohibitions do not prove universal enforcement, and doctrinal completeness proves nothing about practised scope.

In Causa XIV, quaestio 3 of the **Decretum**, Gratian assembles the definitions in three lapidary canons — **Qui plus quam dederit expetit, usuras accipit**; **Quicquid supra datum exigitur, usura est**; **Quicquid sorti accidit usura est** — with the dictum treating whatever is exacted beyond principal as usury.[114] Their breadth is doctrinal. Their reception through the decretal collections, conciliar adoption, pastoral use, litigation, and contractual evasion remains open in the present record.

Aquinas supplies not a slogan but a differentiated jurisprudence.[115] The first article of the usury question calls the charge **secundum se iniustum**: a price cannot be taken separately for the use of a consumable whose ownership passes in **mutuum**. The second distinguishes an agreed increment from a free gift, actual loss from merely hoped-for gain, loan from risk-bearing partnership, and fruits of a pledge from the debt they must reduce. The third addresses restitution and the attribution of gain produced principally by the borrower's industry. The fourth permits borrowing for need from a lender already disposed to usury while forbidding inducement. And Cajetan's later commentary remains Cajetan's:[116] his treatment of bounded **lucrum cessans**, recovery, permission, and partnership risk is evidence of later doctrinal differentiation — not a proposition silently returned to Thomas. At this grain, the Latin line is established as an articulated restraint architecture. Whether that architecture governed transactions, courts, confessors, or markets with any stated frequency is a separate historical line, and it receives no borrowed verdict from the intellectual completeness of the doctrine.

## 13.5 The Latin Practice Perimeter

The practice record is narrower than the doctrinal record. The **census** appears in the scholarly synthesis as the sale of a right to an annual return rather than a loan, with variations in productive base, risk, redemption, pricing, personal obligation, and public debt — and the same analysis shows why formal classification could accommodate transactions with loan-like effects.[117] The exchange materials distinguish real exchange from dry exchange and trace exchange-and-rechange through the banking studies and selected instruments.[118] These carriers confirm that jurists and merchants had forms by which return, risk, place, and time could be legally differentiated. They do not establish the incidence of evasion, or a general success or failure of the usury bar. Except where an underlying act has been inspected, they remain synthesis-mediated practice claims.

The Florentine Monte di Pietà supplies a more determinate institutional case. Menning's archive-based study maps its statutes, pledges, ledgers, subsidies, personnel controls, frauds, and crises. Borrowers generally paid five per cent, described in the statutes as covering salaries and rents; salaries absorbed much of the capped expense; guarantors answered for employee losses; and the state subsidised, and the dukes controlled, the institution.[119]

This is neither a simple evasion nor a pristine prohibition. The institution lent to poorer borrowers at rates reported as substantially smaller than market alternatives, charged those borrowers for operating costs under a non-interest description, distributed some risk to guarantors, and received public support. The five-per-cent charge is a documented borrower cost. The subsidy is a documented public contribution at legal-institutional grain — its final incidence on finite taxpayers not established here. The Monte itself is a place of answer for its own lending and pledge administration; ducal control forms a distinct public layer. The record does not yet establish the forum and remedy available to a particular borrower contesting a charge, pledge sale, or fraud.

Most importantly, the Monte does not by itself prove the registered contrary — that **restraint intensified cost**. That causal-comparative claim requires a counterfactual or antecedent arrangement showing what the same borrowers would otherwise have paid, and which part of the charge was produced by the restraint rather than by the costs of lending. The case establishes priced charitable credit under an anti-usury rationale and makes cost allocation visible. It restricts any claim that restraint simply removed cost; it does not prove that restraint created or increased it.

## 13.6 Islamic Jurisprudential Architectures

The Islamic material confirms differentiation — but only within the selected jurisprudential dossier, and the boundary is part of the finding.

The shared textual anchor is the six-commodities report: gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates, and salt; equality and hand-to-hand exchange within one enumerated kind; freedom to differ across kinds if the exchange is hand-to-hand.[120] The text used is a direct transcription with the named chain — not a critical edition, and no parallel chains have been collated.

On that anchor, the selected juristic texts articulate nonidentical extension rules. For al-Shāfiʿī, excess and delay are distinguished; gold and silver form a price-class, while the other class extends through edibility rather than storage. Ibn Rushd — direct for his Mālikī presentation, comparative beyond it — combines staple food, storability, genus, delay (**nasīʾa**), and excess (**tafāḍul**) differently. The Ḥanafī extension in al-Sarakhsī turns on genus together with measurable quantity, measure or weight, with different effects when one or both properties are present. The selected Ḥanbalī rule in Ibn Qudāma extends the excess bar to things customarily measured or weighed within one genus, with hand-to-hand exchange governing difference across genera. The criteria overlap in places and diverge in others; they are not collapsed into four mutually exclusive civilisational essences.[121] The Qurʾānic collation and critical apparatus remain open. The finding therefore concerns **selected Sunni juristic rules on ribawī exchange** — not "Islamic finance," Islam as a whole, or the historical enforcement of **ribā** doctrine across territories and periods. And that boundary is closed as a printed bar: **a universal "Islam permits/forbids" formula is barred, and no demonstrated corpus of litigated** ḥiyal **exists in the sources used here.**

Two boundary dossiers sharpen the restriction. The dispute over transactions in the **dār al-ḥarb** is available only indirectly. The **ḥiyal** casebooks confirm that lawful problem-solving and circumvention were theorised in normative question-and-answer form — including a surplus-rent case answered in al-Shaybānī's collection. Practice is evidenced by one adjudicated Andalusī case: a three-party double sale designed to conceal illicit profit was reduced by Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ to one valid sale, and that ruling was affirmed by his successor.[122] One adjudication confirms one refusal of a particular form and identifies a judicial place of answer for that dispute. It cannot establish the incidence of the device or the regional effectiveness of the rule.

## 13.7 Forms of Preservation, Rerouting, and Refusal

The cases show several different outcomes, and each reaches only as far as its source shows. The prosbul reroutes a private claim through a court form; the Murabbaʿat deed records a contractual attempt to preserve one claim across release, its enforcement unknown; the **census**, the exchange forms, and the **ḥiyal** show classificatory routes at doctrinal or synthesis grain, with generalised practice untried. The Florentine Monte transforms anti-usury lending into subsidised, pledge-secured, administratively priced credit at one institutional width, and Cajetan develops the Latin doctrine under his own name — neither result licensing a Latin-wide history of transformation. The textual and juristic rules survive in the sources inspected, but survival in a textual tradition is not evidence of continuous or effective practical retention, so retention across periods and regions remains unestablished; no dismantling event at the required grain appears in the record; and the Andalusī judgment refuses one disguised-profit arrangement at adjudicated-case width, with no cross-tradition refusal pattern inferred.

Release, prohibition, pardon, forgiveness, and repair remain distinct throughout. Šěmiṭṭâ is a release norm at textual grain. Jubilee governs return, redemption, dependency, and land in a different complex. Aquinas's restitution article supplies a normative repair **grammar** but no dated repair event. None of these is interpersonal forgiveness, and none supplies a pardon issued by a sovereign or office. Consecration is distinct again: earlier chapters tried sacred dedication and sacred property as forms of tether; this chapter supplies no new consecration episode and rescores nothing. A consecrated status, a prohibited transaction, a released claim, a pardoned offender, a forgiven person, and a repaired injury answer different questions.

The registered contrary asks whether restraint intensified cost or shifted the place of answer. The sources place that possibility under real pressure without closing it. Deuteronomy anticipates loan withholding; the Mishnah attributes the prosbul to that problem; the Murabbaʿat deed protects one claim across release; the Monte charges borrowers while receiving subsidy; the Andalusī case terminates at a qāḍī. Yet the first two are normative self-descriptions, the third lacks enforcement and comparison, the fourth lacks a causal counterfactual, and the fifth identifies a judicial place without showing that restraint moved it from another seat. The contrary therefore returns as a restriction — real at textual and institutional-allocation width, unproven as a causal-comparative law.

## 13.8 No Single Law of Restraint

The materials do not trace one career of restraint. They show different acts at different scales. The Hebrew texts distinguish release, fallow, servant manumission, Jubilee, and interest restraint; the Murabbaʿat deed records one attempt to protect a debt against a sabbatical year; the prosbul preserves a claim through a court form whose later operation is not sampled. Gratian, Aquinas, and Cajetan articulate a differentiated doctrine, while the Florentine Monte turns charitable lending into a subsidised, pledge-secured, administratively priced institution. The selected Sunni texts extend a shared report through nonidentical criteria, and one Andalusī judgment refuses one disguised-profit arrangement. None of these results supplies the others' missing history.

Three movements can be named securely. The prosbul reroutes a claim at legal-form width. The Monte transforms lending at one institutional width, and Cajetan develops the Latin doctrine under his own name. The Andalusī judgment refuses one arrangement at adjudicated-case width. Practical retention across regions and periods, general dismantling, and a continuous history of release remain outside the evidence examined here.

Cost and answer are therefore locatable only case by case. The Murabbaʿat debtor bears the written obligation and property exposure, but no forum or enforcement history is sampled. The prosbul names a court as the place of lodgment, not as a demonstrated chain of judgment and remedy. The Monte allocates charges to borrowers, employee-loss exposure to guarantors, and subsidy publicly, while final tax incidence and borrower recourse remain open. The Andalusī ruling gives one dispute a judicial terminus. These are real allocations. They do not prove that restraint itself created additional cost or moved the final place of answer.

The same limit governs the chapter's larger classification. The sources contain bounded authorisations, and the Andalusī case supplies one sampled termination. They do not establish immunity or the joint occupation of all three archic marks. The family therefore remains undecided. What the chapter has established is narrower and more useful: norms, instruments, institutions, and judgments can restrain, preserve, price, reroute, and refuse without composing one moral history or one causal law. A norm can be read before its practice can be measured — and where the practice record is absent, the absence limits the claim without itself proving a gap.

The restraints do not yield one moral. They yield source-bounded acts of differentiation: a release norm that anticipates its own credit problem; a deed written against a sabbatical year; a court form that preserves claims; a doctrine separating loan, loss, gain, risk, and restitution; a subsidised institution that charges for administration; juristic schools extending a shared report by nonidentical criteria; a judge refusing one disguised-profit arrangement. Some of these forms protect debtors, some preserve creditors' claims, and several allocate costs to more than one seat. The record does not yet prove that restraint itself intensified those costs or shifted the terminal answer.

The next chapter therefore inherits less than a law and more than a catalogue. It receives established normative and institutional restraints, one release-avoidance instrument, one legal rerouting, one priced charitable lender, one adjudicated refusal, and a long boundary of untried questions. Exchangeability must face the archic test with exactly that evidence — no stronger.

[107] P. Benoit, J. T. Milik, R. de Vaux, *Les grottes de Murabbaʿât* (DJD II), doc. 18 ("Reconnaissance de dette, en araméen [55/56 ap. J.-C.]"), 100–104 with Pl. XXIX: transcription 101; translation 102–103; commentary 103–104. The twenty denarii, the added fifth, the sabbatical-year clause, the Nero dating, and the uncertain due-date reading are the editors' constituted text; independent palaeographic certainty is a separate, disputed question.

[108] BHS, apparatus: p. 123 (Exod 22:24); pp. 203–206 (Lev 25); pp. 313–315 (Deut 15, with the Greek expansions at 15:9–10); p. 327 (Deut 23:20–21). BHS is the edition of record.

[109] Otto, *Das Deuteronomium* (1999), 287–289, 303–318, esp. 313–316; Milgrom, *Leviticus 23–27* (AB 3B, 2001), 2245–2249, esp. 2245–2247 — including the bar on converting absent evidence into non-observance.

[110] NA28 at Lk 6:35: μηδὲν ἀπελπίζοντες secure; μηδένα well attested, judged secondary. Reception: Chrysostom, *Hom. Matt.* XV.13, ed. Field, vol. I (Cambridge, 1839), 206–207; H. A. G. Houghton, *The Latin New Testament* (OUP, 2016), 164 (*nihil desperantes* → *nihil inde sperantes*). The dispute: François Bovon, *Luke 1*, Hermeneia (2002), 238–241, esp. 240 nn. 50–51; Matthias Adrian, *Mutuum date nihil desperantes (Lk 6,35): Reziprozität bei Lukas*, NTOA/StUNT 119 (2019), §6.3.6, 162–164 with nn. 143–148, and §6.3.7, 164–169 (Seneca, *De beneficiis* VII.31–32). Neither reading silently replaces the other.

[111] Deut 15:9–10 at BHS, with the Greek-tradition expansions in the apparatus. The verse supports anticipated deterrence, not measured historical incidence.

[112] m. Sheviʿit 10:3–4 at the carrier used: the attributed rationale and the court-delivery formula. Critical Mishnah collation, dating, diffusion, and practice remain open.

[113] Edict of Ammi-ṣaduqa §§6–8: Finkelstein's 1961 and 1969 studies; Roth, *Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor*. Scope limits and anti-evasion provisions at edition level; cross-edition translation differences bar a synthetic clause-by-clause paraphrase.

[114] Friedberg, *Corpus iuris canonici*, Pars Prior, *Decretum*, C.14 q.3, 734–738: cc. 1–3 and Gratian's dictum. X 5.19 and its glosses remain open.

[115] Leonine t. IX (1897), II–II q.78, 155–167, text and apparatus; Langholm, *Economics in the Medieval Schools*, 221–248, as interpretive control.

[116] Thomas de Vio Cajetan, commentary printed at Leonine t. IX, 156–164: bounded *lucrum cessans*, permission and recovery, and partnership risk-and-proportion tests — separately attributed throughout.

[117] Noonan, *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury*, 154–170, on the *census*; the underlying contract and litigation testing lies beyond this record.

[118] Noonan 312–339; de Roover, *L'Évolution de la lettre de change*, 43–64, 119–143, appendix 147–157; *The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank*, 108–141; *Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges*, 48–75, 247–344; Lopez–Raymond no. 61 at 145 and nos. 72–73 at 162–166. No incidence claim is drawn from the syntheses alone.

[119] Menning, *Charity and State in Late Renaissance Italy* (1993), 37–90, 175–232, esp. 60–67, with ASF, Monte di Pietà 1 and 721. The finding is bounded to Florence.

[120] Muslim 1587c (Book 22, no. 102; legacy 3853): the six commodities, the equality and hand-to-hand rules, and the named chain. Critical apparatus and parallel-isnād collation remain open.

[121] al-Shāfiʿī, *al-Umm*, Bāb al-ribā (III 15–19); Ibn Rushd, *Bidāyat al-mujtahid*, III 148–150; al-Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūṭ*, XII 111–115; Ibn Qudāma, *al-Mughnī*, VI 51–53; al-Kāsānī, *Badāʾiʿ*, V 192–193, as bounded corroboration only. Print and Qurʾānic collation remain open.

[122] al-Shaybānī, *al-Siyar al-ṣaghīr*, introduction 10–11, 14–15 (the territorial dispute, indirect); the *Makhārij* casebook and the surplus-rent case at p. 24 (direct); al-Khaṣṣāf located, not collated; the Andalusī case through Serrano, "Legal Practice in an Andalusī-Maghribī Source," *Islamic Law and Society* 7.2 (2000), 187–234, at 205, 220.

# Chapter 14 — Exchangeability Before the Archic Seat

## 14.1 Exchangeability Before the Seat

Chapters 12 and 13 leave an uneven record. Money changes carrier, term, and institutional form; public credit acquires named legal places; release and interest rules qualify claims; one charitable lender prices its administration; one judge refuses a disguised profit. None of these events by itself tells us what exchangeability has become. Their conjunction raises a harder question: has exchangeability remained a route carried by answerable institutions, or has the route itself begun to occupy the seat from which the field is authorised, judged, and exempted?

The seat has a definition, fixed in Volume I and applied at every trial in this book: something occupies the archic office when it authorises the whole field, terminates the question of right, and remains immune to the tribunal it imposes on everything else.[123] The test is conjunctive. A grant or statute may authorise a bounded relation without authorising the whole field. A court may terminate one dispute without making exchangeability the terminus of right. An unsampled challenge proves neither immunity nor answerability. Nor can "the market" be made into an agent when the sources name only offices, texts, institutions, and participants.

No new document enters here. That is not an omission: the chapter's task is to test a candidate against the evidence Part V has already earned, at exactly the widths there established — turning none of its untried lines into evidence, combining none of its restrictions into confirmations, borrowing nothing from earlier parts of the volume. The limit is real nonetheless. Where the preceding chapters did not reach paper issue, issuer-detachment, fiat, digital representation, practical incidence, or effective recourse, this chapter cannot supply the missing trial by synthesis.

## 14.2 The Candidate

With the question and its discipline in place, the candidate can be given its exact specification. The specification is canonical, and it builds on the fold instrument of Chapter 9:[124]

> **The economic fold is not exchange, money, or markets. It is exchangeability promoted into the seat: the route organised toward its own continuation, receiving every forwarded answer, while made-good instances, and those who make them good, absorb the cost.**

This sentence defines the candidate. It does not assert that Part V has found one.

A fold administers an unbounded relation through bounded carriers. The economic fold would be archic only where exchangeability ceased to remain a carried and answerable route and instead occupied the three marks jointly. It would authorise applications in its own name, organise finite carriers toward continuation as such, terminate the questions generated by that organisation, and stand outside the answering it exacts from instances. The definition therefore fixes what would count as promotion. It does not license promotion to be inferred from abstraction, transferability, monetary detachment, institutional scale, or the mere recurrence of exchange.

## 14.3 Five Neighbours

Five neighbouring terms must remain separate, because none supplies the candidate's three marks by substitution. A **market institution** is a historically specified arrangement in which exchange is organised under rules, offices, practices, or instruments — not a total subject, a single transhistorical system, or an archic occupant. A **price** is a ratio or amount stated, calculated, contested, or enforced for a specified object or transaction — not the authority that authorises every valuation. **Liquidity** is a conditional capacity to exchange, transfer, or settle an asset or claim with relative facility — not unbounded exchangeability, and not immunity from correction. **Growth** is a comparative claim across a specified measure and period — not continuation as a normative command. **Competition** is a relation among participants, instruments, or institutions under identifiable conditions — not a self-authorising field, and not an intention attributable to "the market."

Chapter 12 established selected changes of carrier, one statutory institution of public credit, and several located offices. Chapter 13 established differentiated norms, legal forms, one institution, and one adjudicated refusal. None of those findings becomes a finding about price, liquidity, growth, or competition unless its own evidence carried that claim. None becomes evidence of archic exchangeability merely by being placed beside the others.

## 14.4 Three Tests

**Authorisation.** The inherited record contains several bounded authorisations: a royal grant; an official coin reform and mark; an enacted statutory fund, payment structure, and corporation; a conversion court with defined jurisdiction; normative and juristic classifications; an institutional lending arrangement; a court-lodgment form; one judicial ruling. These acts and arrangements authorise particular statuses, transactions, offices, or remedies at their own widths. They do not show exchangeability authorising the whole field in its own name. But that negative sentence must also retain its evidential form: the tried lines show **other** authorisers in the sampled acts; they do not prove that no form of exchangeability ever occupies the mark. The stages on which the candidate would be most directly testable — paper issue, issuer-detachment, suspension and resumption, fiat, digital representation, and broad regimes of enforcement and incidence — were not tried. **The mark's result:** no authorisation of the whole field by exchangeability is established; bounded counter-instances are present; the wider mark remains open beyond them.

**Termination.** The record contains finite terminations. The 833 diploma and the 1694 Act close particular legal questions at the level of the acts they issue. The Andalusī ruling terminates one sampled question concerning a three-party double sale. Chapter 13 also distinguishes court lodgment from later judgment, execution, and remedy, so the prosbul form cannot be recruited as a complete terminal chain; Chapter 12 similarly locates the Court of Augmentations without sampling an asset-level terminal act. Nothing in these materials shows exchangeability **itself** terminating right: exchange routes and devices are objects of legislation, classification, administration, and judgment. Yet one adjudicated refusal cannot prove that exchangeability generally remained subordinate to finite termination, and unsampled recourse cannot be supplied by structural synthesis. **The mark's result:** named acts and one adjudication supply bounded terminations; termination by exchangeability is not established; general subordination to finite termination remains untried.

**Immunity.** This is the least tested mark. The 1694 corporation's capacity to sue and be sued places the corporation's own acts within a legal forum; it does not make the corporation the answerer for the Crown's debt, and it does not by itself establish effective challenge, correction, or finite incidence. The Aurelianic mark makes a reform publicly distinguishable but proves no route of contest. The Florentine Monte is administered and controlled, but borrower remedies and final incidence remain untried. The Andalusī ruling defeats immunity for one device in one adjudicated question — not for exchangeability as a field-form. Absence of proof that exchangeability was exempt is not proof that it was answerable. **The mark's result:** one bounded device is judicially non-immune; the candidate's immunity at field width was not tried.

## 14.5 Located Costs, Incomplete Answers

Costs and answers can be located, but not generalised. The untethering record rarely reaches finite incidence — the 1694 Act names duties, revenues, payment offices, and a creditor-body while final incidence remains open. The restraint record reaches several bounded cost positions: the debtor named in the Murabbaʿat deed; borrowers and guarantors at the Florentine Monte; the parties affected by one Andalusī ruling; a would-be borrower posited by Deuteronomy's warning but not historically sampled. The answer side is equally differentiated — parties and written obligation, court lodgment, institutional administration, ducal control, juristic classification, and one judicial termination are not one place. The record therefore supplies examples of cost and answer being **locatable** at particular grains; it does not establish a general coincidence, a general divergence, or the canonical's proposed transfer of cost to made-good instances. Nor is any historical collapse of route into terminus demonstrated: the analytical collapses the record warns against — carrier with value, corporation with Crown, court lodgment with complete recourse, normative warning with practised incidence — are the reviewer's dangers, barred throughout, not historical findings.

## 14.6 The Contrary

The registered contrary asks what would show exchangeability remaining subordinate to answerable instances and finite repair. It contains two demands, and the evidence must not let the first stand in for the second.

The Part V board supplies bounded evidence of **subordination**. Public credit is co-instituted with named legal places in 1694. A court-lodgment form preserves claims through an identified institution. The Florentine Monte is governed through statutes, administration, subsidy, guarantee, and ducal control. One Andalusī device is subjected to a qāḍī's ruling and reduced to one valid sale. These cases prevent the equation of abstraction or exchange-device with the disappearance of every finite office.

They do not establish **effective subordination to finite repair** across the family. The statutory case does not reconstruct contest or final incidence. Court lodgment does not prove judgment, execution, or remedy. Institutional control does not establish borrower recourse. One adjudication does not establish a general regime. The stages most relevant to field-wide exchangeability were not tried. The contrary therefore returns **less than the claim**: instantiated at bounded legal-form and adjudicated-case widths; its family-wide and efficacy claims still open.

## 14.7 Neither Installation nor Acquittal

**The case remains undecided.** The Part V record does not establish exchangeability's joint occupation of authorisation, termination, and immunity. It also does not establish the candidate's absence. Bounded acts show particular authorities authorising, institutions and courts terminating specified questions, and one device failing to secure immunity. Those findings restrict any claim that abstraction automatically evacuates finite places. They do not show exchangeability remaining **generally** subordinate to answerable instances and finite repair, because effectiveness, recourse, incidence, and the principal modern stages are largely untried. Absence of establishment is not a negative historical verdict — neither triumph nor acquittal.

Nothing left untried in Chapters 12 or 13 becomes evidence here, and none of their restricted findings is enlarged by combination. In the event-vocabulary, the inherited widths stand exactly: severance at carrier width, tethers at legal widths, release at normative width, one adjudicated refusal — and repair nowhere demonstrated as a general finite regime.

The untried boundary is part of the verdict. Paper issue, issuer-detachment, suspension and resumption, fiat, digital representation, broad enforcement, practical incidence, and comparative causal effects are not empty spaces into which the canonical may be inserted. They are the untried material on which its historical instantiation would most need to stand. The next chapter receives a question, not a presumption: its three dated exhibits must run their own registered tests, and they may neither confirm nor defeat this chapter's candidate by thematic proximity alone.

Part V therefore closes without either installing or acquitting the economic fold. Its documents show that detachments, abstractions, restraints, and exchange-devices can coexist with named statutes, offices, institutions, and judgments. They also leave the most exposed forms of modern exchangeability, the efficacy of their answers, and the incidence of their costs largely untried. The canonical remains exact as a candidate specification. Whether any dated modern form satisfies it is the question Part VI must earn anew.

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[123] The three archic marks — authorisation of the whole field, termination of the question of right, immunity from the applied tribunal — are received from Volume I (*Ethical Ontology* I, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21721619) as restated for this volume in Chapter 2 §2.4.

[124] Chapter 9 §9.5 (the five clauses) and the Chapter 9 canonical: carriage of the unbounded is a sedimented fold; the archic fold begins only at promotion into terminal, immune authority over access and right.

# PART VI — MODERN FORMS UNDER TRIAL

# Three Contemporary Exhibits

The last registered episode-bearing Part of this history is contemporary, and it is written under a discipline the earlier Parts did not need: its evidence moves. Modern forms that announce emancipation from the sacred undergo their own trials here — each exhibit tested independently, on its own documents, for whether anything in it occupies the seat this book has been tracking. Resemblance to the administrative configuration of Chapter 11 may be reported only as the recurrence of specified elements; it lends no verdict, because Chapter 11's own classification stands open. Three exhibits at demonstration strength, one chapter; the full studies belong to the commissioned programmes.

# Chapter 15 — Three Modern Exhibits

## 15.1 A Date on Moving Evidence

On 8 August 2026, at 10:52:49 universal time, nine named public pages were captured: four provider or platform documents governing the lifecycles of deployed models; three linked pages of a longevity movement; and two European Commission pages concerning a new legal framework and its national authorities.[125] The timestamp is not decoration. Contemporary pages change, and every claim in this chapter about one of them is a claim about what that page said then — a capture-dated claim, bounded to the selection and source manifest preserved in the Trial Record.

One more distinction governs everything that follows. The three exhibits and their loss conditions were registered before any of this material was gathered, which prevents episodes from being added or dropped once their results are known. But registration fixes episodes, not documents: the particular texts, programmes, and proceedings examined below were selected later, and they can therefore support findings about themselves — not claims about how common such documents are.

## 15.2 Progress: Promise and Termination

The first exhibit distinguishes documented improvement — which this book affirms wherever it appears — from a promoted form of Progress: a promise so indexed to the future that no bounded failure can falsify it, and a cost placed on those rendered expendable for the sake of what is coming. What would show a progress discourse remaining corrigible is equally definite: a programme actually terminated by a bounded failure on its own announced terms.

Whether the modern idea of progress descends from eschatology is a famous quarrel, and this chapter cites it as a quarrel rather than a result. Karl Löwith read modern historical consciousness as secularised eschatology; Hans Blumenberg rejected the derivation and offered "reoccupation" — the modern age answering inherited questions from its own resources — as a rival account.[126] On one point only do the two accounts converge, and only that convergence is used here: Augustine cannot directly carry modern progress. Everything else, derivation against reoccupation included, remains unadjudicated in this book.

The two later documents do narrower and sharper work. Marc Andreessen's **Techno-Optimist Manifesto** of October 2023 describes a techno-capital spiral that "never ends" and should continue "forever," and it places a list of disfavoured ideas under the heading of an enemy: one text, in its own words, with an unbounded horizon and named adversaries.[127] Alphabet X's Project Loon documents the opposite event-form: a stratospheric-balloon programme wound down in 2021 when the path to commercial viability proved longer and riskier than hoped, its technical record published rather than its failure re-described as delay.[128] The pair discriminates. Future-oriented technological discourse is not, as a class, incorrigible: one text instantiates the unbounded promise, one programme ended by its own measure.

What the exhibit earns is precisely that much, and less than the registered claim. Who actually bears a transferred cost for the promise remains untried; nothing establishes how prevalent either form is; and no seat is occupied by a sentence in a manifesto. The result is a restriction: the form exists at document width, its contrary exists at programme width, and the larger history connecting them is not decided here.

## 15.3 Models in Administrative Time

The second exhibit begins with something unglamorous: lifecycle pages. At the capture date, one provider listed prospective shutdown and removal dates for named models. Another distinguished four public states — active, legacy, deprecated, retired — stated that requests to retired models fail, promised a minimum notice period, and separated its own schedule from its partners'. A third called its published dates the earliest possible ones. A fourth, a hosting platform, ran a retirement schedule on its own clock.[129] These are mutable notices, plural clocks on layered services — not one lifecycle, not a guarantee, not a fate.

They are, however, an administration. Chapter 11 documented a configuration with five distinguishable elements: a condition of standing, a register, an interpretation mechanism, an enforcement layer, and the translation of difference into threat. Four of those elements recur in the captured pages — public states, public tables, interpretive policies, and requests that actually fail. The fifth is absent, and its absence is part of the finding. What recurs is a partial administrative form at provider grain; no exhibit in this chapter shows anything holding the final power this book tests for — to authorise a whole field, terminate its questions of right, and stand immune from the interrogation it applies.

The distinctions the pages themselves enforce must also be kept. A model, a provider, a platform, an institution, a user, and a worker are six different things, and nothing here adjudicates what a model is or owes: machine whohood, welfare, and coincidence remain open questions, untouched by product administration.[130]

There is also a governance candidate on the record. At capture, an official European framework was in staged legal application, its rules, offices, and future dates stated by the Commission — while the Commission's published map of national authorities still contained gaps.[131] The gap is a fact about a web page, not about institutions: an incomplete publication does not prove absent enforcement. What can be said is exact: the framework exists and is dated; whether it performs — whether it actually subordinates and corrects deployed models — is open.

## 15.4 Costs That Do Not Yet Add Up

Who pays for a model's training, deployment, continuation, or retirement? Three public proceedings show how easily three different things can be mistaken for an answer. In Idaho, a utilities commission approved a special contract for a data-centre facility: power-purchase costs pass to the customer, embedded rates cover only the first tranche of demand, a modelled benefit was refused as a complete no-harm showing, transmission costs were barred from other ratepayers, and annual monitoring was ordered.[132] That is one adjudicated immediate allocation with anti-shifting safeguards — and it settles neither final economic incidence nor any named model's costs. In Virginia, a data-centre corridor's approvals carried community proffers — until the rezonings were held void **ab initio** and the land reverted: a promise on paper that never became a realised cost, and a printed lesson that a proffer, a projection, or a liability clause is not an incidence finding.[133] In Kenya, proceedings over content-moderation labour hold four positions apart — the platform client, the contracting firm, a proposed replacement, and the workers — with the question of who is the employer still disputed and the upstream contract undisclosed.[134]

One allocation, one non-realisation, one dispute. The three records are valuable precisely because they defeat a collapse: a rate allocation, a promised community benefit, and a contested labour relation are not the same thing, and none of them is final incidence. Where the money finally rests — and whether any of it attaches to a particular model's lifecycle — remains untried.

## 15.5 Repair and the Enemy of Interruption

The third exhibit is a linked corpus of three pages: a health protocol of measurements, interventions, and guides; a manifesto declaring a war on death, aimed at the causes of human and planetary death without limit of horizon; and an author's update describing the project as a prospective global ideology or religion, with rituals, rights, and practices.[135] The classification is the sources' own. Nothing here diagnoses a person, measures the movement's practice, or tests its medicine.

The line this exhibit exists to draw must be drawn without turning mortality into a command:

> **Medicine serves living revision. Repair, cure, postponement, and extension are forms of keeping. Promotion begins only where indefinite continuation is made immune to bounded failure, interruption is translated into an enemy, and the costs of that immunity are displaced without finite answer.**

Death definitively bounds a finite living history; it does not create that history's ownness, confer its worth, or oblige anyone to accept an avoidable end. The aim of preventing or postponing death is therefore not itself suspect — it is keeping. The question begins where the corpus itself poses it: the same movement speaks in two registers at once, the protocol's finite grammar and the manifesto's unlimited war. Which register governs its institutions, whether a bounded failure could ever terminate the programme, and who would bear the costs of its immunity are questions these self-descriptions cannot answer. A medical-looking protocol does not by itself prove the programme corrigible, because finite interventions can remain nested inside an unlimited aim.

## 15.6 What the Exhibits Earn

Three restrictions, and a discipline kept. One text promises an endless ascent, and one programme ends on its own terms — while the promise’s cost-bearers go unidentified. Model instances stand in public administrative states with real registers and real enforcement — while the fifth element of the old configuration is absent and the models’ wider costs are only partly locatable. A war on death and a repair protocol cohabit in one corpus — while the documents do not reveal which governs practice.

Selected elements of an old administrative form recur, at different grains, in formally secular contemporary documents. That is the chapter’s whole positive result, and its limits are part of it: no exhibit demonstrates the complete configuration, no descent from theology is established, no collective subject is inferred, no person receives a verdict, and no seat is shown occupied. Documented improvement and medical repair are affirmed throughout; nothing returns upstream as support for the still-open question of Chapter 14.

What remains is the residue. When sacred legitimacy has been evacuated from the finite and transferred upward, what returns, and in what voice? The volume’s last exhibit is a poem — a hymn, of all things, to the adversary — and its question is whether the finite can be affirmed as worthy without borrowing the grammar of what it deposed. Chapter 16 reads Carducci; Chapter 17 counts what the whole trial earned.

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[125] Nine public pages captured 8 August 2026, 10:52:49 UTC: the OpenAI API deprecations page; the Anthropic model-deprecations policy; the Google Gemini API deprecations page; the Microsoft Foundry model-retirement schedule; the Blueprint protocol; the Don't Die manifesto; the author's update; the European Commission's AI Act application timeline; and the Commission's page of national market-surveillance authorities. Exact URLs and the selection and live-state manifest are preserved in the Trial Record; all lifecycle dates cited below are the pages' statements at capture, mutable by their own terms.

[126] Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History* (University of Chicago Press, 1949), and Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, trans. Robert M. Wallace (MIT Press, 1983). The positions are cited at fixed page-pairs (Trial Record, Dossier 15) and printed as a dispute; neither is adopted, and "reoccupation" appears only as Blumenberg's rival model.

[127] Marc Andreessen, "The Techno-Optimist Manifesto," a16z.com, 16 October 2023. Cited for one future-unbounded and enemy-classifying textual form; quotation under fifteen words; no claim about the discourse's prevalence, practice, effects, or actual cost-bearers.

[128] Alphabet X, Project Loon wind-down announcement (January 2021) and *The Loon Collection* technical record. Cited for one programme termination on the programme's own commercial-viability grounds, with its learning preserved.

[129] The four provider and platform lifecycle pages as captured (n. 1). Prospective dates are notices, not accomplished retirements; providers' and platforms' clocks differ by the pages' own statements.

[130] The public who-form produced through institutional selection is analysed in the author's applied corpus (*Positive No-Ground*, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21628405, and the Vectorized Afterlife analyses), received here under its own imprint; no episode evidence and no machine-who verdict issues from it.

[131] European Commission, AI Act application timeline (staged dates from 2 February 2025 through 2 August 2028) and the national-authority publication, as captured (n. 1). The blanks prove only that the published map was incomplete at capture.

[132] Idaho Public Utilities Commission, Case No. IPC-E-21-42, Order No. 35777 (11 May 2023), concerning the Brisbie LLC data-centre facility.

[133] *Board of County Supervisors of Prince William County v. Oak Valley Homeowners Association, Inc.*, Court of Appeals of Virginia (31 March 2026), holding the challenged rezonings void *ab initio*; zoning reversion completed 29 July 2026.

[134] *Arendse & 42 others v Meta Platforms, Inc. & 3 others* (Kenya ELRC, 2023), ¶¶29–32 (interlocutory primary/secondary-employer treatment); Court of Appeal (2024), ¶¶45–49, 54–66 (merits reserved); consolidated-proceeding ruling of 22 April 2026. Cited for the separated party positions and the unresolved attribution only.

[135] The Blueprint protocol, the Don't Die manifesto, and the author's update, as captured (n. 1). Self-descriptions are evidence of wording and classification only; quotation under fifteen words per source.

# PART VII — THE RESIDUE UNDER TRIAL

# What Returns in the Language of Victory?

This final Part contains no registered historical episode and returns no episode verdict. Its two chapters are a textual exhibit and a synthesis, and their question is inherited rather than proved: where a sacred economy has evacuated legitimacy from finite life and transferred it upward, what returns — and in what voice? The exhibit is a poem: a hymn, of all things, to the adversary.

# Chapter 16 — The Demonic Residue Under Trial

## 16.1 A Toast That Becomes a History

In September 1863 a young professor of rhetoric improvised a hymn at a country gathering near Bologna. A later scholarly account, citing Carducci's collected prose, assigns its final six quatrains to November 1865 — a report this book keeps, permanently in this edition, at the scholar's width.[136] The poem is **A Satana** — the **Inno a Satana** — fifty quatrains, two hundred **quinari**, alternating **sdruccioli** and **piani** with rhyme on the even lines, published in 1865 under the name Enotrio Romano.[137]

The opening is a toast. The speaker raises a glass "to you, immense principle of being, matter and spirit, reason and sense" — **A te, de l'essere / Principio immenso, / Materia e spirito, / Ragione e senso** — and the addressee of this convivial, deliberately provocative salute is Satan.[138] In the poem's rhetoric the name gathers what ascetic and clerical authority is said to have condemned: matter and form, sensuous life, human love, dissent, reason, and science. And the hymn does not remain at the table. It turns the toast into a history — of suppression, survival, revolt, and victory. How that history is organised is the first thing this chapter must decide, and the deciding will cost it something.

## 16.2 What Carducci Said He Made

The genesis is documented in the poet's letters, and they are unusually explicit. To Giuseppe Chiarini, on 15 October 1863: **"Ora eccoti Satana"** — here, now, is Satan — with a definition in Carducci's own hand: his Satan is what the ascetics and the priests had excommunicated — human contestation, resistance to authority, matter and form ennobled — and, in the same letter, an admission that the piece would need revision.[139] To the same correspondent on 12 April 1864, a boundary every later reading must respect: the hymn is anti-mystical, anti-ascetic, anti-medieval — **not simply anti-Christian**.[140]

The sources Carducci himself named are on record too, and only at the width of his notice. In his retrospective prose he points to Michelet, Heine, Quinet, and Proudhon — **le opere**, the works, with no title or passage recoverable from the notice itself. Proposals that the debt runs specifically through **La Sorcière** or the **Elementargeister** remain scholarly conjectures, and the often-felt resemblance to Leopardi is exactly that: a resemblance the documents do not convert into a source.[141]

## 16.3 A Structure That Did Not Survive the Text

The governing plan for this chapter proposed a strong structural hypothesis: that the hymn formally stages three equivalent returns of one irreducible residue — inversion, perversion, recognition — three waves of the same excommunicated force breaking against the same wall. The hypothesis was tested against the poem and the specialist scholarship secured for this chapter, and it lost. The evidence does not support a formal triad, and this book prints the defeat rather than concealing it.[142]

The strongest available account divides the poem once, not three times. Manitta places the large division at verse 105: the first hundred-odd verses retain the structure and elements of a **brindisi**, a drinking-toast with its ironies and provocations; verses 105–200 become a serious ideological-historical movement. This chapter adopts that bipartite reading as its principal scholarly guide — as an attributed reading, not an uncontested fact about the poem.[143] The reported layering of the composition counsels the same modesty from outside the text: a poem whose final quatrains arrived two years after its improvised nucleus weakens any inference to a single pre-planned architecture, without disproving one.

What the second movement contains, the evidence does support: pagan and material vitality surviving suppression through classical memory; resistance stirring inside the monastic world itself; Abelard and Heloise; the reformers' line — Wycliffe, Hus, Savonarola, Luther; then reason, science, and, gathering the whole movement, the locomotive.[144]

The defeat of the triad is not an embarrassment to be minimised. It is symmetric with this book's other losses — the public-dependence claim cut down in Part II, the semantic arrow cut down at **religio**, "unoccupiable" restricted in Part III — and it demonstrates the same thing on the book's own founding conjecture for this chapter: a documented non-closure is a result.

## 16.4 The Train at the End

The train is the poem's own image — a beautiful and terrible monster unchained, crossing lands — and in **this** poem it is the rhetoric of victorious progress. Roda reads the final train as the culminating emblem of modernity; Manitta's terminal reading is explicitly triumphal — **"Satana ha vinto,"** Satan has won, in the qualified secular sense that reason and liberty have won.[145] No specialist source consulted for this chapter makes unresolved recurrence the poem's terminal proposition.

One discipline follows immediately. Carducci wrote other railway poems later, and in them the train darkens into something existential — an **empio mostro**, an impious monster. Those trains are **later**, and the difference between them and this one is Roda's own finding: no single, stable Carduccian railway symbolism may be constructed across the gap, and nothing from the later poems may be read back into 1863–65 to reopen a triumphal ending the hymn itself closes.

## 16.5 The Quarrel After the Poem

The hymn's public career can be told at the width of the surviving reports and no further. Its scandal came in 1869, when **Il Popolo** republished it on the eve of the Vatican Council — an event this book reports through Carducci's own retrospective notice and the named scholarship, with every claim about the newspaper page's layout or print run left unmade, because the evidence does not reach them.[146]

The reception was immediate, and its differences matter more than its noise. Quirico Filopanti objected on republican and deist grounds — an objection from within the anticlerical camp — and Carducci answered him; **Il Diritto** and **L'Unità Cattolica** answered from opposing sides; unauthorised reprints appeared at Palermo, Florence, and Spoleto.[147] And the quarrel outlived its occasion. In the decades after Carducci's death, the hymn was claimed and reclaimed: a militant-secular reading preserved it as a weapon; Catholic polemic kept it as an accusation; national-monumental selections needed the poet without the scandal; and Pascoli attempted to gather **Satana** and the **Ave Maria** into one reconciled national voice.[148] What this history establishes is contest and attempted reconciliation. It does not establish that the text itself caused the contest, or that no reconciliation ever succeeded. What can be said is narrower, and enough: no single settlement represented in this history exhausts the poem's documented uses.

## 16.6 What “Residue” Can Still Mean

The chapter’s governing concept survives the defeat of its structural map — but only in a narrowed office, and the narrowing must be visible. “Demonic residue” names neither a hidden object in the poem nor a fact discovered in the archives of its reception. It names a question this book brings to the text, and a pattern the reception displays.

The question first. Carducci’s conclusion is victory, not remainder. What this book asks — as its own comparative test, read through its own distinction between finite goods and the grammar that gathers them — is whether the victory-language domesticates everything it collects. The hymn affirms matter, love, dissent, reason, and science **under the adversary’s name**; its salute, its conflicts, and its avenging diction keep the affirmation indexed to what it overthrows. Read through this book’s instruments, that is a reactive grammar of affirmation: the finite declared worthy in the vocative of its old accuser.

Two things must then be kept apart, because the poem does not divide itself for us. The goods the hymn praises — the love of Abelard and Heloise, the monk’s insurgent thought, the patient work of inquiry — can be **analytically** distinguished from the adversarial grammar that gathers them, and the distinction matters: the rhetoric’s reactivity does not make the goods themselves reactive by nature; nothing in a kiss or a proof is constitutively anti-transcendent. But that distinction is this chapter’s analysis, not a second voice spoken by the poem. The hymn does not stage the division, and it does not answer the test twice. Within this exhibit, an affirmation of the finite that needs no adversary is **conceivable** — and not instantiated.

So the test this book has carried since its first chapters — can finite lives and modalities be affirmed as worthy without depending on opposition to transcendence? — leaves this poem open. Its contrary is exact: an affirmation with no adversary in the vocative, no counter-cult, no worth conferred by opposition. Whether such an affirmation exists, and where, is not a question one hymn can settle. Chapter 17 receives it as a question — not as an achievement this chapter has already found.

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[136] The report is Bonfatti's, citing Carducci's collected prose (EN XXIV 142–43): a September 1863 improvised nucleus, the final six quatrains added November 1865. The statement stands, permanently in this edition, at the scholar's width.

[137] Text of record: Giosuè Carducci, *A Satana*, in *Opere* (Edizione Nazionale), OEN II 377–385; direct publication witness *A Satana: Inno di Enotrio Romano* (Pistoia, 1865), title-page identity verified from the public Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze/Internet Archive scan; no full collation is claimed in this edition, and no claim here depends on one. All translations are ours from the OEN Italian, controlled independently against E. A. Sewall (1892) and F. Tribe (1921).

[138] OEN II 377, vv. 1–4; translation ours.

[139] Carducci to Giuseppe Chiarini, 15 October 1863, LEN III 377–78.

[140] Carducci to Chiarini, 12 April 1864, LEN IV 49.

[141] OEN XXIV 113. The *Sorcière*/*Elementargeister* proposals are carried in the scholarship, not the notice.

[142] The hypothesis, its trial, and its rejection are recorded in full in the Trial Record (Dossier 16), together with the adjudication's evidence base and the disclosed editorial waiver under which it was closed.

[143] Angelo Manitta, "Modernità e anticlericalismo dell'*Inno a Satana*," in *Carducci contemporaneo* (2012 [2013]), 77–102.

[144] The sequence is visible in the text at OEN II 377–385; its large-scale interpretation follows Manitta's reading and remains attributed to it.

[145] Vittorio Roda, "Riflessioni sul Carducci 'ferroviario'," *Quaderni carducciani* 1.1 (2024), 1–12, esp. 1, 3–4 (DOI 10.6092/issn.3035-1936/20314); Manitta, art. cit., at the terminal reading.

[146] OEN XXIV, with the named scholarship; the newspaper's layout and the episode's print history were not recovered and are not claimed.

[147] Reception as reported at OEN XXIV: Filopanti's objection and Carducci's answer; *Il Diritto*; *L'Unità Cattolica*; the unauthorised reprints. No defensible circulation total survives.

[148] Alessandro Merci, *Giosue Carducci nella cultura primonovecentesca* (doctoral thesis, Università di Bologna, 2015), esp. ch. IV, "Tra Satana e l'Ave Maria," 224–257. Voices known only through Merci's synthesis are cited at that width.

# Chapter 17 — The Finite That Remained

## 17.1 What the Trials Returned

A synthesis earns no right to improve the evidence it inherits. This last chapter therefore begins with the sentence the whole volume has earned, and it is not the sentence a tidier book would want:

> **Across the episodes, the same questions recur, but the findings do not. Some forms authorise or terminate locally; some reroute, restrain, release, or refuse; some candidates remain undecided because the evidence does not test all three archic marks.**

Told Part by Part, the return looks like this. The ancient economies of Part II gave one sacred-civic tether at a bounded institutional grain — consecration genuinely constraining fiscal use, in dated practice — while the Roman divinised-ruler question stayed undecided at the coins' own grain; the grand claim that coinage founded exchange among strangers came back smaller than itself, carriage rather than origin; and sanctuary finance showed real answer-offices while yielding only part of its final incidence. Part III left the temple action historically untried and the choice between severance and repair undecided in the texts; found in the Caesar saying a bounded refusal rather than a doctrine; and cut "unoccupiable" down to a position never successfully occupied **in the tried material**. Part IV returned both of its semantic-succession claims as less than claimed — dated normative etymologising, a double administration — and left the Constantinian configuration exactly where the evidence leaves it: successive terminal acts demonstrated inside a politically non-final controversy, immunity untested, the archic classification open. Part V found several detachments and several tethers where one great untethering had been alleged; returned restraint and release as source-bounded results while leaving practice and incidence widely untried; and left exchangeability before the archic seat undecided — neither installed nor acquitted. Part VI returned three restrictions at three different documentary grains. And Chapter 16 rejected its own governing conjecture in public, leaving the question of a non-reactive affirmation of the finite open.

Two features of that table are findings, not failures, and they must be counted honestly. Many registered questions returned **no trial** — the temple event, eleven separately recorded monetary lines, a broad band of practice, enforcement, reception, recourse, incidence, and performance questions in the later Parts. Each marks where the registered evidence stopped; none describes how the world is; and they cannot be totalled into a percentage, because an episode, a family of lines, and a single source-grain question are not the same unit of counting. The open lines are equally exact — Roman divinisation, severance or repair, the Constantinian classification, exchangeability, the restraint family's joint status, affirmation after Carducci — and this chapter closes none of them. The close cannot add together what the cases did not establish separately.

## 17.2 A Sequence Not Yet Proven

What this Part inherited as its premise can now be stated only as what it is: a sequence for later histories to test.

> **Where legitimacy is withdrawn from finite life and transferred to a promoted form, test for evacuation → residue → inverted worship.**

The volume did not establish that sequence as one history. What it holds are non-cumulative materials at unlike grains: one text whose promise never ends, and one programme that ended; four elements of an old administrative form in captured lifecycle pages, with the fifth element absent and the costs only partly locatable; one poem that affirms finite goods in the vocative of the adversary — on this book's own avowed reading. These findings do not combine into a completed instance of the sequence, and they establish no recurrence, no transmission, no descent.

So the sequence carries three limits on its face. No full case was demonstrated. The volume surveyed neither secular affirmation nor technological administration nor sacred evacuation as general classes, so nothing here says how common any of this is. And the arrows state what a later trial would have to establish — they confer no causation by notation. The sequence survives as a question sharpened to the point where it could be tried. That is what this volume can honestly bequeath.

## 17.3 Two Non-Archic Seats

The chapter's governing sentence must be revised to the width the trials earned, and here it is:

> **Nothing in this record shows the sacred to be the property of a promoted form. The two non-archic seats inherited from Volume I — the perimetralised finite who and the ownerless manner or condition — remain distinct, and neither commands.**

The first clause has finite pressure behind it. Wherever this history allowed final incidence to be located, it reached finite lives: named defendants and debtors, borrowers and guarantors, sanctioned office-holders, litigating parties, workers. And wherever the record stopped earlier — at a treasury, a corporation, a public fund, a legal charge, an institutional liability, a collective assessment, an unresolved chain of attribution — this book stopped with it. Both results stand. It would be as false to convert an aggregate allocation into a named finite cost as to conclude that no finite cost existed because the documents ceased before reaching it.

The two seats must then be held exactly. The perimetralised finite who — a completed finite living history under indelible having-been, addressable though no longer receiving — is not thereby an office from which present answers are due. Someone's being a **who** and something's being the **place where an answer comes due** are different questions with different answers: a living who may be such a place for a particular answer; an institution may be such a place without being anyone; and the dead do not become answer-offices by being irreplaceably themselves. The first seat names irreducible finite having-been, not a new sovereign answerability.[149] And the ownerless manner or condition — common, repeatable, no one's property — is likewise no proprietor, claimant, judge, or final answerer. It issues no programme and licenses no counter-cult. Calling these two structures "seats" names their irreducibility; it hands neither of them authorisation, termination, or immunity.

And then the historical conclusion, at its exact width. No registered episode in this volume established one promoted form jointly holding all three archic marks — authorising the whole field, terminating its questions of right, and standing immune from the interrogation it applies. That is the finding. It is not the same proposition as "the seat was empty": immunity was often simply untried, several classifications remain open, and the absence of an established occupant is not a negative discovery about history. **This record awards the seat to no occupant; it does not prove universal vacancy.**

## 17.4 Affirmation Without an Enemy

Chapter 16 hands this chapter one question, and hands it forward open. The hymn supports a reading of finite goods affirmed through a grammar indexed to what the affirmation opposes; the goods can be distinguished, analytically, from that grammar; and the poem does not thereby supply a historical instance of affirmation without an enemy.

What such an affirmation would have to avoid, and what it might attempt, the two volumes' vocabulary can nevertheless state. **Wonder without command** would attend to the ownerless condition without extracting an imperative from it. **Keeping without proprietor** would maintain the routes and conditions on which finite lives depend, without making the common itself a claimant or an owner. **Repair without erasure** would answer a documented failure at a finite place while preserving attribution, the reality of the damage, and the standing of those affected. None of these forms requires an adversary, and none needs the seat.

Does history already contain them? This volume met bounded neighbours, not completed instances: a sanctuary administration that could be investigated without ceasing to be itself; a lending institution with charges, subsidies, guarantees, controls, and located offices of answer; a programme that ended on its own announced terms and published what it had learned. But each of these was tried here as administration, restraint, answer-location, or termination — none was tried as **affirmation**, and this book cannot reclassify its own evidence after the fact. So the contrary stands open, and stands exactly: a practice or text that affirms finite lives and modalities with no adversary in the vocative, no counter-cult, no worth conferred by opposition, and no unlimited programme immunised against bounded failure. That trial was not run here. It is now specified well enough to be run.

## 17.5 What History Gives Back

Volume I lent this history its instruments: the three-mark test, the who-doctrine, definitive perimetralisation, the ownerless condition, the distinction between carriage and capture. The history now hands them back — not proved, but exercised, and dated.

What the ethos receives: a record of local authorisations and terminations, differentiated offices, reversals, restrictions, refusals, and honest evidential stops; a history stated from end to end without ever needing a composite foldmaster to explain anything; established tethers, releases, refusals, and institutional answers attached to dated instruments — while alleged severances, repairs, transmissions, and immunities remain open wherever the evidence did not reach them; finite whos bearing the costs wherever final incidence could be located, and the nearer allocation retained wherever it could not. And what the ethos is not handed matters as much: no completed history of secularisation; no proof that modern institutions repeat Constantine; no single untethering; no installation or acquittal of exchangeability; no full evacuation–residue–inversion history; no achieved secular affirmation; and no proof that the archic seat was vacant. It receives a method exercised under loss — a method that cost this book its own preferred architecture more than once and printed each loss — a field of dated restrictions and openings, and a sharper set of questions than it began with.

The proper close is therefore not the sentence this chapter was once planned to write. It is this: **no occupant was established by the trials this volume ran, and no untried mark will be filled by synthesis.**

## 17.6 Scholion — An Arrival Refused Admission

One event in this volume's own making belongs in its published record, because it concerns how the argument was kept honest.

During the drafting interval before Chapter 11, on 9 August 2026, an authorial hypothesis complex arrived from outside the registered sample and was publicly dated in the **Imperium–Actus Arrival Declaration**.[150] In one compressed sentence: it proposes a four-station grant-and-revocation history — political distinctness, granted existence, calculative election, processual deployment — joined by an institutional hinge and a theological-transcription hinge, with subordinate comparative questions. That synopsis records what arrived; it states no finding and instructs no reading of the chapters before or after it.

The volume's deposited emergence protocol did not open it. The protocol's first condition — independent emergence from a registered primary episode — could not be satisfied, because the complex arrived authorially and outside the sample; nothing entered the operative register, which closes empty. That non-opening is not a failure to use the protocol. It is the protocol refusing the most tempting shortcut offered to it: the author's own idea, arriving mid-volume, asking to be found in the evidence.

The chapters written after the arrival were drafted under declared knowledge of it, with steering audits requiring that no reconstruction, emphasis, contrary, or verdict move toward or against the complex; those audits live in the volume's Trial Record.[151] The complex itself was routed to the next volume by an explicit authorial ruling — a governance act, not a protocol operation — and one firewall sentence governs the crossing verbatim: nothing tried there retro-modifies this volume's registered verdicts, and this volume's remaining chapters were drafted as if the next did not yet exist.

One question passes onward, and only as a question: whether an empty seat kept by the answerable can be told, and by what, from a centre empty because no one is needed. This volume has neither earned nor applied a criterion for deciding between those two vacancies. It ends, deliberately, before that question — with a seat awarded to no one, and the difference between refusal and absence still to be tried.

[149] The doctrine received here is Volume I's: the two irreducible seats (Part VII and Conclusion), the who-doctrine, and the orthogonality of who and answer-locus (Final Doctrine V21 §§8, 13). A living who may be the indexed home of a particular non-forwardable answer; an institution may be such a home without being anyone; perimetralisation creates no present answer-office.

[150] *Arrival Declaration — The Imperium–Actus Hypothesis* V1.10 and *Integration Ruling and Amendment Pass*, 9 August 2026, deposited at DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21860046 (concept DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21860045); Declaration SHA-256 f31642f80e6fe16f5424a88c9813d2629c623c8b33a6e94eb1fbcb44f8e62411; Integration Ruling SHA-256 e879e126d234bb94534b432e45fe82128f021403f5e697658e37551e71fc8958.

[151] The declared-knowledge and steering-audit register for the affected chapters, together with the volume's complete verdict, collateral, and closing tables, is deposited in the Trial Record: 10.5281/zenodo.21877854.

# Conclusion — The Seat Is Not Awarded

This history opened with a woman at a screen, asking two questions that turned out to be one: **who pays?** and **who answers?** It closes without adding an eighth Part, because what remains is not another trial but the statement of what the trials, taken together, did and did not establish.

The archic office is structural. Every economy of the sacred this book examined — the minted, the kept, the bound, the released, the promoted, the sung — generated the same temptation: that something in the arrangement should come to authorise the whole field, terminate the question of right, and stand immune from the interrogation it applies to everything else. The temptation is not an accident of one age or one institution: across the particular line this book sampled — and this book claims only its sampled line — the candidacy recurred wherever a sacred economy joined promoted standing to administered cost. Whether every sacred economy makes the temptation available is a formal conjecture the sample can illustrate and cannot prove; twenty-five centuries of dated recurrence entitle us to the recurrence, not to the universal.

The occupations are historical. Every candidacy was posed within dated material: some promotions, contests, and costs were demonstrated, and elsewhere one or more of those terms remained open or untried. Consecration was enacted and argued over in named assemblies. A divinised name was minted, received, and disputed. A classification was made law, enforced, reversed, and enforced again. A prohibition was drafted, circumvented, adjudicated, relaxed. A promise was published on a stated day and a programme ended on another. Nothing in this volume behaved like a destiny; everything behaved like an institution — proposable, administrable, contestable, datable. And the dating is asymmetric in a way the record forces us to keep: the tethers, releases, refusals, and institutional answers this book established all attach to dated instruments; the severances, repairs, transmissions, and immunities that were alleged of the same history remain open wherever the evidence stopped. A history in which the restraints are better documented than the escapes is itself a finding.

The cost, where it could finally be located, was finite. Named performers, named accused, named debtors, named borrowers, named workers: wherever this history's record ran all the way down, it ended at finite lives. And wherever it did not — at a treasury, a fund, a corporation, a disputed chain of attribution — this book stopped with it and said so, because converting an aggregate allocation into a named finite cost would be the same sin as denying the cost altogether. Where the record reached final incidence, it reached finite lives; where it stopped earlier, the nearer allocation remains controlling — and the tracing, not the slogan, is the work.

The fold has no foldmaster. At no point in seventeen chapters did the evidence require a hidden subject, a composite author, or a conspiracy to explain what routes, offices, records, incentives, permissions, and defaults explained better. Beneficiaries were not thereby authors; occupants were not thereby founders. That is a discipline and an economy of explanation, not proof that no undisclosed intention or coordination existed: no reconstruction in this volume required a hidden composite subject to explain what dated agents, offices, records, incentives, permissions, and defaults already explained.

The hyperbolic is not the enemy; the danger begins where its administration claims the seat. The hyperbolic entered this volume as an instrument, and in texts of demand or promise; Chapter 16 supplied a different question — whether finite goods can be affirmed without borrowing an adversary's name. Neither question makes the hyperbolic itself the enemy. What the trials interrogated was never the register but its promotion: carriage is a sedimented fold, and the archic fold begins only at documented promotion into terminal, immune authority. That distinction, built as an instrument in Part III, survived every subsequent trial that touched it.

One asymmetry in the evidence must be acknowledged before the verdict is read, because it belongs to the verdict's honesty. The three marks are not equally visible in archives. Authorisation and termination leave acts — decrees, sentences, entries, closures, dated instruments — while immunity becomes archivally visible chiefly where contestation was attempted and its fate recorded; an uncontested seat and an uncontestable one leave much the same silence. The conjunctive test therefore tends, by the nature of archives rather than of the world, toward openness at its third mark, and this book's open classifications are in part the signature of that asymmetry. The discipline cuts both ways — the silence converts to neither immunity nor answerability, and no seat was presumed immune from its grandeur — but the reader should weigh the unawarded seat with the asymmetry in view: it is the honest output of a test that refused to let its hardest mark be presumed in either direction.

And so to the seat. Here the book's own test dictates the exact width of its conclusion, and the width was fixed in Chapter 2 before a single case was heard. The archic office is a structural temptation; candidate occupations are historical; their costs become exact only where the record reaches finite lives. **No registered episode in this volume established one promoted form jointly authorising the field, terminating right, and standing immune. The seat is therefore awarded to no occupant by this record. That is not proof that it was empty: every open and untried mark remains open and untried.** What can be refused is not history but promotion — by keeping routes answerable, locating finite cost where the evidence permits, and refusing to make either the finite who or the ownerless common command.

One sentence of aspiration may follow the verdict, provided it is marked as aspiration and not smuggled in as a finding. Whether the seat remains unawarded is not a fact history has settled; it is a work that institutions, offices, courts, congregations, registries, and finite whos either keep doing or stop doing — the unglamorous plural labour of rendered accounts, dated instruments, answerable routes, and refusals that can name their grounds. This book cannot promise that the work continues. It can only show, at trial length and against its own preferred architecture where necessary, that the work has been done before, by nameable people, on documented days — and that every claim to have transcended the need for it returned from trial as something smaller than the claim.

The two questions from the first page can now be given their final form. **Who pays?** — finite whos, wherever the record reaches its end, and the record should be made to reach further. **Who answers?** — that is the question the archic temptation exists to abolish, and the question this book, by ending without an award, deliberately leaves standing. The difference between a seat kept empty by the answerable and a centre empty because no one is needed has not been decided here. It is the first question of the next volume. This one ends where its evidence ends: the trials were run, the losses were printed, the findings stayed mixed — and the seat is not awarded.[152]

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[152] The complete verdict tables, the collateral and closing records, the version history, and the record of every restriction this book's instruments suffered are deposited in the Trial Record 10.5281/zenodo.21877854. The controlling proposition of this Conclusion is printed and sourced there, together with the superseded architecture it replaced.